

# **Evaluation of the Rockefeller Foundation's work in African Agriculture Resilience and Land-based Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction**

## **Final Report**

Submitted by



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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAR	African Agricultural Resilience
ACCCRN	Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network
ACCRA	Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance
AD	Associate Director
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
ARC	Africa Risk Capacity (programme of WFP and AU)
ARI	Agricultural Research Institute
ATPS	African Technology Policy Studies Network
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CAFF	Climate-smart Agricultural Finance Facility
CCA	Climate Change Adaption
CCAFS	Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CGIAR)
CCI	Clinton Climate Initiative
CCR	Climate Change Resilience
CDKN	The Climate and Development Knowledge Network
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CENA	Climate Exchange Network for Africa
CEP	The Center for Effective Philanthropy
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COP	Conference of the Parties
CPR	Land-based Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction Initiative
CSRD	Climate Smart Rural Development
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EIAR	Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research
FSD	Financial Sector Deepening Trust
FTE	Full Time (Staff) Equivalent
GIS	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
GTZ	German Development Cooperation – now GIZ
ICPAC	IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre
IDS	Institute of Development Studies (UK)

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KARI	Kenya Agriculture Research Institute
KM	Knowledge Management
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification
NARO	National Agricultural Research Organisation (Uganda)
NCAS	National Carbon Accounting System
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NMAE	National Meteorological Agency of Ethiopia
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PI	Primary Implementer
RBM	Results-Based Management
REC	Regional Economic Community of the AU
REDD	Reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
RF	Rockefeller Foundation
RUFORUM	Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture
SCIP	Strategic Climate Institutions Programme (DFID)
SEI	Stockholm Environment Institute
TA	Technical Assistance
UCCR	Urban climate change resilience
UCCRP	Urban Climate Change Resilience Partnership
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WAC	World Agroforestry Centre
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WMO	World Meteorological Association
WWF	Worldwide Fund for Nature

# Summary

## **Purpose and scope**

The purposes of this evaluation are several: to learn from the experience of implementation of the African Agriculture Resilience (AAR) component of the Climate Change Resilience Initiative and the Land-based Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction Initiative (CPR); to guide the planning and design of the proposed Climate Smart Rural Development (CSR) Initiative; accountability to the Rockefeller Foundation's President and Board of Trustees; a contribution as a public good to knowledge; and to extend the learning from this evaluation to RF grantees in the fields of AAR and CPR.

A total of 57 grants were reviewed, spanning the period from 2007 to April 2011. Close to four out of every five dollars granted under AAR went directly to work with agricultural research institutions or to support 'experimental' or innovative work. The majority of the AAR grants and money granted were allocated to primary implementers (PI) based in African countries. In contrast, 71% of the CPR grants and 86% of the grant money was allocated to PI based in the USA. Over 40% of the AAR grants were made to organizations in Kenya which had the effect of creating a greater 'critical mass' of effort compared with neighboring countries that received few grants.

## **Theories of change**

Any development intervention has a theory or model behind it that explains how the intervention will lead to a desired outcome. A well-developed theory of change can help stakeholders reach consensus about how change is supposed to occur; provides a causal model that can guide implementation, monitoring and evaluation; and highlight assumptions and necessary conditions. Theories of change were not developed in advance of the two grant streams so the evaluation team retrofitted the grants into theories reproduced in Annex 7.

Two interesting issues arise from that exercise. Progress towards grant outcomes involves interaction across different type of grants: support to agricultural research institutions; innovative experiments; and supporting institutions. A large part of that interaction is treated as assumptions in the individual grant plans and grants are not planned or managed to enable the interaction to take place. Two 'missing' outcomes were revealed, concerning the roles of extension and dissemination, and the enabling environment, neither of which are the subject of current grants. In the light of these gaps, without further work the grants by themselves will contribute little towards their stated outcomes.

## **Grants under AAR**

The main AAR grants were grouped under three headings: support to research institutions, support for experiments and support to policy and other organizations. In addition, the Foundation gave grants for four scoping studies which were highly relevant and produced information that directly influenced the RF approach and AGRA's own strategy. But neither the studies themselves, nor a summary of their findings was used by the Foundation to inform other grantees or development partners. This was a missed opportunity. The work done could usefully have been promoted more strongly and shared with other development partners to inform mutual strategies.

The Rockefeller Foundation's investments in research, conducted through collaborations of capable organizations, provide promise of showcase opportunities for solutions at scale. Each of these innovative initiatives is not necessarily a first of their kind, nor is RF the only donor, but these are all pioneering in the contexts in which they operate. The experiments too demonstrate the replicability of innovative concepts, and reinforce initiative-wide lessons in the value of professionally managed projects pursuing clearly described objectives and outcomes. Grants under both headings reflect the ambitions of the Foundation to be an innovative catalyst.

What is clear from the key grants for policy and climate support is that the issues and challenges they are addressing are not the kind that can be assessed, addressed and resolved within the space of a relatively small short-term grant. A two-year project cycle period is a challenging and limited amount of time in which to set up new pathways and interventions to develop new institutional arrangements between climate information providers and African agricultural research organizations. Some of the existing AAR interventions are likely to develop evidence and lessons that have important policy implications. Further value could be added through additional documentation and dissemination and use of the knowledge and experience generated.

### **Grants under CPR**

A number of the grants under CPR have shown positive results. There is evidence of impressive outputs and some evidence of higher level outcomes across CPR grantees. But overall, the body of grants is less coherent than under AAR. It is difficult to assess efficiency and effectiveness, not least because there is little in the way of strategy to indicate how the grants are intended to link together. The approach to the CPR grants lacks the exploration and testing of ideas, identification of risks, and the development of innovative solutions that would have been undertaken if the initiative had progressed through the standard RF programming process.

In this work, the Foundation has not yet been able to define a coherent and concise niche where it has comparative advantage. Influencing carbon market policy is a hugely complex task which is dependent upon multiple factors and actors. Whereas RF has been able to demonstrate success with new financing and implementation models it is less clear that RF can make a difference at the level of international policy, especially within the three to five year initiative life-cycle currently favored.

### **Grant management**

The Rockefeller Foundation is undergoing a process of change from being a traditional philanthropic grant-maker towards becoming a results-based impact-driven, developmental catalyst and innovator. In addition to its geography-specific and sectoral areas of focus, RF is also pursuing strategic synergies across and beyond initiatives. Feedback and learning from areas of intervention are increasingly processed within RF in a structured and strategic manner.

In terms of the aid effectiveness principles of ‘alignment’, ‘harmonization’ and ‘managing for results’, the organization-wide changes within RF are moving operations towards globally acknowledged best practice in addressing poverty, inequality and the promotion of growth.

However, this evaluation takes place at a time when the impact of these change processes, coupled with the prolonged vacancy of the Associate Director post in the Nairobi office, have provided considerable challenges to management and strategic direction of the AAR/CPR components.

While the New York-based Associate Director (AD) and Managing Director have provided leadership and made significant contributions, the loss of the Nairobi AD set limits on the added value that RF could bring to AAR/CPR. RF engagement with grantees is reported by grantees to have been limited. The RF Nairobi office is perceived in a range of different ways by grantees, with some experiencing it as absent and unresponsive, while others saying they appreciate the ongoing contact and forwarding of relevant information.

Grantee reporting is highly uneven in quality, and in some cases found to be absent or less frequently submitted than stipulated in the letter of grant. It appears that the grant reporting process is not used as a management and learning tool by either the grantee or RF. A number of grantees expressed doubts that anyone reads the reports submitted. One contributory factor is the combination of large number and small size of AAR grants compared, for example, to ACCCRN, which results in higher workloads and lower staff efficiency.

Despite progress towards a coherent results framework, overall the AAR/CPR projects do not demonstrate a consistent approach or methodology in their design and definition of deliverables. Most grants do not articulate a results chain in any detail and the challenge is how to shape and adjust grantee and grant-maker practices retrospectively towards the discipline of planning and managing for results.

### **Evaluation criteria**

The evaluation was undertaken within the framework of internationally-recognised evaluation criteria. A summary of judgements against those is given in Chapter 7.

**Relevance:** Although the grants are relevant in the broadest sense to the challenges facing African agriculture, the scope and ambition of what the Foundation hoped to achieve in the fields of climate change and agriculture for food security in Africa may have been over ambitious. A more narrowly defined focus based on Rockefeller’s comparative advantage as a ‘risk-taking venture philanthropist’ would have allowed the Foundation to define a manageable grant initiative with relevance directly to the Foundation.

**Effectiveness:** Grantees across both AAR and CPR have provided numerous examples of successful grant activities and outputs. These activities and outputs have been delivered across all AAR and CPR outcome areas as set out the two results frameworks. Generally, the outputs delivered have tended to be less ambitious than those set out in the original grant planning documents owing to a range of risks, gaps and assumptions which were not explicitly addressed at the proposal preparation stage. Progress towards achieving AAR and CPR outcomes is much harder to assess. Neither the Foundation nor the grantees themselves have the monitoring, evaluation and learning systems in place to be able to credibly define and assess outcome-level results.

**Efficiency:** It is too early to assess the efficiency of the two initiatives relative to the results delivered. Process efficiency in grant selection and management is low and has led to the Foundation not being able to effectively administer, monitor progress, engage and give feedback to the individual grantees within AAR and CPR. A relatively modest increase in management resources would considerably improve AAR/CPR efficiency relative to the results delivered.

**Sustainability:** At present the level of sustainability is unclear and dependent on a number of factors. Collaborative initiatives, especially those engaging in complex environments require flexible time-frames to enable multiple actors to engage and interact and for their trust-based approaches to flourish. RF’s current policy is seen by many informants as being too short-term for what needs to be done.

**Impact/Influence:** The evaluation has identified a number of good examples where Rockefeller can claim to have had influence over policy or an impact in terms of enhanced capacity. However, it is not possible to equate these individual examples with systematic and credible impact or influence and to a large extent it is too early to claim meaningful impact within the two to three year life-cycle of the AAR/ CPR grants.

### **Lessons**

A number of lessons have been identified from the evaluation. The key messages are reproduced here with. More detail can be found in Chapter 8.

1. The complexity and vast scope of the African agricultural terrain that RF has chosen to engage with suggests that greater added value can be achieved through engaging “deeper” with “fewer” groupings of mutually reinforcing interventions.
2. The work of the Foundation in AAR and CPR is highly relevant in helping develop results from adaptation experiments and has the potential to link with work on mitigation.



### ***Results orientation***

3. Grantee reporting is weak and is not used as a management and learning tool by either the grantee or RF.
4. Additional grant management resources are necessary if an effective results-based management approach is to be implemented, more so in the emerging trend towards supporting collaborative grants across institutions.
5. Strategic soaks are an effective innovation to help construct, mediate and guide initiative direction.
6. RF grants need to be managed as a coherent portfolio if the benefits from each individual intervention are to contribute towards outcomes.
7. A two-year project cycle period is a challenging and limited amount of time in which to set up new pathways and interventions to develop new institutional arrangements between climate information providers and African agricultural research organisations.
8. Gap filling to identify new grants across the outcome areas has been a mixed success and needs to be based on a sound investigation of contextual and institutional positioning of the individual grantee.
9. It is possible that relatively small individual short-term grants introduce an unintended bias towards activities already within the sphere of the grantee's control, and discourage the development of new collaborative investments whose time demands and outcomes are uncertain.
10. In a donor crowded environment there is significant value in investing in donor coordination and leveraging of combined and coordinated resources in pursuit of common objectives.

### ***Agricultural Research Institutions***

11. Collaborative initiatives require patience with more flexible time-frames to enable locally owned trust-based approaches to flourish. RF's current two-year granting strategy within a five-year focus is seen by many informants as being too short-term for what needs to be done.

### ***Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction***

12. It is evident that CPR lacks the exploration and testing of ideas, identification of risks, and the development of innovative solutions that would have been undertaken if the initiative had progressed through the standard RF programming process including a Search phase rather than being approved directly as an Initiative in Development. However, given that the goal for CPR as an Initiative in Development relates to learning and hypothesis testing (rather than impact for Initiatives in Execution), there is evidence of a number of impressive outputs and some evidence of progress towards higher level outcomes across CPR grantees.
13. Whereas RF has been able to demonstrate success with new financing and implementation models it is less clear that RF can really make a difference at the level of international policy, especially within the three to five year initiative life-cycle.

### **Recommendations**

A number of formative recommendations are made, taking into account both RF as a transforming organisation, and the context of African agriculture and climate change. These recommendations are offered in support of the vision of a future CSRD initiative which can achieve and demonstrate results and impact from an array of strategically selected and managed grants. They are reproduced in full from Chapter 9.

### ***Looking forward to CSRD***

The scope of change interventions under CSRD is broad. Positive lessons have emerged from the experience with AAR and CPR. With the exception of work in support of international policy under CPR, there is no evidence to support the closure of any strands of work, nor have major gaps appeared, but there is clear evidence that grants would be more effective if grantees collaborate more and grants are constructed under a more coherent strategy.

- R1. Starting with the development of a theory of change for the CSRD, it is recommended senior RF management articulate a grant strategy that brings stronger connections, mutual support and added value to the programme as a whole. To this end, the strategy of continuing support at small scale in each of Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda needs to be reconsidered and justified in terms of contribution to outcomes. More effective progress might be achieved from engaging more deeply with fewer partners. If programmes are continued in a number of countries, consideration should be given to developing separate results frameworks for country programmes.
- R2. Where CSRD outcomes are dependent upon cross or inter-sectoral collaboration, RF should ensure the provision of resources – either through its own offices, or through a grantee – to enable the necessary coordination and support.
- R3. With a view to improving sustainability, it is recommended RF invest in sufficient human resources capacity to develop a granting relationship with organisations, rather than through selected individuals into organisations.
- R4. It is recommended that the Foundation builds on emerging results from work on mitigation by small farmers under CPR and continue to meld that work with comparable work on adaptation under CSRD.
- R5. Experience from the AAR suggests that work should continue with innovative experiments and agricultural research institutes, but that grant programmes need clearer objectives and stronger links with other programmes, and especially with national meteorological organizations. RF will need to engage for longer than the current two- to three-year horizon and at sufficient scale to stimulate real change from within and between the grantee organisations.
- R6. It is recommended that grants in support of policy influence and networks be required to develop clear results frameworks that articulate how outputs will contribute to outcomes, demonstrate links with other grants and report against those frameworks as part of the grant cycle. These frameworks will be strengthened if they are able to incorporate the role of RECs as important regional platforms for developing key policy building blocks.

### ***Grant management and learning***

The next recommendation repeats a recommendation from the ACCCRN evaluation and concerns improving the quality of objectives and approach to implementation by grantees.

- R7. As a point of departure in a process of transforming the nature of its grant-making, it is recommended that Foundation senior management and the grants office review the content of grant letters to ensure they articulate and develop grantees' ownership of initiative objectives. They also need to ensure grantees are obliged, where appropriate, to collaborate with other initiative grantees in their delivery, paying heed to performance against outputs and outcomes rather than activity-level deliverables. This may include considering how financial resources can be better allocated to results rather than activity deliverables, and payment tranches linked to real performance.

- R8. RF should strengthen the provision of in-house or contracted technical expertise based in the region to give support to design and implementation of grants or groups of grants. The availability of content and process expertise is an important measure of added-value in RF's own strategic collaborations with other donors working in the same field. RF requires sufficient in-house and/or formally contracted capacity which enables CSRD to make effective management decisions based upon an on-going exchange with grantees (involving M&E, process facilitation, relationship maintenance, magnifying opportunities, and trouble-shooting). In addition to engaging more in the design and structuring of grant-agreements, an increasing collaborative approach also invites RF to consider the extent of its own development role in steering and facilitating groups of grantees towards coherence and demonstrable impact on mutually agreed outcomes.
- R9. RF should consider contracting out or developing in-house CSRD monitoring and evaluation support. Such support could assist in:
- building the capacity of some partners in developing results-based interventions for inclusion in grant-agreements;
  - bi-annual monitoring and documentation of project and overall initiative progress;
  - contributing to the development of feedback loops, reflection and mutual accountability between RF and its partners.
- R10. It is recommended that grantee reporting be strengthened and redesigned to help grantees manage towards outcomes. RF should introduce a simple structured proforma report, that would create little additional administrative burden on grantees but would seek their assessment of progress towards outcomes and work in collaboration with others, and would form the basis of a grant performance database.
- R11. RF should continue with the strategic SOAK exercise and grant convening meetings and invest in these to develop stronger links between grantees. Consideration should be given to elevating the function of the successful grantee convening meeting to include a structured platform for strategic reflection, feedback and guidance for RF's CSRD initiative.
- R12. It is recommended the RF Nairobi office take on a more active networking role in strategically connecting and facilitating synergies amongst existing grantees and partners. Value can be brought to the sector through contributions to managing knowledge, coordinating networks and convening stakeholders to jointly pursue opportunities. Some partners responsible for cross-sectoral collaborative initiatives also indicated their own initiatives could have been further bolstered at strategic moments if the convening power support of RF had been available.
- R13. The donor environment for climate change in East Africa is very crowded. For RF to successfully develop its niche and comparative advantage it is recommended that more resources are committed to donor coordination and leveraging of combined resources.

## Summary AAR and CPR key findings by outcome

Findings by Outcome	What's working	What's not working	Where there is room for improvement OR where there is new 'white space' for new issues
<b>Outcome 1: AAR Capacity Building</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Growing trend to mainstreaming of climate issues and data in work of agricultural research and development centres</li> <li>• Support to curriculum development for inter-disciplinary agro-met post-grad capacity development</li> <li>• WMO/NMAE work in providing climate-related info to Ethiopian farmers demonstrates promise, but too small and too short to be statistically credible</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uncoordinated approach by multiple donors stretching capacity of selected champions to deliver on multiple projects</li> <li>• Supply-driven agendas can be counter to institutional ownership and change</li> <li>• Uneven uptake and integration by various RF partners of 'climate units'</li> <li>• Facilitating collaboration amongst institutions takes more input and time than anticipated</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination of donor initiatives to align with strategies of local institutions and become more organisationally owned with executive buy-in to strategy, rather than 'pet-projects' of individual researchers</li> <li>• Focus on working partnerships between agricultural research and extension with national meteorological agencies</li> <li>• Regional collaboration potential requires support to demand-driven process and acceptance of need to work beyond limiting two-year project periods</li> <li>• Monitoring and documentation of results and evidence needed to show impact of improved capacity of higher-level institutions on the productivity of small holder farmers</li> <li>• Deeper support to fewer projects that can receive support for monitoring, documenting and providing evidence of impact</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2: AAR Knowledge and Experimentation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of new tools and methodologies show promise - Oxfam Harita, FSD, WFP and Kencall projects all have important context-specific success stories to relate – index-based weather insurance and inter-sectoral collaboration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aside from strong examples like Harita and FSD, limited hard data from demonstration projects on the ground in two-year project cycle</li> <li>• Developing consensus on research agenda focus is challenging, and requires resources and patience</li> <li>• RF funds too small to have influence in enabling 'experimentation with institutional arrangements for integration of climate science and agriculture'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RF not the first or only donor in 'new tools and methodologies' terrain – further added value through RF resources assisting to facilitate coordination and collaboration, sharing of knowledge</li> </ul>

<b>Outcome 3: AAR Partnerships and Resource Mobilisation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support by University of Reading and Post doc fellow in Nairobi office should come to be important resource to ARIs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regional research collaboration grant process is challenging and requires process, time and coordination resources</li> <li>No M&amp;E grantee identified – limited monitoring and reporting of best practice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing new alliances and inter-sectoral collaborations – e.g. on data provision - an important way forward – but requires dedicated resources and understanding of process and context, and more than a two-year grant period</li> <li>RF resources towards enabling donor access and donor coordination in relation to collaborative programmes</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 4:AAR Enabling Policies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RF funds have enabled a capable individual to engage effectively through COMESA and into the international climate change and agriculture policy arena</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Data-sharing agreements require higher-level sets of process and agreements between institutions – challenging context across private and public sector uses</li> <li>Limited evidence of policy-related analyses and of the use of these analyses in providing evidence to suggest policy change</li> </ul>	
<b>Outcome 1: CPR Enabling Policies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Good outputs but not in line with original ambitious objectives</li> <li>Development of MRV system in Guyana</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global policy context more complex and not as initially anticipated – outputs delivered are ‘modest’</li> <li>Sustainability concerns as CPR grant funding expect to dry up</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved risk assessment, monitoring, reporting and documentation might demonstrate impacts and value greater than currently evident</li> <li>Initiative scoping and planning resources in a search process would help position more strongly – and help clarify key value-add focus area</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2: CPR New Financing and Implementation Models</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Good learning from piloting of financing and implementation models with small holder farmer focus</li> <li>Alternatives approach to UNFCCC carbon financing – Rainforest Alliance</li> <li>Demonstration of potential in carbon markets to deliver to poor farmers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>‘Real world events’ constraints in carbon market development</li> <li>Sustainability issues – no pilot able to demonstrate sustainable financial viability at community level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In changing original ambition or focus of grant – important to document and reformulate targets that can be monitored</li> <li>RF support towards outcome monitoring and information exchange and interaction of grantees and other role-players would add value</li> </ul>

<b>Outcome 3: CPR Capacity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advisor to COMESA has added to African capacity in elevating agriculture in CC negotiations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dependent on individual and not embedded within institution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Difficult to assess efficiency and effectiveness – limited linking of grants together – opportunity for RF providing or enabling the provision of coordinating ‘glue’</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 4: CPR Organisation Excellence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RF strategy and planning shifting to stronger inter-connected strategic linking through “soaks” process</li> <li>• Good internal reviewing in process of making the grant</li> <li>• Grantee convening meeting in Nairobi 2011 seen as highly successful event to build on for strategic coordination, reporting and mutual accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Results management approach has been challenging in process of transition – grantee reporting not used by either grantee or RF as a management and learning tool</li> <li>• Limited monitoring of and uneven engagement with grantee after grant is given</li> <li>• Some grantees report a perception of insufficient technical and process engagement by RF, and believe more value could be added by RF contributing such resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opportunity for a programmatically aligned collection of CSRD grants and focus areas to evolve during a change-over period</li> </ul>
<p><b>Qualifying comments:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• These outcomes areas were retro-fitted to existing designs and projects from January 2010;</li> <li>• AAR Work is more aligned to clustering by i) research institutions ii) experiments iii) policy than by outcome area;</li> <li>• There has no monitoring and reporting in specific reference to the outcomes areas – this may have resulted in those projects which were better at monitoring and reporting being perceived as more successful. However, the program-level focus of this evaluation did not enable sufficiently detailed assessment and verification of the specific progress and outcomes of each of the 57 projects reviewed.</li> <li>• The short project time-frames in relation to overall project and initiative ambitions make it too early to call in many cases;</li> <li>• Most of the projects do not fit specifically into one outcome area but overlap with aspects relating to capacity building, knowledge generation, and partnership; and,</li> <li>• The chosen outcomes areas are sufficiently generic to be applicable to a wide range of possible actions – which, when not linked or designed and managed in mutually reinforcing ways make it difficult to attribute influence or contribution to the broader outcomes descriptions.</li> </ul>			

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose

The subject of this Evaluation covers two interrelated bodies of work: the African Agriculture Resilience (AAR) component of the larger Climate Change Resilience Initiative, and the Land-based Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction Initiative (CPR).

- The African Agriculture Resilience component of the Climate Change Resilience Initiative was approved in 2006. The total budget of the Climate Change Resilience Initiative was \$70 million of which \$ 14,701,452 was spent in the African Agriculture subcomponent from 2007-2011.
- The Carbon for Poverty Reduction Initiative (CPR) was approved in 2008 as an Initiative in Development<sup>1</sup> with a budget of \$ 16 million. From 2009-2011 CPR has spent \$ 11,748,980 on grants primarily in Africa.

Given their complementary nature the Foundation is considering merging these two bodies of work under one Initiative called Climate Smart Rural Development (CSRSD). In order to inform decisions regarding the design and strategy of CSRSD the Foundation commissioned an evaluation of the AAR and CPR work to date.

The purposes of this evaluation are:

1. Learning from the experience of implementation of AAR and CPR to guide the planning and design of the proposed Climate Smart Rural Development (CSRSD) Initiative.
2. Accountability to the Rockefeller Foundation's President and Board of Trustees for the funds invested to date in AAR and CPR.
3. Contribution as a public good to knowledge to the fields of agriculture, climate change, philanthropy and the field of evaluation. In particular to extend the learning from this evaluation to RF grantees in the fields of AAR and CPR.

The overall **objective** of the evaluation is to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, influence and sustainability of the Foundation's work in African Agriculture Resilience and Carbon for Poverty Reduction. Full details of the specific objectives can be found in the terms of reference at Annex 1.

The assignment started with a briefing to the evaluation team leader at the Rockefeller Foundation headquarters on 26<sup>th</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup> July. Desk reviews of a sample of grants were carried out in August, followed by field visits in East Africa between 30<sup>th</sup> August and 9<sup>th</sup> September.

The report has nine chapters. Following this introduction Chapter 2 explains the evaluation approach and methodology, and presents a statistical overview of the grants. Chapter 3 sets out the context for the grants and explains the theory of change and results frameworks. Chapters 4 and 5 contain the main findings from the grants that were reviewed in detail. Chapter 6 looks at grant management, accountability and learning. Chapter 7 summarizes the evaluation against criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Chapter 8 puts forward lessons and Chapter 9 lists recommendations.

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<sup>1</sup> The three stages of programming at the Foundation are Search, Development and Execution. The Search stage consists of an exploration and testing of ideas, problems, solutions; the Development stage consists of demonstration projects, and the third stage, Execution, involves full implementation at global and regional level.

## 2. Approach and methodology

### 2.1 Approach

The assignment was undertaken against a background of time pressure for preliminary findings to be available by September 20<sup>th</sup> in order to help senior officials in the Foundation prepare for a Board meeting scheduled for November 2011. With that in mind, and following the guidance in the terms of reference, the evaluation team took the following approach:

- An initial briefing for the Team Leader at the Foundation headquarters in New York that included face to face or telephone meetings with Vice Presidents FI and SE, COO, other senior managers, staff from the African Agriculture and Climate Change Initiative as well as related Initiatives.
- Selection of a sample of grants for desk review and follow-up interviews at country level.
- Development of a short grant review proforma derived from the early drafts of the terms of reference and updated as these were finalized.

Following the initial review of grants for follow-up interviews the team travelled to Kenya and held meetings with grantees and other key informant stakeholders concerned with climate change, and agriculture leaders, policy makers and practitioners in the region. Members of the team also travelled to Uganda, Ethiopia and the United States. Additional interviews were carried out in Johannesburg and Pretoria, South Africa and by telephone.

During the course of visits to the Rockefeller Foundation Regional Office in Nairobi, the team conducted an informal Theory of Change workshop with Foundation staff and tested the findings with grantees.

In parallel with the country visits, a separate exercise was carried out to prepare a synthesis of findings from other evaluations concerned with agriculture and climate change. The report from that exercise is presented separately.

### 2.2 Methodology

The team was fortunate to be able to discuss the terms of reference whilst they were being finalized and that helped improve understanding of the context and thrust of the assignment. The methodology hinged on development of an evaluation framework, which was used to structure and organize questions for interviews, and the purposive sampling of grants for field visits. The data gathering tools consisted of:

- **The evaluation framework**, reproduced at Annex 3. The framework draws together the issues in the terms of reference and helps the evaluators to identify specific questions and the nature of the information that needs to be collected. Questions are grouped by type of respondent and these were used to structure interviews.
- **Purposive sample of grants**. A total of 23 AAR grants and 17 CPR grants were sampled for detailed review of documentation and field visits. They are listed in Annex 4. Selection was guided by staff from the African Agriculture and Climate Change Initiative and supplemented by the evaluation team to achieve a broad span of grant purposes and avoid recently approved grants where little implementation had taken place. It is recognized that RF is in the process of implementing changes to the manner in which it is managing some of these newer grants, including collaborative ones, and that action is already being taken to address some of the findings made with respect to older grants.
- **Desk review form**. A review form was developed and used to assess 47 of the 57 grants. Questions were drawn from the evaluation framework and a blank proforma is listed at Annex 5.



- **Capacity building follow-up questionnaire.** In view of the importance of capacity building in many of the grants an exercise was conducted to follow-up participants from a workshop held in 2008. The questionnaire follows the Kirkpatrick<sup>2</sup> approach and uses information from the workshop report to identify core competency areas. The questions are listed at Annex 6. Unfortunately, the survey, which was conducted using an internet proprietary tool, received only 8 usable responses from a list of 64 participants. A summary of findings is at Box 1.

## 2.3 Statistical Overview of the grants

A total of 57 grants were reviewed, spanning the period from 2007 to April 2011. Tables 1 to 4 summarize the distribution of number and size of grants by nature of the grant and location of the PI.

Table 1 Summary of African Agriculture Resilience Grants by type of grant

Type of grant	Number of grants	% of number	Grant value \$	% of value	Average value \$
<b>Agricultural research and development</b>	12	33%	5,345,200	35%	445,433
Experiments	6	17%	6,190,400	41%	1,031,733
<b>International supporting institutions</b>	6	17%	2,291,894	15%	381,982
African supporting institutions	4	11%	371,600	2.4%	92,900
African policy institutions	3	8%	693,300	4.5%	231,100
Scoping studies	3	8%	337,400	2.2%	112,467
Other	2	6%	222,200	1.4%	111,100
<b>Total</b>	36	100%	15,451,994	100%	429,222

Table 2 Summary of Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction Grants by type of grant

Type of grant	Number of grants	% of number	Grant value \$	% of value	Average value \$
<b>Policy</b>	8	38%	2,264,900	19%	283,112
Projects	3	14%	3,843,900	33%	1,281,300
<b>Policy and projects</b>	2	9%	4,000,000	34%	2,000,000
Financing and projects	3	14%	929,500	8%	309,833
Standards	2	9%	398,800	3%	199,400
International supporting organizations	1	5%	149,406	1.3%	149,406
Other	2	9%	165,000	1.4%	82,500
<b>Total</b>	21	100%	11,751,506	100%	559,595

Table 3 Summary of African Agriculture Resilience Grants by location of PI

Primary country location of PI	Number of grants	% of number	Grant value \$	% of value
<b>Ethiopia</b>	5	14%	4,993,900	32%
Kenya	15	42%	4,505,900	29%
Rwanda	1	3%	440,000	3%
South Africa	2	6%	326,400	2%
Tanzania	3	9%	757,400	5%
Uganda	4	11%	2,093,200	14%
UK	1	3%	449,994	3%
USA	5	15%	1,885,200	12%
<b>Total</b>	36	100%	15,451,994	100%

<sup>2</sup> Kirkpatrick, Donald L. (1975) Evaluating Training Programs. The American Society for Training and Development

Table 4 Summary of Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction Grants by location of PI

Primary country location of PI	Number of grants	% of number	Grant value \$	% of value
Ethiopia	1	5%	200,000	2%
Ghana	1	5%	349,900	3%
Kenya	1	5%	494,000	4%
Thailand	1	5%	25,000	0.2%
UK	1	5%	149,406	1%
USA	15	71%	10,033,200	86%
Zambia	1	5%	500,000	4%
<b>Total</b>	21	100%	11,751,506	100%

Key points from the statistical overview are:

- The average sizes of AAR grant was \$429,222; and of CPR grant \$559,595.
- The distribution of size of both the AAR and CPR grants is influenced by a few very large grants. Under the AAR two grants to the World Food Programme totaled £4 million; and under CPR three grants to the William J Clinton Foundation totaled \$7 million. If these are excluded, average grants were \$337,000 and \$264,000 respectively.
- Close to four out of every five dollars granted under AAR went directly to work with agricultural research institutions or to support ‘experimental’ or innovative work. Grants to supporting institutions were smaller in value.
- The majority of the AAR grants and money granted were allocated to primary implementers (PI) based in African countries. In contrast, 71% of the CPR grants and 86% of the grant money was allocated to PI based in the USA.
- Over 40% of the AAR grants were made to organizations in Kenya. To some extent this reflects Kenya’s location as a regional center, but it also has the effect of creating a greater ‘critical mass’ of effort compared with countries that received few grants such as Rwanda and Tanzania.

### 3. Context and strategy

#### 3.1 Context

Global climate change threatens African development; it is estimated to lead to reductions in per capita consumption of 4-5% for Africa<sup>3</sup> by 2030, greater than in other regions of the world. Africa is the most vulnerable and will be the hardest hit region. But climate compatible development in Africa can minimize the harm caused by climate impacts, while maximizing the development opportunities presented by a low carbon, more resilient future.

Despite some uncertainty about localized impacts there is a strong case for taking action to support Africa to address the challenge of climate change and development. Africa is already suffering the negative impacts of climatic variability and related extreme weather events, for example, the 2000 floods in Mozambique cost the country an estimated \$550m lowering GDP by 1.5% (World Bank estimate). Extreme weather events are becoming more common, impacting the lives of poor people (health, food security, and livelihood opportunities), infrastructure and agricultural productivity now. Development agencies are starting to recognize the need to prioritize adaptation assistance for Africa which addresses current as well as future vulnerability, while more evidence is generated to be more confident of specific ways to tackle climate change in Africa.

Women and children will be most affected by climate change given their contribution to African agriculture, collection of water and fuel and weaker control over household decisions including access to nutrition. Their voice must be heard in decision making that affects delivery.

Key areas to help build resilience to a range of climate impacts include interventions in water, health and agriculture. There is also a need to build regional and national capacity to understand climate change and development, generate more evidence and improve Africa's own delivery.

Low carbon climate resilient development presents significant opportunities for growth and poverty reduction in Africa, for example by increasing energy access. Africa has severe energy shortages which are a constraint to growth and poverty reduction. Low carbon development offers a sustainable and cost effective solution which can contribute to wealth creation. This will also reduce vulnerability to likely price shocks from fossil fuel based energy e.g. as in the oil price shocks of 2008.

Africa's forests and land make up the continent's largest contribution to global carbon emissions and large future increases must be avoided to help limit global climate change. Forests also provide livelihoods for many poor rural people, and contribute to national economic development. Increasing volumes of international finance for reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) are becoming available, and Africa needs to build capacity to receive its appropriate share that can be used for development. More sustainable forest use will protect livelihoods as well as reduce future carbon emissions.

There is a growing African awareness of the severity of climate change for Africa's development, as well as the opportunities that international action to tackle climate change present. This accelerated after many African leaders and high profile ministers attended the December 2009 UN climate change conference in Copenhagen. Further momentum is expected in 2011 with South Africa hosting the December 2011 UN climate change conference.

Despite growing high level interest, the ability and capacity to act on climate change and development across Africa is very low. But some countries are displaying a clear intention to act. Examples include:

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<sup>3</sup> Stern N (2006) Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change. HM Treasury, London

- Ethiopia - PM Meles heads the AU mandated heads of state group to represent Africa in negotiations. The government intends to make its development 'climate proof'; and move to lower carbon development.
- Kenya – intends to climate proof development and take advantage of international finance for low carbon development, e.g. by expanding existing investments in large scale wind and geothermal energy.
- Rwanda – aiming to make Rwanda a low carbon economy, to boost efficiency and international competitiveness.
- Ghana – increasing interest in sustainable use of natural resources to counteract climate change impacts, and in REDD.

Some other countries, where climate change is important for their development (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan), have yet to seriously consider climate change implications.

Donors are increasingly addressing climate change as part of development assistance. This includes supporting specific climate change interventions, as well as recognizing the need to make other development assistance 'climate smart'.

Multilateral finance mechanisms have been established under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, largely for adaptation. In addition the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) carbon market was created under the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol. It allows developed countries to pay for emission reductions through projects in developing countries and receive credit for the reductions. Host developing country projects generate emissions allowances (certified emissions reductions) that are purchased and traded.

The World Bank administered Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) were also established to demonstrate developed country commitment to climate change assistance. The CIFs consist of an adaptation fund (Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience) two low carbon energy funds (Clean Technology Fund, Scaling Up Renewable Energy Fund) and two forests/REDD funds (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Programme). The Congo Basin Forest Fund is also administered as one of the CIFs. Many of the mechanisms have yet to disburse significant sums.

The December 2009 Copenhagen Accord committed developed countries to providing up to £30 billion of "Fast Start" finance between 2010 and 2013. This was intended to provide a kick start before finance until a post 2012 climate change deal has been agreed.

It is hoped that a new climate change deal will include quantified post 2012 climate change finance, and establish effective delivery mechanisms drawing on the experience of good development practice. Current negotiations focus on a potential 'Green Fund'. Existing multilateral mechanisms could eventually be incorporated into such a Fund.

The future quantity of international finance needed for climate change in developing countries is disputed. The Copenhagen Accord suggests a figure of \$100 billion per year by 2020, but most developing countries are pressing for more. The African group of negotiators has suggested 1.5% of developed countries' GDP should be allocated. The UN Secretary General's Advisory Group on Climate Finance (AGF), co-chaired by PM Meles of Ethiopia, reported in October 2010 and identified potential public and private sources to make up the \$100 billion.

Regular development bank operations can help provide development assistance for climate change; for example, through lending for low carbon energy schemes, such as wind and hydro, and for adaptation. Both the AfDB and World Bank have established Clean Energy Investment Frameworks that aim to increase spending on low carbon development.

A considerable amount of effort will be required to strengthen coordination amongst donors and hence impact at a continental, regional and national level. Key processes exist to enable

coordination and prioritization these include Nepad's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).

The number of challenges associated directly or indirectly with adaptation to climate change are many. Adaptation is a new area of research and development. But already, governments, municipalities, business, NGOs and individuals are going ahead and are taking leadership in adaptation to climate change. Continued and expanded capacity development for adaptation requires increased and sustained resources. One of the best ways to access resources is to show, with as rigorous data as possible, that the adaptation efforts being made have produced positive results, and that these results are showing impact, or at least progress towards impact. The sort of innovative work promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation, supported by monitoring and evaluation of adaptation initiatives, has potential to help build that evidence. Seen against the context, both grant streams are judged to be relevant in the way they are building knowledge and experience that contributes towards these challenges.

### **3.2 The two grant streams**

The Rockefeller Foundation's Building Climate Change Resilience initiative seeks to help poor and vulnerable communities prepare for, withstand, and recover from the devastating effects of climate change. This work is targeted toward insuring that resilience strategies are a more integral part of agricultural research, development, planning, and implementation in African countries, strengthening, in turn, the resilience of smallholder farmers to climate variability and change and making current investments in improving African agriculture more successful.

The Foundation is investing in efforts including 1) helping agricultural research and development organizations in Africa integrate climate change resilience measures into their practice; 2) testing interventions that could be implemented more extensively in African countries to build resilience to climate variability and change; and 3) developing the necessary scientific evidence base and policy environment to promote agricultural resilience-building in Africa.

The vision for CPR is that farmers in developing countries receive financial incentives for using improved land and forest management practices that increase the amount of carbon stored in trees and soils, thereby enhancing the productivity, profitability and sustainability of their production systems while simultaneously helping to mitigate global climate change.

The Foundation hopes to contribute toward increased livelihood security and improved lives in rural communities, and toward global environmental benefits derived from increased carbon stored in trees and soil. If this initiative is successful, farmers who use improved land and forest management measures to increase the amount of carbon stored in trees and soil will be paid for the global environmental benefits that these activities provide. As a result of the increased land productivity and the additional income poor farmers receive, it is hoped that they will make additional investments that both increase the productivity of their farms and help mitigate climate change.

### **3.3 Theory of change**

Any development intervention has a theory or model behind it that explains how the intervention will lead to a desired outcome. This theory of change or program intervention logic is not always explicit. Some planning tools such as the logical framework present a simplified and summarized version. But often the complexities of intervention strategies require a less structured approach.

A well-developed theory of change can help stakeholders reach consensus about how change is supposed to occur; provides a causal model that can guide implementation, monitoring and evaluation; and highlight assumptions and necessary conditions.

Theories of change were not developed in advance of the two grant streams so the evaluation team has retrofitted the grants into theories, on the basis of Foundation strategy statements, grant

documentation, and discussion with Foundation staff and other stakeholders. The results are in Annex 7.

The task of retrofitting was made easier by the development of results frameworks for both the AAR and CPR grants in 2010. These frameworks define a number of outcomes towards which the grants contribute and these form an organizing structure for the theories of change. Annex 7 Figures 1 and 2 present the AAR; Figure 3 is for the CPR grants.

Taking AAR first, the absence of a situation analysis means there was no analysis of the core problem to which the grants would be directed. From the evaluation team's analysis of the scoping studies (see Chapter 4), two interlinked core problems are defined.

- Farmers lack information about climate threats
- Farmers lack options and ability to change

These support the results framework impact statement and validate the grant strategy.

Two important issues arise from the theory of change.

- Firstly, progress towards outcomes involves interaction between the outputs of the different type of grants: support to ARIs, experiments, and supporting institutions. A large part of that interaction is treated as assumptions in the grant plans and grants are not planned or managed to enable the interaction to take place.
- Secondly, the gap linking outcomes and impact is too great to be spanned without further actions, which under present arrangements are also all assumptions. Two missing but necessary outcomes, termed by us 'secondary outcomes', concern the roles of extension and dissemination, and the enabling environment.


The reason these two points are highlighted is that they bring clear implications: i) that the grants need to be managed as a coherent portfolio if the benefits from each individual intervention are to contribute towards outcomes; and ii) that much of the current portfolio is work that is well 'upstream' from benefits to farmers. This is not a criticism, as the grant program has only been active for a few years, but the Foundation needs to have a clear strategy about how the grants do enable progress towards impact.

The theory of change for the CPR is shown in Annex 7, Figure 3. This is more rudimentary than for AAR as there is less supportive strategic analysis for the grant initiative. However, the logic is sound and the elements are a natural complement to the work under AAR.

### **3.4 Looking forward to CSRD**

Development of the theories of change has enabled the evaluation team to map the combined intervention activities of the AAR and CPR grants. Figure 1 presents this. Poor farm households are the focal point with their core problems. The aim is to contribute to actions in support of mitigation and adaptation. The rest of the diagram indicates the four main areas of intervention in policy, agricultural research, climate research and information, and extension and dissemination services. The same diagram is reproduced in Annex 7, Figures 4 and 5, with the expenditure under the grants program superimposed on the diagram.

Figure 1



## 4. African Agriculture Resilience - AAR

### 4.1 Introduction

The “new execution strategy” for RF’s African Agriculture component was approved in mid-2009. Given the project designs, component context, geography and institutional scope, a period of twenty-four months is too soon in most cases to expect to see definitive outcomes. There were inevitable seasonal and institution-related delays in establishing some of these interventions, while others were first granted more than a year later in the second half of 2010.

In the three-year trajectory over which AAR and now CSRD has been shaped, a purposeful but organic evolutionary approach is evident. The development and institutional knowledge of the AAR portfolio of grants grew around an incremental set of relationships and knowledge that the Nairobi-based Associate Director was key in developing. In line with organization-wide practice changes, the first draft of the AAR results framework was developed in January 2010. It was effectively a retrofit to bring together a developing broad vision and expanding strategy.

While Chapter Six addresses issues related to grant management we need to note here that the capacity of RF to monitor and engage its partners strategically in the AAR initiative over the last twelve months has been limited owing to the vacant Associate Director post in the Nairobi office.

While RF commissioned scoping studies to inform its strategic approach, initial grants were made as early as June 2008 for events such as the IGAD ICPAC conference as an entry point *“to meet with people working on these issues ... as we begin to build our network and identify the strongest agents for change and impact”* (Grant Memo 2008 CLI 310). Since then RF has pursued and responded to various clusters of opportunities aimed at integrating climate change resilience through i) supporting agriculture and development organizations in Africa; ii) testing pilot interventions; iii) developing a scientific evidence base and supporting engagements towards an enabling policy environment.

This chapter begins by outlining the scoping studies that preceded approval of the AAR execution strategy, and then addresses the selected grants in three conceptual clusters: support to Agricultural Research Initiatives; experiments; and institutions and policy. Selected initiatives are discussed in relation to the first four outcomes areas of the results framework. The specific outcome statements for the Initiative are:

#### **Outcome 1 – Capacity Building**

#### **Outcome 2 – Knowledge and Experimentation**

#### **Outcome 3 – Partnerships and Resource Mobilization**

#### **Outcome 4 – Enabling Policies**

The work under AAR is assessed according to the following overall indicators of impact described in the January 2010 draft results framework:

- New institutional arrangements between climate information providers and African agricultural research organizations have been established and lead to routine information exchange.
- Incorporation of climate change projections into African agricultural research and development decisions.
- Experimentation with interventions that allow small holder farmers to better cope with climate variability and recover quickly from climate extremes.
- “Evaluation of experiments to inform agricultural development and extension services.” (Results Framework, January 2010).



## 4.2 The scoping studies

Three of the grants issued under the AAR funded scoping studies to explore aspects of the climate change challenge and identify potential strategies. They were directed towards sub-sectoral themes:

- 2007 CLI 301 to SEI Oxford in support of a research project to identify key opportunities for integrating and addressing climate change
- 2008 CLI 308 to World Agroforestry Centre's (WAC) MDG Centre for East and Southern Africa, in collaboration with Columbia University's Earth Institute to prepare a report assessing water resources management strategies to improve the capability of smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa to adapt to climate change
- 2008 CLI 325 to IUCN in support of a study on potential pathways for strengthening African livestock practices and systems so that farmers and communities are better able to respond to the predicted consequences of climate change and variability

A fourth grant to AGRA (2009 CLI 310) had a similar focus to develop a strategic plan for building climate change resilience into its own agricultural research and development agenda.

The SEI and IUCN reports both give prominence to the need for improved information about climate to farmers and the options available to respond to climate change. The WAC report goes into detail about ways in which agriculture water management can be developed for smallholders. And the AGRA study identified a number of ways in which existing programs should be scaled up in the context of climate change and a new water investment program created.

In the context of the RF strategy, the approach taken by SEI and IUCN reports has had the most direct influence. Four important issues emerge from those studies. Firstly, that institutions need to understand the climate change and vulnerability context and not rush to blame climate change without first exploring other causes. Secondly, to be aware of the tension between the underlying trend in climate change and seasonal variability in climate. *'Agricultural adaptation that has always taken, and continues to take place in Africa, is responding more to perceived climate variability than climate change.'* (SEI page 24) Thirdly, that there are very few "proofs of concept" – that is examples of agricultural decision makers that have successfully drawn on climate change projection data to take decisions that have improved agricultural productivity or human well-being. (SEI page 4) Fourthly, that capacity to adapt requires improvements in information about climate, in the options for response available to farmers and in the policy environment that governs access to those options. (IUCN page 7) The main thrust of the two studies is captured in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2





Figure 3



These figures are shown because they illustrate building blocks in the theories of change for the AAR initiative. They also highlight the importance of the four strands around which the Rockefeller Foundation grants are clustered: technology and agricultural research; climate research and information; extension services; and the policy environment.

The scoping studies were relevant and produced information that directly influenced the RF approach and AGRA’s own strategy. In particular, the decision to invest so heavily in both the national agricultural research institutes and universities is supported by these studies. The content of the studies has value as a public good for practitioners dealing with climate change and agriculture. But neither the studies themselves, nor a summary of their findings was used by the Foundation to inform other grantees or development partners. This was a missed opportunity. The messages about the need to develop climate capacity among agricultural researchers, the importance of the enabling policy environment, and the awareness that in the short run adaptation is about coping with climate variability, are all strong themes that have a bearing on climate change interventions and could usefully have been promoted more strongly and shared with other development partners.

### 4.3 Support to Agricultural Research Institutes (ARIs)

The essence of RF’s support to ARIs was based on the perceived need for a range of capacity building efforts within and between these institutions. Therefore this section primarily responds to the AAR Results Framework Outcome Area 1 – Capacity Building as detailed here:

<b>Outcome Area – Outcome Area 1 – Capacity Building</b>	<i>Agricultural research and development centers enhance their capacity to address the major climate related agricultural challenges that will affect the food systems for the poor in Africa. This includes identifying and supporting champions who can lead this work within these centers and beyond by bringing the best of agricultural science and climate science together to strengthen existing and generate new interventions that enable smallholder farmers to adapt to the challenges of climate change.</i>
<b>What success would look like</b>	<i>Agricultural research and development institutions improve their ability to analyze climate data and incorporate climate information into agricultural research and development strategies, and their ability to conduct and disseminate agricultural research that tests solutions designed to increase the stability of agricultural production under changing climatic conditions.</i>

Within Outcome Area 1, the RF capacity building support to the ARIs falls within two relatively discrete ‘outputs’, broadly summarized as:

- Programs at African universities to train students in both agricultural science and climate science; and,
- The creation of new climate adaptation units and teams within agricultural research and development institutions.

The Evaluation Team visited institutions in Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, sampling and interviewing grantees under both outputs. Significant RF – ARI funding has also been provided to institutions in Tanzania (Sokoine University of Agriculture) and Rwanda (Institute of Agricultural Sciences of Rwanda) as well as Egerton University in Nakuru, Kenya. Some of these grants had not been in implementation for a very long period. Owing to time and resource constraints the Evaluation Team did not visit these institutions. Therefore, beyond the desk reviews conducted of all AAR grants, the detailed analysis which follows is based on those grantees which the evaluation team met and interviewed face to face. The key grants / grantees the analysis is based on are identified at the start of each sub-section.

#### 4.3.1 Programs at African universities

<b>Output 1.1</b>	<i>Programs at African universities train students in both agricultural science and climate science. African professionals have the interdisciplinary capacity to address complex climate change issues.</i>		
<b>Key grants / grantees</b>	2009 CLI 323	Makerere University	\$548,700
	2008 CLI 312	RUFORUM	\$980,000

2010 CLI 307	RUFORUM	\$84,600
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The Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture (RUFORUM) has a long history of partnership with RF, dating back to an initiative known as the FORUM which was originally initiated by RF in 1992. Since then RUFORUM has evolved under a number of donor grants (particularly the Gates Foundation) to form a consortium of 29 universities in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa mandated to oversee graduate training and networks of specialization in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries.

*“Through a networking approach, RUFORUM’s vision is to see a vibrant agricultural sector linked to African universities which can produce high-performing graduates and high-quality research responsive to the demands of Africa’s farmers for innovations and able to generate sustainable livelihoods and national economic development.”* RUFORUM Vision statement, <http://www.ruforum.org/content/about-us>

There is a long running and trusting relationship between RF and RUFORUM. The nature of this relationship goes some way to explaining the relatively large size of the initial RUFORUM grant under AAR. 2009 CLI 312 *Enhancing adaptation to climatic change in Africa: Linking agro-meteorology and agriculture* was scheduled for 3 years and cost \$980,000. The specific objectives as set out in the Grant Memo:

- Establish current institutional knowledge and arrangements for training and research in climatic change and variability in selected ESA institutions
- Develop the human resource capacity in the study of agricultural climatic change adaptation in Africa
- Enhance resilience of vulnerable agricultural communities to impacts of climate variability and change.
- Strengthen collaboration among ESA Higher Learning institutions in the field of climatic change and variability research for development (R4D)

A second, much smaller grant (2010 CLI 307 *Facilitating RUFORUM Universities to Access Climate Change Adaptation Funds and Training Opportunities*) for \$84,600 was provided for 11 months in 2010 for RUFORUM *‘to provide support to RUFORUM to coordinate member universities to access climate change adaptation funding and training opportunities in order to develop their own internal capacities in research and training on climate change adaptation in agriculture.’*

Face to face interviews with RUFORUM secretariat staff and more detailed document analysis revealed some interesting insights into the success of grants, how they have evolved, and how they have been delivered. These findings are summarized below:

**Both grants can demonstrate considerable success** particularly in terms of the activities undertaken and the deliverables achieved, as summarized here.

<b>2008 CLI 312</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First 6 students awarded PHDs in dryland resource management with a further 4 PhDs expected to be awarded by end of 2011 and a target of 150 PhDs set within the RUFORUM Strategic Plan 2011-2015</li> <li>• Agriculture and climate change curriculum development &amp; review across the network</li> <li>• Short capacity building courses in proposal writing, communications and ICT skills carried out</li> </ul>
<b>2010 CLI 307</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developed a database of current and upcoming climate change adaptation funding and training opportunities.</li> <li>• Hiring process of a part time resource person to provide technical support delayed but recently been concluded.</li> </ul>

- RUFORUM describe the nature of working with RF very favorably. *'RF is interested in RUFORUM priorities and is not simply driven by their own interests as other donors. In addition, they are very 'hands off' and don't request much other than progress reports. Gates on the other hand are much more active taking deliverables back in-house and ensuring they are a success for Gates.'*
- RUFORUM felt that the database to identify climate-related funding opportunities had been a 'quick win' and could point to four or five subsequent funding opportunities which partners across the network had been able to take advantage of because of the database. The 2010 CLI 307 grant provides a nice example where a relatively small investment which, if well targeted and demand-driven, can deliver tangible benefits within a relatively short time frame of less than two years. *'RUFORUM now acts as a broker for sources of information on funding for climate change for network members.'*
- Both grants have experienced constraints which have delayed implementation. The most significant has been the struggle to find and recruit suitably qualified national and international climate change experts. This issue is referred to later as similar constraints have been experienced by KARI and Makerere. Perversely, a key RUFORUM success indicator in years to come will be the extent to which capable and suitably qualified climate change experts become more available across the region as a result of RF support to MSc and PhD training in East Africa.
- Despite the obvious success, grant implementation has not always followed stated objectives and owing to the lack of reporting and monitoring beyond the activity and output level, it is almost impossible to assess if the original objectives (as defined above and in the Grant Memo) have been successfully achieved or not. There is no evidence of monitoring or reporting directly against original grant objectives beyond periodic progress reporting.

RUFORUM has and continues to be successful in attracting significant amounts of donor funding which presents both opportunities and challenges. Despite RF's history establishing RUFORUM, the Secretariat has been successful diversifying its funding sources to such an extent that RF funding is now less significant than the funding received from the Gates Foundation, the European Commission, and IDRC amongst others. Whilst these funds can be considered a clear sign of success, RUFORUM may soon reach a stage where they lack the absorptive capacity to productively utilize further funds given the scale and resources available within the Secretariat. The Evaluation Team detected signs of this limited capacity during the country visits with multiple team members away from the office, and long delays in response times. More significantly, there was some evidence of a general loss of sight of specific grant objectives in the drive for accessing more donor funds to contribute to higher-order RUFORUM objectives. Put simply, RF is effectively just seen as one of a number of interested donors with its own grant application systems and procedures, which if managed correctly deliver flexible core funding to RUFORUM. This explanation would to some extent explain the limited reporting beyond the activity level.

RUFORUM recognizes that it does not have the systems or the current capacity to assess progress beyond grant activities and outputs. Using the training of MSc and PhD students under the 2009 CLI 312 grant as an example, RUFORUM can measure the total numbers of students it has trained (MSc and PhDs awarded) as well as the quality of the individual outputs (dissertations produced etc.) Beyond the output level, RUFORUM has much less idea what it is achieving and what this means for its purpose. For example, what the increase in skills and capacity as a result of RUFORUM training means in terms of shaping climate change and agriculture research practice for smallholder farmers or influencing policy at national and regional level is unknown. Yet this is ultimately the purpose of the support. Positively, RUFORUM recognizes that it needs to address this high-level M&E issue if the Forum is to continue to justify donor support for the influence and impact it is having. RUFORUM is presently taking a number of steps to address this, starting by developing a 2011-2015 Business Plan and Strategy (supported by the Gates Foundation) which sets out a small number of strategic priorities (gender, ICT, and M&E) which RUFORUM need to strengthen in order to progress as an institution. In terms of M&E, it is critical that RUFORUM develops internal (within the Secretariat) capacity to define, monitor and evaluate higher-order outcomes before it can start to assess progress and build M&E capacity with its university partners across the region.

- A knock-on implication for RF of RUFORUM not yet having the capacity to conduct the M&E of their higher-order outcomes is that it makes it almost impossible for RF to judge their own success attempting to build the capacity of ARIs across the region.
- It is beyond the remit of the Evaluation Team to define the nature of the relationship RF should keep with RUFORUM. What is clear is that RUFORUM is increasingly focusing on defining and strengthening its strategic vision and direction as the hub of a regional collaborative forum of universities under the mantra *'developing the capacity for capacity development'*. Understandably RUFORUM is using pooled donor funds fungibly where it can, to coordinate and achieve this vision. For RF to engage at this level would require a shift from a relatively small, discrete grant-project focus to a contributing and coordinating role at a strategic level, working with RUFORUM at the network level in partnership with other donors. This is something that requires a management decision from RF but is also something that its grant funds are already likely to be contributing to.

Very similar to RUFORUM, the grant objective in the Grant Memo for the \$548,700 2009 CLI 323 grant to Makerere states:

*“This grant will support the Makerere University Faculty of Agriculture to create a regional climate change community of practice with East Africa-focused collaborators. Specifically, the proposed project will enable Makerere University to develop human capacity, bolster research, and strengthen climatic change adaptation and policy development in Eastern Africa.”*

The interviews on the grant with the Makerere staff revealed similarities to the experiences reported by RUFORUM in a number of areas:

- **Implementation delays caused by lack of available climate change and agriculture skills** – Makerere required a no cost extension for one year (to end of 2012) due mainly to the challenge of recruiting a climate change expert (initially an international) who was supposed to play a leading role in implementing the major grant activities. This was eventually resolved by the setting up of a Climate Change Panel comprised of leading Ugandan experts. However, it seems to the pool of experts is so small that the various RF-grant receiving organizations in Uganda have ended up sharing the same experts across multiple boards and committees, perhaps duplicating effort from the same small pool of expertise. For example, Dr Everline Komutunga, sits on the Makerere climate change board whilst she also heads the current RF grant on AAR at NARO Kawanda. However, the evidence of the lack of skills does seem to bear out RF’s original rationale for support to ARIs – that of limited capacity on climate change and agriculture across the region.
- **Some evidence of outcomes** – As was the experience with multiple ARI-grantees, grant managers were happier talking about activities and outputs than outcomes and preferred not to relate outputs specifically to the objectives originally set out in the Grant Memo. Makerere were able to describe a number of policy-related outcomes, where as a result of the grant and their increased profile and capacity on climate change and agriculture, the Department of Agriculture had been asked to prepare a policy paper to be presented to the Ugandan Cabinet and as well as more broadly being seen as the source of information to backstop Government on the issues of climate change. These outcomes, perhaps in part because of the relatively short life span of the grant, were described more as ‘cherry-picked’ success stories rather than more systematic and robust reporting of outcomes against objectives.
- **Difficulty separating grant activities from other, wider and on-going institution-level activities** - As full-time academics, grant-managers at Makerere are managing multiple demands on their time. As far as the Evaluation Team could tell, Makerere only had a junior Research Assistant position dedicated to managing the RF grant with more senior key individuals only able to provide inputs when they could find the time. Similar to RUFORUM, limited institutional and absorptive capacity combined with the imperative to secure donor funds suggest some level of pooling and fungibility in the use grant funds towards institutional rather than grant objectives. This may be something that RF supports. However, part of the explanation of the patchy and uncoordinated progress of the grant may be attributable to insufficient staffing resources dedicated to its implementation. In the future RF may choose to ensure that grantees have credible and realistic plans in place to staff grants to deliver on time - if a proposal budgets for 2 full time inputs then RF must ensure that they recruit these inputs and that these inputs are dedicated to the grant.

- **Working with Rockefeller** – Similar to the feedback of multiple grantees, the RF grant management approach was described as very light touch. *‘Many grantees appreciate this as it allows them freedom to manage the grant without interference.’* However, this sentiment was tempered by the regret that limited if any feedback / comment has been received from RF on the content or quality of the deliverables or strategic direction of the grant. In addition, Makerere staff felt they do get more feedback from informal interaction with grantees than they do from RF grant management team or the interaction the team facilitate. Makerere mentioned they had not had a visit from RF under the current grant.

#### 4.3.2 The creation of new climate adaptation units

<b>Output 1.2</b>	<i>Creation of new climate adaptation units and teams within agricultural research and development institutions</i>		
<b>Key grants / grantees</b>	2009 CLI 321	National Agricultural Research Organisation	\$479,900
	2010 CLI 304	Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research	\$420,000
	2009 CLI 322	Kenya Agricultural Research Institute	\$470,400

The three grants above provide an interesting spectrum of cases on the creation on new climate adaptation units within agricultural research and development organizations. Each will be dealt with in turn with any striking similarities and differences drawn out at the end.

The objective of the \$479,900 grant (2009 CLI 321) to the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) in Uganda is defined in the Grant Memo as:

*“To increase awareness of and dialogue about climate change issues and to enhance the level of accuracy and robustness of climate change research in order to create demand-driven, market-responsive adaptation practices that are broadly adopted.”*

This grant was primarily focused on strengthening NARO’s own institutional capacity to engage with climate change and agriculture issues at both policy and programming levels. It was evident to the Evaluation Team that the grant had been well implemented and significant achievements have been delivered in the 24 months since inception. In particular, NARO seems to have successfully established a climate change community of champions across NARO with buy-in from the most senior NARO staff members. The NARO could also demonstrate significant progress in a range of other activities including: setting up a network of automatic weather stations across Uganda based on the rationale that climate-related policy decisions should be based on sound data (evidence-based policy); testing farmer perceptions of the impact of climate on agriculture on the ground – through pilots in seven Districts across Uganda covering main agro-ecological zones; starting a small grants scheme concerned with addressing climate-agriculture research gaps; and, formalizing direct access to parliamentarians to inform Ugandan climate policy through NARO as an agency of Ministry of Agriculture.

These findings may reflect a grantee that was well prepared to present to the Evaluation Team. But it is also felt that they demonstrate the value that can be gained from a relatively small grant when a grant is well planned, coordinated and managed. One critical factor is that NARO does not appear to have multiple sources of donor funding, so consequently they have used the resources available to them very strategically. At the same time, those staff they dedicated to the grant have been able to devote their time to delivering the grant outputs without the distraction of other competing donor interests. In line with the experience of other grantees it is both too soon and not possible given the M&E systems in place to be able to assess the significance of the grant in terms of NARO’s enhanced capacity to integrate climate and agriculture programming and influence policy in this regard. Based on this and other interviews, the Evaluation Team did notice that there is a relatively small and consistent group of climate change agriculture experts in Uganda who seem well positioned to engage with and influence policy. In terms of defining the logical next step for NARO (potentially under the CSRD initiative, the NARO team explained: *‘The key is integrating policy with reaching the communities on the ground. For this a better understanding of rural indigenous knowledge (IK) is key*

*and this means engaging local leaders and the local political wing of communities. This process of engagement is essential to develop technologies that the communities and farmers believe in – combining CC data / evidence with locally appropriate adaptation strategies and capacities.'*

The Evaluation Team experience with the 2010 CLI 304 Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) is of direct contrast to that of NARO. Whereas institutional traction within and across NARO was clear, the same cannot be said for EIAR. There are a number of reasons for this:

- *'This grant seeks to establish EIAR as a national leader and coordinator in climate change adaptation within agriculture research in Ethiopia, especially in relation to using agro-metrology data to improve agricultural research.'* 2010 CLI 304 Grant Memo. From a review of grant documentation and interviews with EIAR grant management and related stakeholders inside and outside of government, it was apparent that grant objectives are far too ambitious and unachievable with unrealistic budgets and timeframes. RF should share some responsibility for this situation, having identified a relatively junior official via a telephone interview, and to-date having never visited EIAR. Anecdotally, when the official submitted the invited proposal for an amount of \$42,000 RF phoned back and asked EIAR to rewrite a new proposal for an amount of \$420,000, modeled on the proposals developed by NARO and KARI.
- Owing to the positioning and location of the grant-holder, the \$420,000 EIAR grant is unable to be used as per the letter of grant to employ a coordinator and establish a climate change unit and engage, network and influence across EIAR and government as a whole. Some grant monies are being used to support research and teaching in climate change and agriculture. These teaching and research activities are consistent with some activities outlined under the fourth and fifth objectives in the letter of grant. RF funds have resurrected a discontinued post-graduate course on climate change and agriculture at Arba Minch University, and are supporting some students there (this is the biggest budget expenditure reported to date – with \$22,120 U.S. expended on a \$20,000 budget line). The project is also supporting training for small numbers of academics and researchers on subjects such as 'scientific proposal writing; Agricultural Systems Simulator, and Decision Support system for Agrotechnology transfer' – these courses were held at the Nazreth Research Station at which the grant-holder is based. It is reported that some of the EIAR grant will be provided to Prof Mark Jury of the University of Puerto Rico to offer training courses at Arba Minch University and Nazreth research station in December 2011. Prof Jury is conducting research with the BGIS unit into how weather variables relate to crop yields.
- Whereas NARO has managed to mainstream climate change across NARO by writing it into their 2011-2015 Strategic Plan, other directorates within EIAR are not aware of the grant and its objectives. Part of this is attributable to simple logistics. The EIAR grant-manager is effectively a single individual within a small department of six people (plus two students) in an office 100km away from the EIAR head-office. He holds virtually no operational budget. Similar to the situation the Evaluation Team sensed with RUFORUM and Makerere, the grant manager seemed unsustainably over-stretched in implementing multiple initiatives and consequently, is not present or visible at national or international meetings of relevance to the ARI initiative of RF (no one from EIAR attended the two-week training at Egerton University in June 2011). At the same time, the grant manager has been managing a \$13,000 grant from ASARECA, a \$40,000 grant from the World Bank, and has just submitted a grant proposal to DFID's Strategic Climate Institutions Programme (SCIP).
- More significantly still, the main grant objectives do not align with the possibilities that can be realized in the EIAR context. The grant is not contextualized or aligned to other major overlapping initiatives within the Government of Ethiopia and is dwarfed by similar initiatives of major donors (EU, DFID, USAID). Both DFID and the EU (among other donors) are pouring large amounts of resources into mainstreaming climate change in Ethiopia (including to mainstreaming into agriculture), a lot of which appears to be duplicated in smaller amounts in the RF grant. Similarly, EIAR is neither capable of, nor mandated to undertake to form a consortium and to coordinate and network the various government departments implementing environment and climate change projects, as agreed in the letter of grant. Instead the Cabinet of the Government of Ethiopia has issued a decision that climate change will be mainstreamed into all departments, and that the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) with the support of the Office of the Prime Minister will take the lead on this.



The Kenya Agriculture Research Institute (KARI) experience under RF grant 2009 CLI 322 seems to fall somewhere between that of NARO and EIAR. Similar to EIAR, the grant objective was unrealistically ambitious – *‘In support of establishing a climate change adaptation unit that will serve as the focal point for integrating climate change resilience measures into Kenya’s agriculture research programs.’* And the grant was immediately hit by a number of critical constraints, most significantly the struggle to identify and recruit a capable and experienced climate change expert to lead and manage the grant. This meant that within the two years of implementation, two climate change experts have been recruited: the first expert left and joined the East African Community Climate Change Unit, in Arusha, Tanzania; and, the second was only recruited April 2011 after an extensive search and is relatively junior to lead a grant program with such ambitious objectives. She is currently doing her PHD research at the same time. These critical constraints explain the delay in implementation of some activities and the request for a no-cost extension to December 2011.

Similar to the experience of grants across the AAR initiative, the reality of implementing the grant demonstrates a marked divergence from the planned and approved objectives at the start. The grant proposal stated that KARI would develop a new Climate Change Focal Directorate within KARI. In reality KARI has established a Climate Change Unit as a sub unit of the Natural Resource Management Programme, one of the four focal research areas of the institute. This is a far less significant basis upon which to *‘establishing a climate change adaptation unit that will serve as the focal point for integrating climate change resilience measures into Kenya’s agriculture research programs.’*

Consequently, the outputs and outcomes which the Unit has achieved seem to be far more modest than initially planned. Within KARI itself, apart from the formal launch of the Climate Change Unit, little has been achieved beyond creating awareness and establishing linkages with the other KARI focal research areas. Broader knowledge development and information sharing activities are still in their infancy and are certain not at the national coordinating level initially envisaged. At policy level, a small but significant success attributable to the grant, KARI has been co-opted into Technical Working Group responsible for the Kenyan National Adaptation Plan. Generally, it would seem that funding to KARI is far too small in size and duration for any of the senior leadership / management of the institute to consider making the major changes to structure, function and systems that would be required for a Climate Change Adaptation Unit to play a genuinely focal role.

#### **4.3.3 Lessons from supporting ARIs**

- A common theme that the Evaluation Team sensed across a number of grantees is that it appears that ‘popular’ ARIs are becoming versed in accessing donor funds for what are possibly overlapping or at least broadly defined engagements, and that RF grant funds are being used primarily to fulfill and promote existing institutional objectives where there are operational budget shortfalls. In many cases it seems these ARIs are not yet allocating funds on budget lines that match discrete grants.
- Given the limited capacity of grantees such as RUFORUM to report progress beyond outputs, combined with limited demands from RF for evidence of increased capacity from their grantees, it is not possible to assess whether or not the RF capacity support to ARIs has been successful. RF may not want to *claim* success if it were evident but it is important for RF to be able to *identify* success if and when it occurs. At present it is simply not possible to answer whether or not RF’s capacity building efforts with ARIs have been a success or not. This, in turn, makes it almost impossible to define the nature of future support to ARIs.
- A linked point relates to ‘capacity to do what specifically?’ At the individual expert and even institutional level this obviously relates to the capacity to integrate climate change and agriculture, and then to apply this expertise to inform policy and practice. However, RF has not yet defined capacity building indicators at either the institution or initiative-level, and the Evaluation Team could not find any evidence of attempts to assess progress in capacity building across the ARIs.
- Similarly there seems to be no plan or ‘road-map’ illustrating the inter-institutional linkages between the ARIs / newly established Climate Units and how they come together as a regional entity that is greater than the sum of its parts. One potential solution to this problem may be found in ‘translator

organisations’ which can build linkages between research, policy and practice. The SEI Scoping Study has some important observations on the challenges of bringing agricultural decision-makers and climate scientists together (p. 49 and 52) and where there is a need for “translators” who can bridge the gap. A potential role for RF in this arena would be to dedicate the skills of a convenor/ translator such as John Gatenya to build consensus on regional collaboration between institutions in East Africa. For this to be a success RF would need to engage ARIs from the outset to define the climate change agriculture capacity agenda (as well as regional success indicators) rather than simply engaging them in capacity building as a passive but diffuse group of institutions so that they buy-in as a coherent network from the start.

#### 4.4 Support to experiments

The Rockefeller Foundation’s investments in experiments, conducted through collaborations of capable organizations, provide promise of showcase opportunities for solutions at scale. Each of these innovative initiatives is not necessarily a first of their kind, nor is RF the only donor, but these are all pioneering in the contexts in which they operate. These experiments demonstrate the replicability of innovative concepts, and reinforce initiative-wide lessons in the value of professionally managed projects pursuing clearly described objectives and outcomes.

The intersection of African agriculture and climate resilience is a complex and vast terrain where many of the critical solutions will emerge as a result of processes in which multiple actors and sectors find the means of collaborating together.

Cross-sector collaboration is increasingly acknowledged as an ideal working modality in Africa, pooling complementary resources in pursuing greater collective impact and scale (Stott, 2011).<sup>4</sup> The African climate change and agriculture context has attracted the support of multiple donors and has already given rise to multiple partnership initiatives.

Six grants were made to four experimental initiatives, comprising 41% of total RF grant-making to AAR (Table 5). The grant size is above the AAR average, possibly reflecting a higher level of absorptive capacity of these organizations.

Table 5 Key data of support to experiments

Grant Ref.	Grantee Institution	Grant Amount (US\$)	Project period	AAR Outcome Areas
2008 CLI 309	Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSD)	\$375,000	July 1, 2008 – June 30, 2010 – extended to December 31, 2011	2,3,4
2009 CLI 312	Oxfam America	\$568,300	Nov 1, 2009 – April 30, 2011	1,2,3,4
2011 CLI 303	Oxfam America	\$498,000	April 1, 2011 – June 30, 2012	1,2,3,4
2009 SRC 141	GSMA Foundation (Kencall)	\$749,100	September 1, 2009 – Feb 28, 2011	1,2,3
2008 CLI 317	World Food Programme	\$3,000,000	October 1, 2008 – March 31, 2012	2,3,4
2010 CLI	World Food	\$1,000,000	September 1, 2010 –	2,3,4

<sup>4</sup> Stott, L. (2011). The Partnering with Governments Navigator: Building Effective collaboration with the public sector in Africa. International Business Leaders Forum/GTZ.

Grant Ref.	Grantee Institution	Grant Amount (US\$)	Project period	AAR Outcome Areas
309	Programme		December 31, 2011	

With respect to the RF AAR results framework, these grants primarily and successfully address the targeted outcomes on ‘knowledge and experimentation, and ‘partnership and resource mobilization’.

#### 4.4.1 Capacity Building

These interventions do not directly address the primary capacity building outcome of the AAR which is more targeted at capacitating agricultural research and development institutions to integrate climate science into agricultural research aimed at assisting small-holder farmers. It is however important to recognize the potential institutional capacity building impact these interventions might well achieve in terms of changing the ‘rules of the game’.

Two important capacity building outcomes are discernable to different extents in all of these of these grants: i) enhanced capacity of participating organizations (including meteorological and agricultural research organizations) to collaborate and understand the important roles and valuable contributions of the different sectors; ii) enhanced appreciation of the potential of social cohesion and trust in being able to offer the potential of human security that cannot normally be achieved acting separately at levels of smaller scale.

The Oxfam, FSD and GSMA grants have built capacity of multiple stakeholders to develop and engage in new institutional arrangements and relationships in which both users and providers of climate information have been critical.

#### 4.4.2 Knowledge and Experimentation

All of the experiments under consideration here involve cross-sectoral partnerships in which public, private and civil society are working together to achieve common goals. While RF sits on the steering committee of the Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSD), these experiments are a strong example of where RF has provided grants to experienced and professionally managed organizations to act as partnership brokers and managers.

With a small qualification about the WFP project, the overall rationale of the supported explorations is well aligned with developing innovative and potentially ‘game-changing’ interventions that enable small holder farmers to better cope with climate variability and recover quickly from climate extremes.

The first grant in the WFP intervention was for the development of the Africa RiskView software application that uses satellite-based rainfall information in estimating real-time estimates of food needs ahead of and during times of disaster. The WFP seconded a project staff member to Addis Ababa to work closely with the African Union in broadening ownership of the initiative. In seeing the success of the prototype in being able to rapidly quantify needs, the second grant from RF was to enable WFP to explore using the software in conjunction with promoting the development of an AU-led risk pooling facility, along similar lines to that successfully developed in the Caribbean region.

Being at a higher continent-wide level, the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) intervention does not target small holder farmers. Should African governments follow through on their expressed interest and collectively adopt and implement the facility, it will help entire communities, including smallholder farmers, meet basic food security needs in the event of climate-related shocks.

The grants to FSD and Oxfam America are directly concerned with piloting context-specific weather index insurance products which provide farmers with security and options for change. Both of these promising initiatives are professionally managed and implemented in complex inter-sectoral contexts. Index-based insurance projects are beginning to enable previously risk-averse farmers on the margins to invest in fertilizers and achieve improved yields in good years, and get insurance reimbursement in bad years.

The Oxfam HARITA initiative has taken nearly four years in development to the present point where the levels of trust among collaborating organizations and 14,000 participating farmers in target communities is high, with the consequence of a snow-balling demand. Harita is further bolstered in its links to the Productive Safety Net Programme, an Ethiopian public works program present in twelve districts with 600,000 beneficiaries. Oxfam reports that between forty and sixty percent of the farmers who took insurance would not have been able to do so if they were not able to exchange their labor for insurance through the Safety Net Programme.

In Kenya, the FSD program works directly through the banks that provide small-holder farmers with seasonal loans. The insurance is offered as part of the loan package, and in the event of the weather index threshold being reached the insurance payout first services the loan, and then provides the remainder to the farmer.

The grant to GSMA is exploring alternative cost-effective means of mobile telephone-based extension support to Kenyan small holder farmers. This well-targeted innovation is directly aligned with the RF strategy and this outcome area. Kenya business process outsourcing company Kencall has received RF funding via U.S.-based non-profit, GSMA. Similar and related work is being supported by the Gates Foundation elsewhere in East Africa and in Asia. By September 2011 Kencall had fielded 128,000 questions from 72,000 farmers. It is interesting to note that questions around weather information were low in priority.

The Kencall initiative is another example of an experiment trying to work out the best models in which all stakeholders carry some costs so that all collectively can benefit.

#### **4.4.3 Partnerships and resource mobilization**

While the financial concepts themselves are relatively new and are modeled upon initiatives elsewhere around Africa and the world, a significant element of the pioneering challenge relates to the development of new alliances, pathways and mechanisms for the institutionalization of cross-sectoral collaboration. These initiatives are examples that will have important lessons and assist in the understanding of critical success factors for other similar collaborative initiatives.

Should RF choose to further pursue the opportunity, the project provides ongoing entry points of high-level access in furthering relations with the African Union.

The donor-supported nature of these experiments might have some shorter-term unintended consequences in the inevitable cross-stakeholder negotiations in the apportionment of the real costs of these interventions. In effect, the donor-support is able to play an important barrier-removal role in ensuring that the concept as a whole is demonstrated – removing real-costing arguments until proof of concept is closer.

#### **4.4.4 Enabling Policies**

These experiments open up some important policy and governance implications, each of which will take time and process effort in order to find workable solutions. In all instances there are high levels of support and involvement from government stakeholders.

A recurring challenge in the development of services from which one or more partners is obtaining an income, is the reluctance of other partners to provide their contribution at no cost. The provision

of donor support, if not consciously managed, can serve to mask the debate until proof of concept convinces all parties of win-win value – or it can become a perverse subsidy which, when ultimately removed, results in key actors no longer being willing to collectively contribute towards maintaining the partnership.

State-financed institutions such as meteorological and agricultural research services are first faced with bureaucratic challenges in authorizing their officers to provide a regular service to what has previously been a non-target group (e.g. rainfall data to private sector insurance companies, or farming extension advice to private sector companies whose customers pay for the service).

There is a concern from within publically funded institutions at the potential extent and detail of what might become a growing demand. In the case of climate data, many of the metrological services are unable to provide insurance companies with complete country-wide historical rainfall data. They simply do not have it, and if they do it is seldom automatically updated and available on computer databases. There are many ongoing gaps and lapses in the manual recording of such data.

Likewise, while it is the mandate of agricultural research organizations to research and provide useful information through government-appointed extension officers to small holder farmers – there are understandable concerns for the need to obtain policy guidance in applying their agricultural expertise in new directions, which result in the private sector profiting.

These meteorological and agricultural research service organizations recognize their own capacity and resource limits, and they do have a desire to have improved capacity to fulfill their mandates. In the positioning for attention by those who control the allocation of resources (including donors), it is a natural point of departure to raise concerns that the service providing organizations do not have the resources and capacity to respond to the additional demand that will arise from this new avenue of collaboration.

It is these kinds of dynamics of negotiation that require leadership and the development of policy direction from executive levels within government. Cross-sectoral collaboration also requires the careful mediation of competing interests and time-frames. In the case of the Oxfam America HARITA project a great deal of its success and social capital has been leveraged through participating community-based reputations of organizations such as the Relief Society of Tigray (REST). The buy-in of local insurance companies to the HARITA project is predicated on their ability to turn a profit. The investment of organizations such as REST is motivated by the aim of longer-term social wealth creation. For REST, the push and pull of engaging is acting to ensure the system invests in the future by targeting the very poor subsistence farmers, rather than targeting quicker generation of profit through servicing already more secure farmers. The incentive for demonstrating quick results through short-term funding cycles may have the unintended consequence of excluding those poorest of farmers.

#### **4.4.5 Conclusions**

RF's support to experiments has yielded high levels of promise for innovative wide-scale collaborative solutions which can lead to improved food security and resilience from climate-related shocks.

Though barriers to successful implementation at a wide scale do exist, with time and stakeholder commitment, they are not insurmountable. Key amongst these barriers are uneven stakeholder capacities, legal and regulatory issues and the lack of data.

The process and trust-based nature of these collaborative initiatives requires patience with more flexible time-frames. Multiple informants interviewed were highly appreciative of RF being among the first, for example, to champion and finance explorations of micro-insurance in Ethiopia. The visibility and confidence of a donor like RF can serve to play an important trigger role in giving other donors and stakeholder actors confidence to engage more deeply. Concerns were however voiced

by these same informants at the short-term nature of RF funding adding uncertainty and higher opportunity costs in sustaining interventions in complex areas that take longer. Compared to other donors in the field, RF is seen as contributing small grants for periods of time that are too short for what needs to be done.

#### 4.5 Support to institutions and policy

Important assistance has been provided to diverse institutions with relevant interventions aimed at enriching the African climate change knowledge base, developing partnerships and capacitating research and government institutions. The key strategic focus of this support has been “to ensure that climate change resilience is embedded into Africa’s agricultural research agenda” (Grant Memo 2009 CLI 307).

The strategy of granting to African and international supporting and policy-based institutions seeks to promote the creation and dissemination of knowledge products which i) can influence and support practice in direct relation to smallholder farmers; and ii) positively influence the development of enabling government policies.

Four types of institutions are targeted in the AAR; i) African research and development organizations; ii) institutions carrying out field-based adaptation experiments; iii) climate science institutions; and iv) institutions that can help develop and promote adaptation-related policy initiatives for the benefit of the agricultural sector in Africa (Grant memo: 2009 CLI 325). The grants are listed in Table 6.

Table 6 Key data of support to institutions and policy grantees

Grant Ref.	Grantee Institution	Grant Amount (US\$)	Project period	Institution type	AAR Outcome Areas
2009 CLI 325	African Technology Policy Studies Network	\$242,000	Sept 1, 2009 – October 31, 2010 – extended to March 31, 2011	iv) develop and promote policy	2,4
2008 CLI 310	IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)	\$132,600	June 1, 2008 - Nov 30, 2008	iii) climate science	1,2
2009 CLI 307	IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)	\$77,800	October 1, 2009 – July 31, 2010 - extended to December 31, 2010	iii) climate science	1, 2
2010 CLI 314	University of Reading	\$599,400	October 1, 2010 – December 31, 2012	iii) climate science	1,3
2010 CLI 311	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa	\$250,900	September 1, 2010 – December 31, 2010	iv) develop and promote policy	4
2009 CLI 318	World Meteorological Organization	\$323,000	September 1, 2009 – August 31, 2011	iii) climate science & ii) field-based experiments	1,2,3,4

While the grouping of these five grant recipients and their unrelated interventions is retrospective, the concept of programmatically supporting a cluster of grantees to develop, assemble and disseminate focused evidence in relation to specific CC challenges is a niche that could be productively developed if there was a focal coordinating point. If support to future pilots,

experiments, and capacity interventions were cohered around one or two common themes within the broad ambit of CSRD, the links between evidence and policy influence could be made stronger.

#### 4.5.1 Capacity Building

Support to three of the five grantees was aimed at building capacity for new institutional arrangements and relationships between providers and potential users of climate information.

Identified as a key regional provider of climate information, an early grant in June 2009 to the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) was in partial support of a workshop which, inter alia sought to promote interaction of a wide range of relevant stakeholders with climate scientists and resource persons. RF actively used its networks and convening power to bring in other CC international experts it was supporting to make presentations and add value to the conference. (An attempt to follow-up with participants from the ICPAC workshop is described in Box 1.

Following a period of scoping, In November 2009 RF approved a second grant to ICPAC aimed at developing ICPAC's own organizational strategic planning capacity and to elevate its visibility to other donors. RF had determined that if ICPAC was to serve as a climate change adaptation resource for other African institutions that RF also seeks to support (the ARI's); it was important to procure international expertise in developing a strategic plan for the organization.

While the provision of short-term expertise was a good idea and responded directly to a need expressed by the grantee, it appears that the roots of the identified data quality and access issues were located institutionally deeper than could be addressed by a short-term grant for the development of a strategic plan and funding strategy. It remains a longer-term challenge in developing collaborative approaches in which there is inter-institutional willingness to share climate-related data.

A lesson from this experience is that interventions that require or lead to operational changes within the implementing and related organizations take longer and more work and follow-up than originally anticipated. There remains an expressed need for improved conditions which enable routine information exchange. RF has not provided ICPAC with a further grant as it appears that the national research and development institutions supported by RF would benefit more by having stronger collaborations with their own national meteorological agencies.

#### Box 1 Results from a workshop follow-up survey

In view of the importance of capacity building in the grant portfolio, a workshop conducted by ICPAC in 2008 for which good documentation was available was selected for a follow-up survey of participants. Contact details were available for 64 participants and they were sent a link to an internet survey. Some 24 of the email addresses were no longer active and of the remaining 40, only 8 people completed the survey. Clearly, such a low response means there is little scope to generalize from the results. The table below summarizes response for nine questions. The remaining six questions asked about contacts with institutions and individuals dealing with climate change in the hope that a network analysis might be possible, but too few responses were received.

The responses are interesting. They are positive about the value of the training and provide a number of relevant examples about ways in which participants have been able to make use of the knowledge and skills they gained. To improve the chance that workshops contribute to the Foundation's capacity building outcome the Foundation should consider institutionalizing a follow-up survey. Earlier follow-up might have resulted in a better response than that we experienced, and done systematically across grants would result in a comprehensive body of information. The mechanism of follow-up could be used to foster a community of practice around climate change. This could be a role for a grantee such as RUFORUM. In the unanalyzed questions respondents note that personal contact is their preferred and most common means of interacting with other climate change people. Participation at a RF-supported workshop could be the ideal starting point

### Box 1 Results from a workshop follow-up survey

for such interactions, but the post-workshop experience needs to be managed.

	Questions and comments	Response
1.	<p><b>Do you think that the knowledge and skills gained at the workshop has improved your effectiveness?</b></p> <p><i>'I have investigated the traditional methods of weather forecasting among the some communities in the Upper West region of Ghana and have achieved interesting results'</i></p>	87.5% - A lot 12.5% - Some
2.	<p><b>Have you made use of any new tools, methods or information gained at the workshop, in your work?</b></p> <p><i>'Assessment of availability of food based on rainfall data, access to inputs based on price data, Diet score or Food score. Cropping strategy by using climate changes and crop resistant on the way of resilience.'</i></p> <p><i>'I have been keen on observing collective adaptation strategies used by communities at household level to cope with the changing weather conditions. Having done Integrated Pest Management Project at College level, the workshop provided a good platform to advance my skill on agricultural land practices that enhance livelihood resilience under climate change and variability in our country. Indeed, I can attest that the workshop was an eye opener for me as a young aspiring professional.'</i></p>	62.5% - A lot 25% - Some 12.5% - None
3.	<p><b>On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 is low and 6 is high, how would you rate the overall value of the workshop for your work?</b></p>	37.5% - 4 50.0% - 5 12.5% - 6
4.	<p><b>Have you started to collect sector specific data to establish association and trends between climate and production?</b></p> <p><i>'As a follow-up to the training at home, all agricultural extension agents in the Region were supplied with the sets of forecasting equipment and collected data from their operational areas that gave a wider coverage than the stations of the Ghana Meteorological Agency. We collaborated with the GMet in data collection and analysis.'</i></p>	37.5% - A lot 50% - Some 12.5% - A little
5.	<p><b>Have you involved local communities in any way to help you with the data?</b></p> <p><i>'Community Opinion Leaders, Agro-Based NGO representatives, Interested private individuals and staff of the FM radio stations in the Region were also trained and supplied the simple barometers and rain gauges for them to participate in data collection at the station and giving early warning to communities on imminent rains.'</i></p> <p><i>'Production trends collected using household questionnaire'</i></p> <p><i>'We do carry out survey on local farmers' production and outputs. Some rainfall stations are manned in local areas with participations from various communities'</i></p>	37.5% - A lot 50% - Some 12.5% - A little
6.	<p><b>Have you used new methods of analyzing meteorological and hydrological data in your work?</b></p> <p><i>'I have been using Climate Predictability Tool (CPT) and SYSTART in carrying out seasonal rainfall predictions'</i></p>	25% - A lot 25% - Some 37.5% - A little 12.5% - None
7.	<p><b>Have you quantified and prepared any vulnerability indices?</b></p>	12.5% - Yes 87.5% - No
8.	<p><b>Have you prepared any policy recommendations as a direct result of knowledge or skills acquired at the workshop?</b></p> <p><i>'Yes. On the issue of start date and end date of the rain season in (location).'</i></p> <p><i>'I have been using the seasonal rainfall forecasts in advising the government and local farmers based on the onset and cessation of rainfall and the expected amount of seasonal rainfall.'</i></p>	28.6% - A lot 28.6% - Some 14.3% - A little 28.6% - None
9.	<p><b>Have you stayed in contact with any people you met at the workshop?</b></p>	57.1% - Some 42.9% - A little



A more recent grant in Kenya (Weather Information for Development - WIND) was made by RF in partnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for a cross-sectoral collaboration aimed at providing smallholder farmers with access to better weather and climate information. This includes the purchase and operation of 120 automatic weather stations which will feed data into the Kenya Metrological Services.

If ICPAC was targeted for capacity building to ultimately enable access to quality climate-related data, the grant, nearly a year later, to the University of Reading was primarily (60%) aimed at developing capacity through facilitating partnerships between climate information providers and eight RF-selected agricultural research centers across East Africa.

The strategic design of the support to the University of Reading is premised upon the not yet validated assumption that the newly established “climate units” receiving RF support will develop the capacity and institutional positioning in their own institutions and countries to be able to integrate climate change information and data into their national agricultural development strategies. As discussed in the previous section on ‘support to ARI’ these ‘climate units’ are variously placed and unevenly enabled within very diverse institutional arrangements in their own countries. The possibility of sustained inter-institutional collaborative ventures at the regional level seems remote at this stage. The possibility of demand-driven individual research projects of regional relevance is more likely.

Greater levels of interest are evident among the growing numbers of universities represented in the University of Reading support for the development of post-graduate courses and entire curricula for them to offer at their institutions. While such courses will no doubt add to knowledge and capacity, it also becomes necessary for some facilitation and decision-making as it is unlikely there will be sufficient students for all universities to offer the same courses.<sup>5</sup>

The University of Reading report that their assessments indicate a key gap and need is for strengthening climate risk and adaptation research capacity at the national levels, and that efforts need to be made to establish working relationships between the RF CC units and the national metrological services. The regional collaboration envisaged and promoted by RF will require significantly more time and institution-building process support before already overstretched government officials and academics are incentivized by their employers to dedicate time for this.

The University of Reading grant also makes provision for a post-doctoral fellow to provide networking and information support for a two-year period, with the Climate Exchange Network Africa (CENA) website recently established as a primary vehicle. The fellow is located within the Nairobi RF offices and is likely to play a critically important networking and facilitating role in following up on ensuring agreed and timely action amongst participants. It is too early to determine the value of the new web portal in developing a common sense of collaboration and cooperation. Prima facie, there does appear to be strong added value to capacitating researchers by making what are reported to be previously unavailable research papers and data more widely available through CENA.

These initiatives have been up and running for too limited a period of time to discern any sense of ownership and demand-driven engagement by the target individuals and the institutions they are part of.

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<sup>5</sup> The partners invited to in upcoming discussions on curriculum development include Uganda - Makerere university and RUFORUM; Ethiopia - Mekelle University; Kenya - Egerton University; Tanzania - Sokoine University and University of Dar es Salaam; Rwanda - Rwanda Agriculture Board / National University of Rwanda and University of Reading - Walker Climate System Research / Statistical Services Centre

It is already apparent however, that developing new institutional relations (beyond individual research collaboration links) requires leadership efforts and dedicated inputs that most of the participating academics and government officials are not in a position to provide.

It is unlikely within the current five-year period that there will be visible evidence of where capacity built at climate change units or academic institutions has led to new interventions that enable smallholder farmers to adapt to the challenges of climate change.

The compacted timeframes of the initial grant provide challenges for the development of common research agendas and projects. As the grant memo points out: “The success of this grant will be determined by the willingness of these institutions to collaborate with the Reading team, as well as each other”. The value of statistical training and data support provided through the University of Reading is predicated upon the requirement that “there still must be capable staff” in the climate units. In the case of EIAR, the individual grant-holder has the requisite academic qualification but is overstretched and does not have a “climate unit” or any staff that could be sent to the two-week training course held at Egerton University during June 2011.

#### **4.5.2 Knowledge and Experimentation**

The RF grant to WMO stands out as a demand-driven initiative with potential positive and sustained impact in capacity building and experimentation in which a pilot experiment on improved access to weather information will assist small holder farmers to cope better with variability. The Director General of the National Meteorological Agency of Ethiopia (NMAE) approached the WMO and asked for assistance in replicating a successful pilot that the WMO had undertaken in Mali. In turn, the relevant official at WMO was aware of RF’s interest in this area and asked if RF in New York if they might be willing to support the work.

This grant has been successful as a small qualitative pilot experiment aimed at improving agricultural production through enhanced use of forecasting and rainfall information by agricultural extension officers and small farmers. With support at the highest level in NMAE linking at similar levels in the Ministry of Agriculture, both sets of officials have been able to develop important new working relationships between the NMAE and targeted agricultural extension officers. The grant has also served to strengthen technical and working relationships between NMAE and WMO and groups of small holder farmers in selected pilot regions. The RF CC unit partner at EIAR was invited to participate on the steering committee but, due to other pressing commitments, has not been able to engage.

In this instance, the size of the grant and the timescale in which it was required to be implemented have provided some limitations. From a timing perspective, the learning and validation that occurs from the project is dependent upon seasons and rainfall events that cannot be controlled. From a scale perspective, the small size of the intervention is insufficient to generate the kind of data needed for publication in a journal or sharing on an international stage. Rather, in the opinion of the WMO, valuable district-specific institutional relationships have been built, and there is a body of qualitative and anecdotal evidence to suggest that there is value in expanding this initiative to a scale which will enable comprehensive documentation and scientifically representative data. Should that project prove the cost-effectiveness and value, then the Director-General would be able to carry the budget argument to the Government of Ethiopia. WMO estimates that a pilot project of statistically valid scale would cost in the vicinity of \$5 million. (See also Box 2)

#### **4.5.3 Partnerships and resource mobilization**

The second objective of the University of Reading grant is for the development of inter-institutional relations for collaboration around a common regional research program. Such initiatives will very likely always require the sourcing of financial support external to the core budgets of the participating national institutions. The scale of support provided by RF to the University of Reading,

and to the associated institutions in five countries provide potential for useful individual short-term collaboration and individual learning opportunities, which may or may not result in sustained individual relationships.

Some of the more visible, qualified and capable officials and academics in this network are able to attract significant donor funds to their research budgets and departments. In each case, each donor has expectations of deliverables that these busy people are not always able to entirely meet. It has become apparent that the 'demand' for regional collaboration from the donor side is not as easy to implement and not always a priority. The University of Reading was initially invited to undertake a scoping study of needs and priority areas of the participating institutions. Before this study could be completed, at the Nairobi partner convening in February 2011, RF announced that it had established a U.S. \$3million fund to incentivize research collaboration among partners.

### Box 2 Building partnerships – what happens next?

The RF grant to WMO provides a microcosm that surfaces some generic strategic operational CSRD questions for RF on issues of financial scale, length of support necessary, number of projects and adding RF facilitation and networking resources to secure sustained impact.

The \$323,000 project with NMAE via WMO is a demand-driven inter-institutional mini-pilot collaboration which, by various accounts received, is demonstrating the value of enabling collaboration between agricultural extension officers and meteorologists in Ethiopia, and – when “tested by a climate shock” it is believed by the implementing agencies that it will demonstrate its value in having provided forewarning and informed agricultural decision-making.

The two-year limited duration and small scale of the grant are such that there are not enough resources to engage and monitor a statistically valid sample size, and to be sure of a climate shock in order to demonstrate the relative value of fore-warning and planning. Experience and feedback from the pilot do indicate that this initiative is worth pursuing and piloting at a scale which can provide the Director General of NMAE with the fact-based evidence to motivate for the government of Ethiopia to implement the initiative at scale. Such a pilot would also provide WMO with the possibility of sharing lessons learned with other countries.

RF's key ARI partner in Ethiopia, EIAR, was invited to participate at various levels, including in a Climate and Food Security Working Group, but has not been able to take up the opportunities. WMO is engaged in discussions with WFP and Oxfam about the possibility of further linking with the Harita initiative that has also been supported by RF. WMO has also had discussions with Irish Aid who “may” be interested in talking about providing some additional support.

The WMO project with NMAE raises useful questions with respect to next steps in the event that a seed grant has led to the development of promising partnerships. Does RF see it as its role, and does it have the staffing and convening resources to assist those partners in accessing further support and development of this initiative? Does RF invest further itself as a possible parallel national partner in Ethiopia?

#### 4.5.4 Enabling Policies

Aside from the grant to COMESA supporting engagement in CC negotiations, RF's support to African Technology Policy Studies Network (ATPS) is the clearest example of support to an African institution primarily seeking to inform and influence policy development processes.

The support to COMESA, originally earmarked via CPR, has enabled a capable individual consultant who was working with an RF grant to WWF, to become a climate change advisor to the COMESA Secretariat. RF grant funds have been key in that they have paid the salary and travel costs of this person to be able to engage at key high-level platforms and push the agriculture climate-change agenda within Africa and globally. The support provided has been less successful in institutionalizing capacity on issues of climate change within COMESA and the other RECs, and the sustainability of this engagement post COP17 is in some doubt.

It appears that earlier grants within AAR were more focused on supporting capable individuals within institutions, and later on evolved towards a more institution-wide focus. A September 2009 grant to the (ATPS) enabled the Executive Director to engage with the IPCC and at various conferences. The grant also provided for the ED to direct funds for the conduct of research and grey-literature publishing of policy-related research. The flexible ambit of the funding suggests the objective of ensuring visible African engagement and contribution to the policy arena was primary ahead of any specific focus area, or collaborative approach with other RF grantees.

Support to UNECA in convening the Seventh African Development Forum high-level conference in 2010 is a less direct, but also useful, means of enabling awareness and discussion amongst influential policy makers. The conference was specifically focused on climate change and provided RF and its partners with access an event and influential decision-makers with whom they could engage and pursue possible opportunities. It is understood that RF continues to engage in discussions and consider the establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union.

The SEI scoping report points out the need for “translators” to specifically formulate scientific evidence in a manner that is comprehensible to non-scientists and especially in the policy arena. ATPS is one example of this potential. FANRPAN is able to convene thematically focused conferences, commission specific pieces of research, and through its networks report to and obtain audiences with important African decision-makers. Much of the influencing takes place through the provision of non-formal policy and information support, and it would be counter-productive for organizations like FANRPAN to publically claim attribution. RF might however engage and jointly strategise the design of grants in specific pursuit of mutually agreeable outcomes, and ask for more detailed reporting from grants provided.

From a programmatic perspective, there is further potential within RF for a focused process of assembling documentation and evidence across supported interventions and disseminating this into targeted policy and public media arenas. In a future CSRD there is potential for a cluster of RF-supported partners, through their various partnerships and platforms, to assemble specific bodies of evidence, or demonstrate the viability and cost-effectiveness of a pilot or experimental interventions. The challenge and opportunity is to translate the scientific and experimental outcomes into policy-relevant messages and recommendations for purposeful targeting at events such as the African Development Forum, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, and others.

#### **4.5.5 Conclusions**

If looked at from a programmatic perspective, the AAR/CSRD intervention is, in development terms, still a nascent collection of widely distributed and mostly unconnected projects that have been retrospectively clustered into component areas.

There appears, in a number of cases, to be further untapped potential value in RF providing additional management and technical support “glue” to cross-pollinate and facilitate the development of additional collaboration and development in a CSRD program. The complexity and vast scope of the African agricultural terrain that RF has chosen to engage with suggests that greater added value can be achieved through engaging “deeper” with “fewer” groupings of mutually reinforcing interventions.

What is clear from the key non-conference-related grants discussed in this section is that the important issues and challenges they are addressing are not the kind that can be assessed, addressed and resolved within the space of a short-term relatively small grant.

A two-year project cycle period is a challenging and limited amount of time in which to set up new pathways and interventions to develop new institutional arrangements between climate information providers and African agricultural research organizations. A two-year approach is more suited to

‘commissioning’ organizationally sophisticated and mature institutions to test something that they are already equipped and set up to undertake. Many of the solutions to the strategic objectives chosen by RF in the AAR arena demand the pioneering and development of new cross-sectoral collaborative partnerships in institutionally weak and fractured contexts.

Establishing new institutional platforms that are responsive to the key imperatives and incentives that drive their participants’ demands time and investment from those participants, as well as sustained support and engagement from a group of sponsors.

Some of the existing AAR interventions are likely to develop evidence and lessons that do have important policy implications. Further value could be added through additional documentation and dissemination and use of the knowledge and experience generated.

Some of the experiments are likely to present important evidence of new and valuable collaborative solutions, and also are a rich source of contextual material for furthering the understanding and development of effective cross-sectoral collaboration.

The initiative to support the development of climate units in ARIs is ambitious, and will require more resources and time for the development of a clear focus and achievable common purpose. More especially, a successful ARI collaborative initiative will require dedicated RF support in engaging and cohering with the increasing number of donor organizations engaging all of these same institutions from different organizational entry points, and with competing visions. Support is also needed in the planning implementing and monitoring of the ARI interventions with a view to results-based management and demonstrating impact.

Influential individuals from organizations associated with those projects will engage in the policy arena only in so far as they have institutional mandates and incentives to do so. For example, while many of the scientists engaged at ARIs may publish their research, and even present it at an academic conference, it is a rare that the same individuals will become engaged in processes aimed at influencing the workings of policy and governance.

A number of the partners interviewed conveyed a sense that they would continue to submit proposals to RF in seeking to sustain what is seen as an initial short-term grant. In the event that RF does not approve the next proposal, they will take it to another donor. The circumstances of a short-term relatively small grant in an increasingly crowded donor environment invite consideration of comparative advantage and added value. The RF granting and reporting process is reported by many as flexible and positive to engage with. The consequence of this flexibility is that monitoring and reporting of impact becomes very difficult to discern, and that in some cases it may even be possible that more than one donor is separately credited in ‘supporting’ the same activities.

In some cases the short-term nature of the granting does not give confidence to the stakeholders to invest their own time and resources as deeply, and could lead to an under-investment in activities with potential, but that require time and effort in facilitating process and collaboration with other institutions? In other words, it is possible that relatively small individual short-term grants introduce an unintended bias towards activities already within the sphere of the grantee’s control, and discourage the development of new collaborative investments whose time demands and outcomes are uncertain.

Very often, where intervention outcomes are dependent upon cooperation and cross-sectoral collaboration donors have the opportunity to add value and assist in a demand-driven facilitatory and convening way. There is a qualitative difference between, for example, granting jointly with other donors in a pilot to test approaches to index-based insurance systems – as compared to establishing from scratch a collaborative research platform across diverse institutions in five different countries . The value-add of convening and facilitating extends beyond target participant organizations. In a donor crowded environment there is significant value in investing in donor

coordination and leveraging of combined and coordinated resources in pursuit of common objectives.

## 5 Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction (CPR)

### 5.1 CPR Overview

The Carbon for Poverty Reduction Initiative (CPR) was approved in 2008 as an Initiative in Development with a budget of \$ 16 million. From 2009-2011 CPR spent \$ 11,748,980 on grants primarily in Africa. The CPR Initiative at the outset was conceived as a global Initiative in Development and included work in Guyana, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Many of the projects funded, especially the work on standards and methodologies, were global in scope.

A full list of the CPR grants up to the start of the evaluation is set out in Table 7. The evaluation combined:

- For all CPR grants - a desk review of the formal grant documentation and grant deliverables available through the RF SharePoint system;
- For a purposive sample of grants – semi-structured face-to-face and telephone interviews undertaken during the field visits to Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa, and the United States;
- A small number of face-to-face and telephone interviews with key informants outside grantee organizations including donor staff, government policy makers, a range of carbon market experts outside grantee organizations.

Table 7 CPR Grants List

Grant Ref.	Grantee Institution	Grant Amount (US\$)	CPR Outcome Areas <sup>6</sup>
2010 CPR 202	CARE USA	494,000	<u>2</u> & 1
2009 CPR 206	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Secretariat	500,000	<u>3</u> & 1
2009 CPR 209	Conservation International Foundation	198,800	2 & <u>3</u>
2009 CPR 207	Environmental Education Media Project for China	1500,00	
2009 CPR 210	Environmental Education Media Project for China	15,000	
2008 CPR 203	Forest Trends	100,000	<u>2</u> & 3
2009 CPR 201	Forest Trends	229,500	<u>2</u> & 3
2010 CPR 203	Forest Trends	600,000	<u>2</u> & 3
2008 CPR 202	Meridian Institute	96,300	<u>3</u>
2009 CPR 204	Meridian Institute	100,000	<u>1</u>
2010 CPR 204	Meridian Institute	193,600	<u>1</u>
2009 CPR 208	Nature Conservation Research Centre	349,900	2 & 3
2009 CPR 203	Rainforest Alliance	200,000	<u>2</u>

<sup>6</sup> Outcome Areas underlined represent key/particularly significant grants for that Outcome Area. Where specific grants were designed to contribute to multiple Outcome Areas, both Outcome Areas are listed with the primary focus listed first.

Grant Ref.	Grantee Institution	Grant Amount (US\$)	CPR Outcome Areas <sup>6</sup>
2008 CPR 201	William J. Clinton Foundation	2,000,000	<u>1 &amp; 2</u>
2009 CPR 202	William J. Clinton Foundation	2,000,000	<u>1 &amp; 2</u>
2010 CPR 201	William J. Clinton Foundation	3,000,000	<u>3 &amp; 2</u>
2008 CPR 204	World Wildlife Fund	500,000	1 & 2 & 3
2009 CPR 205	World Wildlife Fund	650,000	1 & 2 & 3
2010 OAS 302	Oxfam	25,000	1 & 3
2010 CLI 311	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)	200,000	Unclear
2010 CLI 314	University of Reading	149,406	Unclear

## 5.2 Evaluating the CPR Initiative Portfolio

Before, evaluating activities, outputs and outcomes under CPR, it is important to note the following caveats and assumptions:

- The definition of ‘success’ for CPR adopted by the Evaluation Team is set out in the CPR Results Framework:  
*“If this initiative is successful, farmers who use improved land and forest management measures to increase the amount of carbon stored in trees and soil will be paid for the global environmental benefits that these activities provide.”* Land-based Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction Results Framework, page 1.
- RF grant-making under the Initiative has been (retrospectively) defined under four key Outcome Areas - *Enabling Policies, New Financing and Implementation Models, Capacity, and Organizational excellence, management, accountability and learning*. Despite the retro-fitting and in the absence of another ‘lens’ by which to approach the CPR initiative, Outcome Area is deemed the most appropriate framework to assess the CPR portfolio. The *Organizational excellence, management, accountability and learning* is interpreted to relate to internal RF grant planning, management, and lesson learning, and is dealt with separately in Chapter 7. To the best of the knowledge of the Evaluation Team there is no definitive list of which CPR grants contribute to which Outcome Area. Consequently, the allocation adopted in the analysis below is based on the findings from the desk review which assessed grant documentation to establish which Outcome Area(s) the grant contributes to;
- Based on the evidence available to the Evaluation Team, it seems only limited initiative design and planning was undertaken before the first grants were commissioned under the CPR initiative;
- The initiative did not progress through the standard three phases RF programming – Search, Development and Execution. Rather CPR was approved directly as an Initiative in Development;
- There is no evidence of a CPR baseline document or scoping documents equivalent to those commissioned to inform the design of the AAR initiative;
- Despite significant progress defining a CPR results framework, at present no indicators have been developed at output or impact level. However, there are success statements which to some extent act as indicators for each Outcome Area;
- Although success is defined at the level of farmers, Outcome Areas focus on enabling policies, new financing and implementation models, and capacity building at the national level. Taking this one step further, there is currently no explicit elucidation and only a little implicit understanding within RF of a CPR Theory of Change or results pathway linking activities, outputs, outcomes and impact as well as major risks and assumptions;



- The majority of grants contribute to more than one Outcome Area making an assessment of the contribution of a specific grant to a specific Outcome Area more complicated. Further complexity is introduced as a series of grants have been given to a number of organizations (in particular Clinton Foundation, Forest Trends, Meridian Institute, and WWF). As would be expected, these grant series have tended to ‘evolve’ over time so that a grant proposal that began with a focus on capacity may evolve in subsequent grants to focus more on influencing policy or testing implementation models; and,
- The Clinton Foundation (US\$7.0m), WWF (US\$1.15m), and Forest Trends (US\$929,500) have all received series of grants with objectives across all three Outcome Areas and which account for a significant proportion of total CPR funding. Each of these organizations merits a short stand-alone analysis which are detailed under one of the outcome areas below but which as a set of grants contributes to multiple Outcome Areas.

### 5.3 CPR Outcome Area 1 – Enabling Policies

#### 5.3.1 Outcome Focus

<b>Outcome Area</b>	<i>International and national policies emerge that allow and encourage the inclusion of agricultural and other land-based carbon sequestration activities in global carbon markets</i>
<b>What success would look like</b>	<i>Forest management and agricultural land management policies and practices more effectively and efficiently contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and increase the resilience of smallholder agriculture as a result of the acceptance and use of land based carbon credits.</i>
<b>Key grants / grantees</b>	2008 CPR 202 Meridian Institute 2009 CPR 204 Meridian Institute 2010 CPR 204 Meridian Institute 2008 CPR 201 William J. Clinton Foundation 2009 CPR 202 William J. Clinton Foundation 2009 CPR 206 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Secretariat

#### 5.3.2 Outcome Area 1 Results

The CPR initiative was conceived in 2008 against a backdrop of great optimism in the potential of global carbon markets to deliver benefits to poor rural communities dependent on agriculture and agro-forestry. The rationale for RF’s involvement was simple - ensuring that policies are in place for smallholder agriculture to take advantage of the potential of global carbon markets. In practice, delivering the results originally envisaged has proved more difficult, owing in large part to unexpectedly complex external environment at national and international level which has proved beyond the control and influence of CPR grantees.

A number of significant results have been achieved but what is clear from the grantee interview and analysis is how deliverables (outputs) have generally differed from defined objectives and how a series of grants (particularly to the Clinton Foundation) have evolved and transformed away from their original objectives in response to external constraints, and generally delivered far less ambitiously than was originally conceived. The Clinton Foundation accounts for 60% of the total grant funding allocated under CPR. As such, the Clinton Foundation was expected to deliver a significant proportion of CPR results across all three Outcome Areas with a principle focus on Outcome Area 1. Their experience, detailed in Box 3 below, is broadly illustrative of grantee experience across the CPR initiative.

<b>Box 3 - Clinton Climate Initiative</b>			
<b>GRANT</b>		<b>FUNDING</b>	<b>% CPR FUNDING</b>
2008 CPR 201	William J. Clinton Foundation	\$2,000,000	17%
2009 CPR 202	William J. Clinton Foundation	\$2,000,000	17%

### Box 3 - Clinton Climate Initiative

2010 CPR 201	William J. Clinton Foundation	<u>\$3,000,000</u>	<u>26%</u>
		<b>\$7,000,000</b>	<b>60%</b>

Over three grants and four years the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) under the William J. Clinton Foundation has accounted for \$7m and 60% of CPR funding. Interviews were held with the CCI Director of the Global Carbon Measurement Program in Washington and the CCI Country Director in Kenya. The essence of the CCI support was to establish and test a National Carbon Accounting System (NCAS) at the policy level and set up a number of viable demonstration projects at the community level. In practice, the CCI CPR strategy has evolved in the face of the lessons and challenges encountered over the 3 years of the RF support as well as external factors which have constrained and slowed the development of international carbon markets since 2008. RF would be justified in concluding that its support to CCI has not delivered against its original objectives and that the results that have been delivered have been more modest than expected. CCI maintain that the initial discussion with RF related to a 'vision' to establish credible MRV of climate finance all the way through to viable projects on the ground. 'Neither parties knew how this would develop but the initial agreement was for 5 years support at approx. \$2m/year.'

That is not to say that important results have not been achieved as well as significant lessons learned. Based on the constraints encountered, CCI have revised down their overly ambitious initial objectives to focus on smaller niche areas as their understanding of the carbon-market space has grown. For example, within NCAS, a key aspect is defining robust and credible Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems. Within MRV relevant satellite data availability and software is critical. To this end CCI have established the Global Forest Observations (GFO) group and published several journal articles on data requirements for MRV, reportedly influencing global policy on MRV data requirements.

#### Key results / outcomes:

- Guyana – most successful country context – CCI provided major support to develop a viable MRV system – so much so that Norwegian Government is now willing to provide \$70m in REDD funding in absence of functioning UNFCCC climate finance credits.
- Kenya and Tanzania – CCI has set up a National Carbon Accounting Centre in Tanzania and assisted Kenya with REDD Readiness proposal as well as accessing additional support and technical assistance from Norwegians and Australian government.
- Far less progress has been made in terms of viable community-level demonstration projects. The projects have been delayed and constrained by a range of external constraints (particular politicized land tenure issues at local and country level). No organization has yet been able to crack financially viable projects benefiting communities at the ground level.
- Future sustainability of CCI activities will be a challenge – CCI have not approached RF for further grant funding due to a sense that RF are frustrated with the lack of progress and how the grants have evolved. At present very little funding committed beyond end of 2011 although grant proposals have been submitted by CCI to the Australians (approx. US\$10m) and the Norwegians.

#### Lessons from the CCI grant series:

- More on-going interaction with RF throughout the life cycle of the grant stream would have better prepared RF to understand the complexities, constraints and evolution of the work of the CF, which in itself would be a valuable outcome.
- Improved grant planning during the conceptualization of the overall CPR initiative as well as for the individual CCI grants would have better identified key external risks.
- CCI have met the minimum reporting requirements placed on them by the RF grant process. However, minimal planning, monitoring, lesson learning and synthesis requirements have been placed upon them either before or during the grant period. Therefore aspects of impact, influence, and innovation may well have been achieved and may be very evident to CCI, but they are not reported to RF. This has diminished lesson learning and contribution to policy.

Table 8 The evolution of CCI grant objectives

<i>From broad and ambitious to more specific and less ambitious</i>	
GRANT REF.	GRANT OBJECTIVE
2008 CPR 201	No Grant Memo available and very few details of the Grant Objective detailed through available documentation. Signed Grant Agreement explains the grant as a 'partnership' between CCI and RF with the following longer term outcomes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>A pilot system will be in place for carbon monitoring</i></li> <li>• <i>Models of institutional capacity and supporting mechanisms will be in operation in multiple developing countries to ensure that carbon payments will benefit small-holder farmers and reduce poverty.</i></li> </ul>
2009 CPR 202	<i>The current grant for the Clinton Foundation for its Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) addresses barriers by developing and deploying an internationally accepted measurement system for carbon sequestration in trees and by further developing and testing national carbon accounting systems in four countries using that management system. With supplemental funding from other sources, CCI will also help to design and implement demonstration projects in Guyana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Cambodia.</i>
2010 CPR 201	<i>To develop, deploy and demonstrate carbon measurement and accounting systems including demonstration projects that enable poor people in rural areas of developing countries to participate in and benefit from global climate markets.</i>

Table 8 details the evolution of the CCI grant objectives, which rather than becoming more ambitious throughout the life-cycle of the grant series as results are delivered and progress towards an overall objective or purpose is achieved, seem to become less grounded as grant implementation has progressed and the constraints and challenges mentioned above are encountered. This feature is evident across a number of grantees but is most significant for the CCI as they represent the majority of CPR grant funds.

Although on a much smaller scale, the Meridian Institute has also had a series of three grants which contribute primarily to CPR Outcome Area 1 Policy, as well as Outcome Area 3 Capacity. The nature of the relationship between RF and Meridian is different from that of other grantees in that Meridian's focus has been on providing scoping and landscaping support directly to RF rather than undertaking activities which attempt to engage or influence the wider CPR policy and programming environment. The context of the relationship between Meridian and RF across the three grants was explained as incorporating 2 distinct phases:

- Phase 1 – Meridian was engaged by RF to provide a 'landscaping' role related to carbon markets and the opportunities this might present for poverty reduction related to agriculture in Africa – reportedly this was done as a direct request from Judith Rodin and Gary Toenniessen. Significantly this engagement took place after the large grant stream to the Clinton Foundation had been formulated and commissioned so the findings of the landscaping could not influence the content and strategic direction of the initial Clinton grant. Based on the document analysis available through the RF SharePoint and the interviews with Meridian, it is unclear how the landscaping support provided to RF shaped the content and subsequent strategic direction of the CPR initiative, if at all. The Meridian Interim Report from the first grant simply reports on the activities undertaken and not on the implications of the outputs or potential outcomes.
- Phase 2 – Post Copenhagen COP – RF asked Meridian to engage and coordinate REDD negotiators – bring together a unique group of NGOs, donors, governments, and individuals interested in agriculture and carbon finance in order to demonstrate that agriculture as well as forestry is appropriate for carbon financing. A meeting scheduled to take place at Bellagio never happened because of disruption to air travel arising from volcanic ash in 2010. Meridian did coordinate this group and produced a set of deliverables in line with their grant memorandum. However, at interview

when pressed on the potential outcomes (or impact) these outputs may have produced, Meridian struggled to identify anything specific. Rather, Meridian feel that outcomes are not appropriate for the capacity support, facilitation, and convening role they play.

In summary, it is obvious that both Meridian and RF feel that there is great value in their relationship and that the advisory role Meridian has offered to RF under CPR has significantly contributed to the initiative. However, the unique and personal nature of the relationship and the relative lack of documentation of specific outcomes resulting from the interaction make the added value of the Meridian grants difficult to assess.

The support provided to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Secretariat (COMESA) also falls under Outcome Area 1 in the results framework. However, as this grant has broader links to RF’s work on building the capacity of African institutions, the COMESA grant is dealt with under Outcome Area 3 – Capacity.

### 5.3.3 Contribution to CPR Success

Success under Outcome Area 1 Enabling Policies is defined as:

*Forest management and agricultural land management policies and practices more effectively and efficiently contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and increase the resilience of smallholder agriculture as a result of the acceptance and use of land based carbon credits.*

Based on this definition it is very difficult to assess the extent to which CPR grants have been successful. As described above, grantees have generally delivered the outputs (particularly deliverables such as reports and meetings) in line with their grant agreements. And there is some evidence of successful results – CCI can demonstrate it has made a major contribution to developing a viable MRV system in Guyana and has set up a National Carbon Accounting Centre in Tanzania and assisted Kenya with REDD Readiness proposal. Generally, grantees have given the impression that progress towards success has been constrained by a very complex carbon-market environment. This, combined with a lack of formal outcome-level reporting required of grantees and very limited outcome monitoring from RF, means that, beyond isolated grantee-level results, there is very little evidence of an enhanced enabling policy environment for CPR. A less ambitious and more narrowly defined policy outcome would have allowed RF to contribute towards success against a more meaningful and realistic objective.

## 5.4 CPR Outcome Area 2 – New Financing and Implementation Models

### 5.4.1 Outcome Focus

<b>Outcome Area</b>	<i>New financing and implementation models are created that make it technically and economically possible for smallholder farmers to participate in and benefit from carbon markets through implementation of land management techniques that increase carbon sequestration in trees and soil.</i>	
<b>What success would look like</b>	<i>Poor communities receive increased and timely compensation and/or agricultural benefits for their verifiable contributions to land-based carbon sequestration through more efficient financial mechanisms that reduce transactions costs, new approaches to benefit sharing, and implementation models that facilitate greater levels of aggregation.</i>	
<b>Key grants</b>	2008 CPR 203	Forest Trends
	2009 CPR 201	Forest Trends
	2010 CPR 203	Forest Trends
	2009 CPR 203	Rainforest Alliance
	2008 CPR 204	World Wildlife Fund
	2009 CPR 205	World Wildlife Fund
	2010 CPR 202	CARE USA

#### 5.4.2 Outcome Area 2 Results

The major grantees under Outcome Area 2 are Forest Trends and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), although there are some relevant and interesting outcomes from the support provided to CARE and the Rainforest Alliance. Owing to the nature of the activities and the links with COMESA, the WWF grants are dealt with under Outcome Area 3. The initial investments made to these grantees were conceptualized around demonstrating that financing and implementation models from carbon markets could deliver benefits at the community level.

Once again however, there is some evidence that the constraints previously mentioned (often described as ‘real world events’) have shifted the direction, lowered the ambition, and altered the results delivered by these grantees. The set of three grants received by Forest Trends is a case in point. Similar to CCI, Forest Trends initially set out with an objective to support the development of National Carbon Accounting Systems (NCAS) and then articulate the potential opportunity market-based carbon payments present to poor communities involved in agriculture and agro-forestry. The grant process was commissioned against a backdrop of optimism about the potential of carbon markets to benefit the poor and was ambitious in that it proposed working on three fronts – influencing carbon market policy, supporting the development of a carbon fund or climate facility with the private sector, and demonstrating the viability of this with communities.

The approach taken by Forest Trends was two-phased: Phase 1 – 2008 CPR 203 and 2009 CPR 201 – aimed to better understand agriculture and carbon finance opportunities and constraints (transactions costs for communities, risks to private sector investment, and highly politicized issues such as land tenure which constrain carbon market policy and programming). Phase 2 – 2010 CPR 203 – to pilot and articulate investment opportunities through 2 pilot projects under a Climate-smart Agricultural Finance Facility (CAFF) in Ghana and Ethiopia. Phase 1 seems to have been successfully delivered. In the same way as other grantees have experienced, progress under phase 2 has been slower. That is not to say that the pilots under the CAFF have been unsuccessful. Rather, Forest Trends is keen to stress that considerable learning has come out of the pilots, summarized as follows:

- *“Optimism remains in the potential for carbon finance - successful carbon financing will develop given time but will take longer than 2- year grant cycle.”*
- The carbon finance context has changed since the CPR grant initiative was conceptualized – the bilateral UNFCCC carbon financing agenda which is highly politicized (and to which CCI is tied) has stalled. Rather, Forest Trends adapted to a changed vision by taking a country by country approach of engaging specific institutions in each country and building local capacity on three fronts – communities, private sector (financial institutions and commodity producers), and government policy makers through the pilots in Ghana and Ethiopia.
- Future context is squarely focused on forest carbon (REDD+ and REDD++ including agro-forestry and agriculture). This agenda drove Cancun (COP 16) and is driving the run up to Durban (COP17). *“There remains high donor interest in the potential of carbon markets for poverty reduction but donors tend to be more risk averse than RF. Therefore there is an opportunity for RF to lead conversation and encourage donors to follow.”*
- Forest Trends recognize that insufficient grant planning was undertaken in order to better identify the constraints and risks posed by a complex environment. In order to improve grant planning and monitoring they would endorse a framework combining a Theory of Change with Scenario Planning to build in unpredictability of various possible development pathways / scenarios. This would allow grantees to be fleet-footed in response to changes in the external environment whilst at the same time establishing a framework for improving grant planning and monitoring.

It was apparent to the Evaluation Team that there has been very little interaction between the CPR grantees, even between those undertaking very similar grants under the same Outcome Area. Most apparent is the almost complete lack of interaction between CCI and the other grantees (WWF, Forest Trends, Meridian Institute, CARE US, and Rainforest Alliance) despite the dominance of CCI

within the grant portfolio and the similarity and overlap of a number of their grant activities with others such as Forest Trends.

In terms of design similarities, the Rainforest Alliance work is similar to that of Forest Trends in that they have attempted to demonstrate the viability of carbon finance by stepping outside the UNFCCC process. However, the Rainforest Alliance appears almost unique amongst CPR grantees in delivering against their objectives on time and according to the budget of a single grant – dealing with a complex external environment without lowering their ambition or altering their objectives.

The Rainforest Alliance is a standards promotion organization. They received a single grant of US\$200,000 to scope and establish a low carbon farming module which could be integrated in their sustainable agriculture standard. The essence of the idea was to market ‘climate friendly’ crops (cocoa and coffee) to private sector producers. The interesting implication for RF is that rather than engaging with the entire carbon finance environment as other grants have tended to, the Rainforest Alliance was funded to pilot and develop a single, distinct, and coherent idea. The Rainforest Alliance deem the module to be ‘climate smart’ because it aims to enhance the livelihoods and resilience benefits of existing farming practices with additional payment possibilities for environmental services (mitigation through reductions in GHG emissions which private sector producers are willing to pay for to reduce their carbon footprint). Similar to the change in direction adopted by Forest Trends, the unique feature of the Rainforest Alliance approach is that it side-steps the UNFCCC-based carbon credit system which is complex, politicized and slow and unpredictable in its development.

As assessment of the Rainforest Alliance work reveals two critical success factors:

1. The concept is based around a single, distinct, manageable and coherent idea.
2. As the leading standards promotion organization, the Rainforest Alliance is able to draw upon the presence of existing, already established networks or relationships that i) reduce opportunity cost and time needed through already having established a working relationship of trust; and, ii) bring sufficient numbers of actors together to provide economies of scale - and even if it were a pilot, sufficient numbers of actors from which learning can be credible and shared.

The CARE and the Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) program of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) grant entitled Making Carbon Finance for Sustainable Agriculture Work for Poor People in Western Kenya is directly comparable to the CCI pilot project work in the Mau Forest at Enuskoopia in Kenya. However, whereas the CCI pilot demonstrates a significant disconnect between planned objectives and subsequent delivery, initial evidence from the CARE grant points to a discreet, realistic, and well managed project which is benefiting from detailed planning at the outset. The project focuses on Nyanza Province and specifically the Nyando River catchment where there are high levels of poverty and serious environmental degradation issues. The project aims to demonstrate how carbon finance can be used to enhance farm production – and thus food security – and build resilience of livelihoods and farming systems to climate change, while at the same time delivering on climate mitigation goals.

The CARE proposal sets out very clearly a strategy and process for their CPR project. Unlike CCI and Forest Trends, the CARE project is conceived as a long-term initiative comprising three phases with only the first phase dependent on RF funding. Thus the overall aim of the project is concerned with learning from a pilot rather than achieving change. In direct contrast the CCI and Forest Trends grants have been designed to rely on a series of grants from RF to progress from pilot, through development, to sustainable implementation in an unrealistically short three to five year time period.

Similar to the Rainforest Alliance conceptualization, the CARE project is deemed to be ‘climate smart’ in that to increase farm productivity and food security while also increasing the amount of carbon sequestered from the atmosphere should ensure that adaptation converges with mitigation and both become co-benefits.

Much of the learning around the challenges of implementing carbon-finance demonstration projects is similar to that of CCI and Forest Trends. In terms of sustainability, CARE are already aware that the project will not be financially viable as originally conceived and that current carbon markets will not fund the continuation of the project. This arises from a combination of the carbon price being too low and the small scale of the project. CARE estimate that break-even is more likely to take about 10 years as the pilot needs many more trees hence much larger numbers of farmers. These sustainability issues are in line with those experienced by CCI at Enuskoopia.

In terms of interaction with other CPR grantees, it is interesting to note that original demand and conceptualization for the grant came from an interaction between RF and CARE at the Katoomba Group meeting in Ghana, facilitated by Forest Trends. The combined CARE-RF rationale for the grant was not a field project per se but a learning and initiation model that could be scalable and replicable. Overall, it seems that the project has delivered this. However, subsequent CPR grantee interaction has been limited to low level engagement with COMESA and WWF. CARE has not interacted with CCI. This is likely to have limited the extent to which new knowledge and learning on new financing and implementation models have been shared within the CPR initiative.

### 5.4.3 Contribution to CPR Success

Compared to Outcome Area 1, success is more apparent under Outcome Area 2 new financing and implementation models. A number of new financing and implementation models have been piloted and there is considerable evidence of learning in terms of how to make these models technically and economically viable for smallholder farmers, despite no grantee institution (or institution outside RF) able to ‘crack’ the financial sustainability issue at present.

Compared to Outcome Area 1, one reason for the relative success of Outcome Area 2 relates to pilot projects being undertaken on a case by case local level where grantees can control a greater number of the risks and individually they are less vulnerable to the complex, external environment which has constrained carbon-market policy environment.

A number of innovative approaches are evident, particularly the neat, well-planned alternative approach to carbon finance tested by the Rainforest Alliance. Overall, grantees have successfully demonstrated the potential in carbon markets to deliver benefits to poor farmers, even if sustainability is a long way off. These benefits can be considered climate smart if the activities are designed so that adaptation converges with mitigation and both become co-benefits.

Whilst Outcome Area 1 Enabling Policies has inevitably focused on achieving policy change, Outcome Area 2 has focused more on learning than change. Significant learning is apparent across all grantees despite the fact that much of this learning has related to the difficulties and challenges of establishing viable models for smallholder farmers. However, the relative lack of interaction and exchange between grantees is perhaps a missed opportunity and results may well have been amplified had RF invested slightly more in enhanced outcome monitoring and improved grantee interaction and knowledge sharing.

## 5.5 CPR Outcome Area 3 – Capacity

### 5.5.1 Outcome Focus

<b>Outcome Area</b>	<i>Capacity to design, implement, monitor, and integrate agricultural carbon sequestration activities within agricultural development programs is increased among development professionals and capacity to monitor and measure land based carbon sequestration at the national level is increased, facilitating expansion in the amount of carbon finance applied to agricultural land uses.</i>
<b>What success would look</b>	<i>Practitioners in the development and environmental community and National level policy makers have and use the capacity to design, implement, monitor and finance land</i>

<b>like</b>	<i>based carbon sequestration projects based on lessons derived from empirical evidence, and successfully disseminate lessons learned and good practice guidelines.</i>						
<b>Key grants</b>	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>2009 CPR 206</td> <td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Secretariat</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2008 CPR 204</td> <td>World Wildlife Fund</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2009 CPR 205</td> <td>World Wildlife Fund</td> </tr> </table>	2009 CPR 206	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Secretariat	2008 CPR 204	World Wildlife Fund	2009 CPR 205	World Wildlife Fund
2009 CPR 206	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Secretariat						
2008 CPR 204	World Wildlife Fund						
2009 CPR 205	World Wildlife Fund						

### 5.5.2 Outcome Area 3 Results

No grants or grantee organizations are specifically referred to in the Outcome Area 3 results framework so this presents a challenge to evaluating RF efforts to enhance capacity under the CPR initiative. Those grants referred to in the table above are deemed to be relevant to Outcome Area 3.

By their very nature, a significant proportion of the activities, outputs and outcomes delivered by the grantees under Outcome Areas 1 and 2 relate to enhanced capacity. For example, CCI have clear enhanced Tanzania's capacity to engage in carbon finance policy discussions through the development of a National Carbon Accounting Centre. And similarly, supporting the Kenyan Government with their REDD Readiness proposal has developed their capacity to benefit from future UNFCCC REDD opportunities. In each of the financing and implementation pilots financed under Outcome Area 2, the capacity of local communities of smallholder farmers to better understand and prepare for the potential carbon finance opportunities has clearly been demonstrated. However, increased capacity has not been the driving force of these grants and across the grant portfolio there is no evidence of any process / framework to assess or define increased capacity.

WWF and COMESA are the two grantees where capacity building has been the defining feature of their grants and where attempts to directly enhance capacity are most apparent.

WWF has received two grants under the CPR initiative totaling US\$1.15m. The purpose of the first grant (2008 CPR 204) was to support WWF's partnership with COMESA to help develop and promote an African Bio-Carbon Initiative designed to ensure due consideration of African interests in the context of forth coming international negotiations on global climate change. The purpose of the second grant (2009 CPR 205) was to build on the previous grant and move beyond supporting the African position in international negotiations, to create the necessary institutional, policy and practice frameworks that incentivize rural communities to practice land-based carbon sequestration. The project is known as the Rural Futures Programme and aims to mobilize a variety of stakeholders to achieve the integrated development of rural Africa. In practice, both grants shifted away from their original purpose and emphasis to focus more broadly on strengthening the role and capacity of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, particularly COMESA. WWF maintain that the shift in emphasis was based on a mutual understanding with RF that there was and is a strategic opportunity to engage with certain Africa RECs as they gain in maturity and are recognized for the potential role they can play leading and coordinating climate change policy and programming across the continent.

This shift in emphasis was accompanied by a 'sister' grant to the WWF 2009 CPR 205 grant made to COMESA (2009 CPR 206) to:

1. Support an African Group of Negotiators in forging a common position on pertinent issues affecting the continent in the on-going climate change negotiations.
2. Support COMESA Member States to develop and implement climate change policies, strategies and action plans that are directed towards building resilience and reducing vulnerability in particular among the rural poor.
3. Establish a robust community climate knowledge management and sharing platform by strengthening a select farmer organizations and community institutions to bolster their effectiveness in supporting farmers to adapt to adverse impacts of climate change.

Whilst WWF did launch the African Bio-Carbon Initiative in partnership with COMESA and subsequently launched the Rural Futures Programme, the general and fairly open funding support from RF to both grantees has primarily resulted in one advisor to work with and support the



COMESA Secretariat, and to become engaged in CC negotiations processes. As a regional secretariat, COMESA has been less well placed and capacitated to directly engage in the project management of the envisaged carbon sequestration readiness in Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia. The support through COMESA to African CC negotiations capacity has been effective and has reportedly had significant impact. In retrospect, support for envisaged pilot interventions on carbon sequestration might have been channeled through an organization with an implementing mandate capacity, who could liaise through COMESA as an entry point to the identified countries.

With the limited reporting available, and whilst this individual is widely reported to be a charismatic and influential ‘mover and shaker’ it is not possible to determine the extent to which this support has delivered any specific or concrete results or the extent to which capacity within and across COMESA has been enhanced beyond the additional resource capacity of the mandated individual to engage in policy negotiations processes. The primary value of this grant to RF may be that of a potential entry point to COMESA at an institutional level. The issue for RF is how to ensure they utilize this opportunity. WWF maintains that RF is missing this opportunity to support, network and engage COMESA at a strategic level despite RF having a huge comparative advantage in this area: *‘Judith Rodin can command an audience at the level of RECs and RF has the profile to convene. Whilst Bellagio is the perfect location.’*

### 5.5.3 Contribution to CPR Success

The key successes under the two WWF grants relate to mobilizing support for African institutions as philanthropists, donors and African governments themselves increasingly recognize the emerging maturity and potential of organizations such as NEPAD and COMESA.

In addition, WWF feel that the effectiveness of their grants has been broader than the objectives stated in the grant memo – focused on developing thinking on rural transformation in the face of the challenges presented by climate change under the heading ‘Rural Futures’ and that this thinking can significantly inform RF’s conceptualization a future CSRD initiative. However, WWF have struggled to engage RF in a dialogue explaining the evolution of the grant and how this has influenced their thinking about climate smart rural development. More broadly, the majority of the grantees interviewed, except for the Meridian Institute, felt that they had not been engaged by RF on the lessons, knowledge and capacity they had gained from the CPR initiative which could feed into CSRD either throughout the life of the grants or more recently in advance of CSRD.

The experience of the provision of the advisor to COMESA demonstrates that, however influential and charismatic, capacity is only likely to be increased on an activity / issue level rather than at the institutional level required for real change and influence from COMESA. This in turn requires RF to engage with COMESA at an institutional rather than individual level.

## 5.6 Conclusions

- *Some positive results from CPR* – There is evidence of a number of impressive outputs and some evidence of higher level outcomes across CPR grantees. For example,
  - At the policy level: CCI can demonstrate it has made a major contribution to developing a viable MRV system in Guyana and has set up a National Carbon Accounting Centre in Tanzania and assisted Kenya with REDD Readiness proposal.
  - At the project level: the neat, well-planned alternative approach to carbon finance tested by the Rainforest Alliance through their low carbon farming module which could be integrated in their sustainable agriculture standard.
  - At the capacity level: mobilizing support for African institutions as philanthropists, donors and African governments themselves increasingly recognize the emerging maturity and potential of RECs such as NEPAD and COMESA.
  
- *CPR is less coherent as a body of work than AAR.* There are several reasons for this:

- The development of carbon markets both at the international and national policy level, and the local community level is inherently complex and contingent upon a multitude of external factors beyond the control of grantee institutions. More attention should have been given to grantee selection, grant monitoring and lesson-learning by RF, and to grant planning and risk mitigation by individual grantees.
  - Because of this inherent complexity, particularly apparent under Outcome Area 1 which is contingent on policy change at the national and international level, CPR results have tended to differ from the objectives defined in the grant documentation
- *Difficult to assess efficiency and effectiveness* – Whether CPR has been successful as a coherent grant initiative that is ‘greater than the sum of its parts’ is difficult to assess as there is no explanation of how the various grants link together or support each other. Similarly, there is very little documented or synthesized evidence of how specific grants have contributed to CPR outcomes as very little is reported at the grant level beyond defined outputs – most frequently progress reports. This issue is further compounded by virtual absence of an approach, framework or process to monitoring grantee outputs, synthesize outcomes, and extract knowledge and learning at the initiative level.
  - *Overlapping Outcome Areas* – Related to the point above and further complicating the assessment of CPR efficiency and effectiveness is the issue of overlap on outcome areas which to an extent is inevitable, particularly when a significant proportion of grantee activities relate to capacity (Outcome Area 3) when working on policy (Outcome Area 1) or financing and implementation models (Outcome Area 2). The implication for RF is that a lot more clarity could have been brought to bear with some ‘scoping’ work on defining the Outcome Areas and Theory of Change more tightly at inception (and also in getting corresponding grantee objectives, outputs and outcomes to ‘connect’ in the grant design and contracting process.
  - *Initiative planning* - It is evident that CPR lacks the exploration and testing of ideas, identification of risks, and the development of innovative solutions that would have been undertaken if the initiative had progressed through the standard RF programming process including a Search phase rather than being approved directly as an Initiative in Development.
  - *A balanced portfolio* – The portfolio of grants is not balanced across the Outcome Areas or in the scale of the grants allocated across grantee organizations. In particular, the Clinton Foundation set of three grants accounts for US\$7m of the US\$11m portfolio.
  - *Defining a coherent and concise niche where RF has comparative advantage* – Influencing carbon market policy is a hugely complex task which is dependent upon multiple factors and actors. Whereas RF can has been able to demonstrate success with new financing and implementation models it is less clear that RF can really make a difference at the level of international policy, especially within the three to five year initiative life-cycle currently favored by RF.
  - *Maximizing possibilities for successful interventions* - Two broad aspects that are key: 1) sufficient in-house and/or formally contracted capacity which enables RF to make effective and informed decisions based upon an on-going exchange with grantees (involving M&E, process facilitation, relationship maintenance, and trouble-shooting etc.); 2) A core of grantees that are identified as having a record of being capable institutional actors with already established relationships and networks with stakeholders and beneficiaries that RF is ultimately seeking to target.

## 6. Grant management, organizational excellence, management, accountability and learning

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with management of the grants by the Foundation. The importance of results-based grant management was formally recognized when the results frameworks for both AAR and CPR were finalized in January 2010. One outcome objective under each grant stream was “organizational excellence, management, accountability and learning” The results framework outcome statement envisages that:

*“The Climate Change/African Agriculture team operates effectively, efficiently, provides leadership in RF and in philanthropy, contributes to the RF Mission, is relevant and accountable to its stakeholders and learns from its monitoring and evaluation to improve its performance.”*

Team members in this context are taken to be the leadership and management staff employed by the Rockefeller Foundation in Nairobi and New York who share responsibilities for making significant inputs to AAR/CPR.

The AAR/CPR initiatives do not yet appear to have had the opportunity to further develop the results management system as envisaged in the January 2010 draft of the results framework. While AAR/CPR does not have agreed indicators of success for its outcome areas, this AAR/CPR outcome statement is effectively the same statement as that used for the ACCCRN program. The same indicators as developed in the ACCCRN program will therefore be used as the basis for this assessment:

- partners’ and grantees’ performance
- satisfaction of partners, donors and networks with the responsiveness of the AAR/CPR Team
- the influence that AAR/CPR have upon RF initiatives and management practices.

### 6.2 Strategy and planning

The Rockefeller Foundation is undergoing a process of major change from being a traditional philanthropic grant-making operation towards becoming a results-based impact-driven, developmental catalyst and innovator. RF has replaced its previous thirty-year horizon on sectoral engagements with an ambition of being a catalyst within a specific location and sector over a five-year period. RF’s renewed organization-wide vision focuses on resilience building engagements in which poor and vulnerable men and women are enabled to improve their lives.

New appointments and positions in the last three years are reinforcing this process of change. The appointment of a Managing Director for Monitoring and Evaluation in 2009, and the appointment of a Vice President for Strategy and Evaluation within RF have provided significant impetus for an organization that seeks to operate within a results-based framework. The process of organization change within RF is reported by staff as “a tough process of adjustment” in: i) retrofitting existing grants into a new framework, ii) critically engaging in discussions around strategy, added value and comparative advantage, and iii) practically implementing new approaches in grant-making as the organization’s processes and staffing roles and responsibilities seek a new balance.

In addition to its geography-specific and sectoral areas of focus, RF is also pursuing strategic synergies across and beyond initiatives. Feedback and learning from areas of intervention are increasingly processed within RF in a structured and strategic manner, and can lead to further pioneering innovations, such as the emerging multi-donor initiative of UCCRF being informed and catalyzed by the RF ACCCRN experience. Key staff absences or leadership gaps in contribution to the strategic value chain can also result in lost opportunities – within and across initiatives.

The progression of organization development within RF has resulted in the recent emergence of “strategic soaks” as a key platform in constructing, mediating and guiding initiative direction. These “soaks” are the recognized platforms from which internal strategic discussions and monitoring are beginning to be carried out. The “soak” enables engagement of grant staff with senior management in determining the evolution of strategy. They are the site from which memos and Board updates are constructed, and also the site at which grant managers account for the alignment of their proposed grants with the overall portfolio strategy.

The emergence of RF’s matrix-oriented field-focus of five issue areas,<sup>7</sup> with defined objectives and increasingly clearly articulated strategies, are challenging the organization to explore new ways of selecting, cohering and administering its grants.

In terms of the aid effectiveness principles<sup>8</sup> of ‘alignment’, ‘harmonization’ and ‘managing for results’, the organization-wide changes within RF are moving operations towards globally acknowledged best practice in addressing poverty, inequality and the promotion of growth.

However, this evaluation takes place at a time when the impact of these change processes, coupled with the prolonged vacancy of the Nairobi Associate Director post, have provided considerable challenges to those responsible for the management and strategic direction of the AAR/CPR components.

In addition to coping with impetus for change in the way RF approaches its grants selection and management, the AAR/CPR components themselves are subject to a rethink with a view to developing the Climate Smart Rural Development (CSRSD) component instead.

These intersecting processes of change challenge available staff to balance the need for ongoing attention and involvement with current grants and their processes, while at the same time thinking through a new strategy approach and niche that will enable RF to engage and bring added value. The third and inter-linking process of concurrent change is developing grant management and administration systems that enable selection, design, monitoring and reporting of outcomes and impact from within and beyond individual grants.

From a grantee perspective, most who were interviewed were not aware of any RF theory of change, or where their grants fitted into RF’s overall strategy for engaging in AAR/CPR. More recently RF has been appending to its grant letters a four-page summary of its vision for CSRSD.

The grantee perception report results from the CEP 2010 survey (see Box 4) indicate positive feedback from both the CCI and a small sample of CPR grantees.

#### Box 4 Evidence from the CEP survey 2010<sup>9</sup>

##### Key Findings - CCI

Climate Change grantees rate the Foundation significantly *higher* than other Rockefeller grantees for understanding of grantees’ organizations, effect of the Foundation’s funding on sustainability of their work, overall satisfaction, strength of funder-grantee relationships, clarity of the Foundation’s communication, the

<sup>7</sup> Basic survival safeguards, global health, environment and climate change, urbanization, and social and economic security.

<sup>8</sup> **Ownership:** Recipient partners exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and co-ordinate development actions;

**Alignment:** Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures;

**Harmonisation:** Donors’ actions are more transparent, collectively effective and harmonised with each other;

**Managing for results:** Managing resources and improving decision-making with a focus on results;

**Mutual accountability:** Donors and partners are accountable for development results

<sup>9</sup> The Center for Effective Philanthropy (2010) The Rockefeller Foundation Grantee Perception report Results: Initiative Reports for Climate Change, and Carbon and Poverty Reduction

#### Box 4 Evidence from the CEP survey 2010<sup>9</sup>

extent to which the Foundation is a thought partner in grantees' work, and the success of the Foundation in building capacity.<sup>2</sup> A significantly *larger* proportion of Climate Change grantees received a site visit and a significantly *smaller* proportion report having a contact change or using the Foundation's funding to bring other investors into their program to create leverage of existing work.

##### **Key Findings - CPR**

Statistical testing was *not* conducted for the ratings of Carbon and Poverty Reduction grantees because there were fewer than 10 respondents from the initiative. On average, Carbon and Poverty Reduction grantees rate *higher* than other Rockefeller grantees for the consistency of the Foundation's communication resources and for the significance of the Foundation's funding in relation to their other funders.

### 6.3 Grant Selection

The AAR component execution strategy was approved within RF in mid-2009. The Associate Director based in the Nairobi office played a lead role in developing the strategy and in initiating an organic process of grant selection and grant-making in building a portfolio. Grants were made as early as 2008, mainly for conferences and workshops, which enabled RF to begin engaging with key role-players in the region.

Informed by the scoping studies, and through a process of selected stakeholder engagement, the component architecture evolved, cohering around support to the three areas; i) agricultural research institutions; ii) experiments; and iii) institutions and policy. The January 2010 draft results frameworks defined the outcome areas to which grant-making should be aligned.

The AAR/CPR team is reported to have a weekly video conference meeting where discussion focuses upon grants under review and in process. For African grantees the funding decision is made early-on during the concept stage, and the AAR/CPR team then provides support in the further development of that proposal.

Key to grant-making strategy for 2010 was then to "identify gaps in grant-making across the Outcome areas", and "to identify and engage new grantees to fill gaps" (pp 8-9 AAR Results Framework, January 2010).

Early grant selection processes appear to have been strategically opportunistic, with RF staff in New York and Nairobi using their networks and referrals to identify and approach people who might be able to engage in relevant project areas. In most cases RF has approached grantees and invited proposals related to areas of mutual interest. Though few in number, there have also been successful grants made (e.g. World Meteorological Organization and the Ethiopian Meteorological Service) where organizations have approached and made relevant proposals to RF. In the case of the World Food Programme, an RF Associate Vice President read a journal article in early 2008 that interested her. A few phone calls were made and a delegation from the WFP flew to New York to discuss an investment in the development of software. This engagement has led to \$4million in grants from RF, a WFP/AU partnership, with progression to an ambitious but promising Africa-wide design replication of a successful Caribbean-wide risk-pooling initiative. This initiative has attracted interest from other donors and continent-wide interest from African countries in the idea of a functional Africa Risk Capacity facility. The initial \$3million proposal from WFP simply outlined a planning process ahead of the submission in July 2009 of a three-year implementation plan. The initial \$3 million grant was made on the strength of credible partners undertaking to submit a more detailed plan at a later stage.

While there were some subsequent questions around the internal alignment of the WFP intervention to RF's AAR objectives, the grant was made with confidence in the WFP and key staff to professionally implement what is both a technical and very process-oriented complex intervention.

RF trusted the project leaders it met, it also had confidence in oversight and internal accountability mechanisms within WFP. The risk of pioneering the implementation of a good idea was reasonable.

This evaluation also found an example of the consequences of RF seeking to award a grant without sufficiently confirming or validating the assumed contextual and institutional positioning of the individual grantee that was referred to them.

The process of “filling gaps” has led to some supply-driven examples in which scoping, and stakeholder identification processes seemed to have been more limited, or where referrals carried a strong weight. It is reported that some individuals in national agricultural research institutes were telephoned ‘cold’ by RF and invited to submit proposals to RF. An example of the grant selection process not working out as planned is the case of the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR – grant 2010 CLI 304). A relatively junior official at an agricultural research sub-station, but someone with the appropriate academic agro-meteorological scientific qualifications, reports submitting a proposal following a thirty-minute ‘cold’ telephone call from RF. Upon receiving the proposal RF again contacted the proposer and invited him to adjust the proposal content and increase the amount from \$42,000 to \$420,000. In effect, the official was invited to submit a proposal similar to an example that RF would provide – the proposals developed for NARO and KARI with the assistance of Dalberg Global Development Advisors.

The evaluation team has found that a number of the objectives agreed to in the EIAR grant cannot be achieved as the grant-holder is neither mandated nor capacitated to undertake associated activities. The grant holder is not “the Head” of his department as described in the RF grant memo. It is evident that senior management in RF understands that EIAR is using this grant to build a climate change coalition across government and to mainstream climate change across all research departments in Ethiopia.<sup>10</sup> In reality, the grant-holder is not enabled or mandated to lead or even engage in already established national processes being led by the Office of the Prime Minister and the Environment Protection Agency. A further objective of the RF EIAR grant conflicts with established government process in that it is the EPA and not an official in the BGIS department in a sub-station 100km outside of the capital that is mandated to develop policy with respect to the institutional structuring of climate change functions in government. Due to internal regulations, the EIAR principle grantee is unable to implement procurement as envisaged in the grant agreement and the grantee is unable to employ a climate change advisor, or establish a climate change unit, or purchase a super-computer, or a vehicle – as envisaged in the generic proposal provided to him and agreed upon. To date, no one from RF has visited EIAR or met with its senior administration. RF is reportedly in the process of discussing a further grant to this grantee.

In both examples, the letters of grant were addressed by RF to the Executive Director (WFP) and Director General (EIAR). In the case of WFP, the return contract was signed by the Executive Director. In the case of the EIAR grant, the signatory is an official in a position entitled “Planning, Evaluation and Monitoring Coordinator”.

#### **6.4 Grant management**

The overall management of Rockefeller Foundation’s (RF) East Africa AAR/CPR components has been challenged by the absence of an Associate Director in the Nairobi Office for close on a year (2010-2011). While the New York-based Associate Director (AD) and Managing Director have provided leadership and made significant contributions, the loss of the Nairobi AD set limits on the added value that RF could bring to AAR/CPR on three key fronts:

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<sup>10</sup> “We met with the Ethiopia Institute of Agricultural Research, a climate change grantee, who are using our grant to build a coalition of partners from various government institutions and doing innovative work to ensure that all research departments in Ethiopia factor in the issue of climate change.” (Heather Grady – VP of RF Trip Report for Ethiopia in January 2011).

- strategic facilitation in identifying and responding to opportunities and requests from important actors;
- promotion and maintenance of network relations and content knowledge with and among key partners;
- lapses in institutional memory, grant administration and closer monitoring of grantee progress.

RF engagement with grantees is reported by grantees to have been limited. The RF Nairobi office is perceived differently by grantees, with some experiencing it as absent and unresponsive, while others saying they appreciate the ongoing contact and forwarding of relevant information. It is understood that the weekly AAR/CPR team video-conference meetings do not monitor grantee progress and performance, but are more focused on the development of new grants. It appears that the main means of monitoring and engaging with selected grantees takes place through informal e-mail exchanges, occasional telephone calls, and by RF staff observing at training courses at which groups of RF grantees are attending.

The Africa Regional Office is most often identified in grant memos as having responsibility for monitoring grants *“through field visits, conference calls, reports, and both formal and informal discussions”*. In a number of grants (e.g. ICPAC) RF’s monitoring role is extended to actively participate in meetings. Capacity constraints within the AAR/CPR initiative have limited the extent of monitoring and partner engagement that has been possible. The Regional Managing Director also notes that the office experiences high demands on staff time to participate in VC meetings and other exchanges with colleagues at RF Headquarters, which have a bearing on time available for interaction with grantees.

Grantee reporting is highly uneven in quality, and in some cases found to be absent or not as frequently submitted as stipulated in the letter of grant. It appears that the grant reporting process is not used as a management and learning tool by either the grantee or RF. A number of grantees did express doubts that anyone read the reports submitted.

Two examples illustrate the span of current practice. In one case (EIAR) no reports for the grantee could be found within the RF system even though the letter of grant required four quarterly narrative reports over that period. The grantee insists he submitted a narrative report to RF Nairobi and to the Office of Grants Management during December 2010, and showed the evaluation team a copy of that report on his computer. At the end of August 2011 the grantee submitted an annual report following the financial disbursement related triggering of an automatically generated reminder e-mail from RF. As part of its ‘Atlas’ system RF has triggers for automatic e-mails to be sent to grantees in the event that a payment tranche is due and a required report has not been logged. This same automatic system does not apply to regular reports that are not tied to payments.

In contrast, the Financial Sector Deepening Trust submits reports using its own internal reporting proforma. This tabular format conveys key information about the project objective and outputs, gives comments about progress with activities, and includes assessments against performance targets, project purpose and impact. Although more elaborate than the Foundation requires, the use of a simple tabular format with progress information and some performance assessment is an approach that could strengthen RF’s monitoring and grant management.

A positive example of movement towards a more formalized portfolio-wide engagement was the grantee convening meeting held in Nairobi during February 2011. Grantees report the meeting as being valuable to them in better understanding RF and its strategies, and also as a networking opportunity to engage with other grantees working in similar content areas. An annual convening meeting provides a useful platform for enhanced coordination among partners, mutual accountability, and sharing strategic information and learning.

A number of the grantees did comment strongly that the level of detail that could be provided in the time allowed for grantee report-backs in the convening meeting was unsatisfactory, and felt there

should be higher expectations of accountability and presentation of evidence in support of claims of impact.

## 6.5 Efficiency

This chapter has commented on the existence of capacity constraints within RF AAR/CPR that have impacted upon the process of grant selection and management. In exploring issues of efficiency, the evaluation of ACCCRN made a simple comparison of resource use compared to grant sizes and numbers. These numbers do also have to be read while taking the capacity of implementing grantees into account.<sup>11</sup>

AAR/CPR grants are generally smaller and more plentiful than those in ACCCRN. At the time of evaluation AAR had made 36 grants totaling \$14.7m; with CPR making 21 grants totaling \$11.7m – collectively, 57 grants totaling \$26.4m. By contrast the ACCCRN initiative had issued 36 grants to 18 grantees totaling \$38 million.

The size of grants to African institutions is smaller. The biggest grants have all been awarded to international organizations<sup>12</sup> that generally have the professional management capacity and experience to implement and account without closer monitoring and capacity building support needed.

Looking at Tables 9-11 below, there is a reasonable parity in comparisons of full-time equivalent staff to amount of funds disbursed. When looked at from a perspective of grant numbers to FTE's, the capacity challenges within AAR become very apparent, even without taking into account the additional opportunity cost of granting to some organizations not familiar with results-based management approaches.

Table 9 Comparative full-time equivalent staff allocations

Initiative	Full Time Staff Equivalents (FTEs)			
	Managing Directors	Associate Directors	Research Assistants	Total
AAR	1@20%, 1@5%	2@20%	1@40%, 1@20%	1.25
CPR	1@20%	1@20%	1@20%	0.60
ACCCRN	0.45	1.5	0.7	2.65

Table 10 Resource use efficiency: ACCCRN and AAR/CPR by spend

Initiative	Total FTEs	Budget (\$ million)	grant \$m / FTE
ACCCRN	2.65	38	14.3
AAR	1.05	\$14.7	14.0
CPR	0.60	\$11.7	19.5

<sup>11</sup> The RF Board has issued a decision which encourages the organization to increase the proportion of African organizations receiving grants for activities in Africa. From a management and monitoring perspective, grant-making to professional and well-established international organizations has lower opportunity costs.

<sup>12</sup> For example: Oxfam America, World Food Programme, Clinton Foundation, World Wildlife Foundation,



Table 11 Resource use efficiency: ACCCRN and AAR/CPR by number of grantees and grants

Initiative	Total FTEs	Grantees (grants)	grantee / FTE (grants/FTE)
ACCCRN	2.65	18 (36)	6.79 (13.58)
AAR	1.25	30 (36)	24 (28.8)
CPR	0.60	12 (21)	20 (35)

In considering the 1.25 FTE allocation to AAR, it must also be recognized that this total is made up of six different people allocated variously in Nairobi and New York. Looked at in this context, it is entirely understandable that RF has not been able to meaningfully monitor progress, engage and give feedback to the individual grantees within AAR and CPR.

A further comparison with ACCCRN is appropriate here. The ACCCRN program is established with three additional external management support contracts; through ARUP (management and strategy), ISET (grantee sub-contracting and management) and Verulam Associates (implementing an extensive initiative-wide monitoring and evaluation program).

It can reasonably be argued that if a results-based management approach is to be undertaken in what is already an institutionally challenging and diverse African context, the CSRD program should be allocated additional grant management resources, especially to enable capacity building and monitoring support to some potentially important grantees whose experience of results-based planning, implementation and reporting is limited.

## 6.6 Managing for results

There have been ambitions in the AAR/CPR components for the establishment of a results-based monitoring system. The draft results framework sets an ambition of developing an RBM framework with a clear vision, outcomes, outputs, work-plans and targets for results. The intention is also to “produce monitoring reports for progress in achieving results”.

Most of the grants under consideration in this evaluation were formulated prior to or soon after the development of the draft results framework. In these grants, the letters of grant outline the inputs, list key activities and provide due dates for reporting. It is common for grant letters to define project ‘deliverables’ as progress reports, with ‘milestones’ being the sequence of activities to be undertaken. In this respect, grants are not being managed for the achievement of results.

Overall, the AAR/CPR projects do not demonstrate a uniform approach or methodology in their design and definition of deliverables. The letters of grant mostly contain text cut and paste from grantee proposals and of uneven quality - reflecting the wide range in capacity and quality of the management systems of the grantees. In a number of cases project deliverables are limited to the provision of regular reports, and do not describe a series of planned steps and activities towards achieving a defined result. In other instances where the grantee has the professional capacity, the grant letter contains a clear and logical description of the grant outputs, targeted outcomes and timeframes.

A desk-top review of all AAR/CPR grants found forty two per cent of the grants give very limited or no attention to distinguishing between activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts. Forty nine per cent of the grants had limited presentation of performance indicators and targets (See Annex 8).

The challenge is retrospectively how to shape and adjust grantee and grant-maker practices towards the discipline of planning and managing for results. It is unlikely that existing grantees can be incentivized to change grant implementation, as these grants require only focus on deliverables and

not outcomes. The ACCCRN mid-term evaluation also found challenges in getting existing grantees to own and engage with a results-based system introduced outside of already concluded contractual processes.

Within RF there was a shift during 2010 when internal grant memos came to include a template detailing the percentage contribution of the proposed grant's thrust towards the initiative outcome areas. The remaining challenge is for RF to further develop its own strategy framework, outlining how existing and where future grants will cohere to reinforce each other and contribute to the desired initiative outcomes and overall impact.

A key step in the process of transition requires a revised process of engaging new grants to enable easier and consistent results-based design and reporting. The recommendations of the recent mid-term evaluation of ACCCRN are helpful in addressing what is still a system-wide set of circumstances. To paraphrase their recommendations:

*“To facilitate a more connected results orientation throughout the initiative the Foundation might usefully consider a number of changes to the grant letter format in addition to the addendum letter. This might include:*

- *distinguishing between deliverables (what the grant produces) and milestones (progress steps towards the deliverable)*
- *adjusting the language of granting, from present tense activities (e.g. Initiate engagement with small holder farmers) to past tense to convey completed end states (e.g. smallholder farmers engaged)*
- *adjust the level of achievement upwards from micro-level Activities to meso-level Outputs (e.g. from: ‘Organize a workshop on climate data, forecasting and agricultural decision-making; to: ‘Increased awareness among agricultural extension officers and metrological agencies on benefits of collaboration’). This implies grantees taking responsibility for results at a higher level, which can be attributed back to their agency*
- *to support the Output focus, the possible introduction of a very simple results framework, with indicators, within each grant letter*
- *an expectation, and requirement, that grantees would undertake a certain level of monitoring and reporting of their own Output delivery”*. (Mid-Term Evaluation of ACCCRN, p.48).

This evaluation concurs with the findings of the ACCCRN mid-term evaluation. RF is strongly committed to delivering impact, but the grant-making architecture is still in a process of transformation to enable this.

## 7. Assessment against the evaluation criteria

### 7.1 Relevance

#### Relevance

To assess the relevance and rationale of AAR and CPR to the mission, strategy and work of the Foundation; the fields of climate change and agriculture for food security in Africa; and development outcomes on the African continent.

At the macro level both AAR and CPR address a real need at the intersection between climate change, agriculture and poverty in Africa.

In terms of relevance to the mission, strategy and work of the Foundation, the picture is more complicated. The evaluation has shown that addressing issues at the intersection of climate and agriculture, particularly those related to the development of carbon markets, is complex and dependent on multiple interacting external factors. Particularly in relation to CPR, little scoping work was undertaken in advance of commissioning the grant initiative in order to define relevance relative to the Foundation's ambitions, niche, and comparative advantage. Put simply, the scope and ambition of what the Foundation hoped to achieve in the fields of climate change and agriculture for food security in Africa may have been over ambitious - the Foundation 'may have bitten off more than it can chew.' A more narrowly defined focus based on Rockefeller's comparative advantage as a 'risk-taking venture philanthropist' would have allowed the Foundation to define a manageable grant initiative with relevance directly to the Foundation. The complexity and vast scope of the African agricultural terrain that RF has chosen to engage with suggests that greater added value can be achieved through engaging "deeper" with "fewer" groupings of mutually reinforcing interventions.

### 7.2 Effectiveness

#### Effectiveness

To assess the effectiveness of AAR and CPR in delivering their outputs, as well as their progress towards achieving their outcomes, namely:

- capacity and knowledge in Africa for building climate change resilience into rural development;
- new partnerships and financing mechanisms enable Africans to draw upon global expertise and funds for implementation;
- enabling policies at the national and regional levels.

With regard to results the assessment is a mixed one. Grantees across both AAR and CPR have provided numerous examples of successful grant activities and outputs. These activities and outputs have been delivered across all AAR and CPR outcome areas as set out the two results frameworks. Generally, the outputs delivered have tended to be less ambitious than those set out in the original grant planning documents due to a range of risks, gaps and assumptions which were not explicitly set out or addressed in the proposal preparation stage.

AAR and CPR is not based on a clear logic chain or theory of change, and results frameworks for both initiatives have only relatively recently been developed through a retro-fitting exercise. These design, management and monitoring tools are not common currency with grantees or the Rockefeller Regional Office in Nairobi. Most grants were issued before the results framework was formally adopted, and its use by grantees is further hindered by grant letters contracting grantees to deliver activities and some outputs rather than focusing on outcomes.

Progress towards achieving AAR and CPR outcomes is much harder to assess. Neither the Foundation nor the grantees themselves have the monitoring, evaluation and learning systems in place to be able to credibly define and assess outcome-level results. This is to the detriment of the

grant initiatives as it makes it almost impossible for the grantees or Rockefeller to claim success beyond ‘cherry-picking’ isolated ‘success stories’ or to assess success beyond the activities and outputs of individual grantees. For example, there is little doubt that some level of capacity building has taken place within the ARIs supported by the Foundation. However neither the institutions themselves nor the Foundation grant management team have the monitoring and reporting resources, systems and tools in place to be able to credibly claim these outcomes, and what they mean for ARIs as a whole across the region. RF grants need to be managed as a coherent portfolio if the benefits from each individual intervention are to contribute towards outcomes.

Impact and influence is dealt with in section 8.5 but given the relatively short grant life-cycle of two to three years, it is generally assumed that it is not possible to claim meaningful impact within this timeframe.

### 7.3 Efficiency

#### Efficiency

To assess the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of AAR and CPR in using the Foundation’s resources (human and financial) wisely to achieve the desired outputs and outcomes. This includes an assessment of the alignment of the evolution of grant making with the intended outcomes of AAR and CPR.

It is too early to assess the efficiency of the two initiatives relative to the results delivered. Efficiency is thus considered in terms of the use of resources to manage and deliver the grants to their current status. The Evaluation Team has commented on the existence of capacity constraints within RF AAR/CPR that have impacted upon the process (efficiency and effectiveness) of grant selection and management as well as the extent of monitoring and partner engagement that has been possible.

In exploring issues of efficiency, the evaluation team made a simple comparison with the resources used under the ACCRN initiative (see Tables 9-11). AAR/CPR grants are generally smaller and more numerous than those in ACCRN, collectively totaling 57 grants worth \$26.4m. By contrast the ACCRN initiative had issued 36 grants to 18 grantees totaling \$38 million. Generally there is a reasonable parity in comparisons of full-time equivalent staff (FTE) to the amount of funds disbursed between ACCRN and AAR/CPR. However, when looked at from a perspective of grant numbers to FTE’s, the capacity challenges within AAR become apparent, even without taking into account the additional opportunity cost of granting to some organizations with lower capacity, who are not familiar with results-based management approaches.

When considering the 1.25 FTE allocation to AAR to the 2.65 FTE under ACCRN, it must also be recognized that the AAR total is made up of six different people allocated variously in Nairobi and New York. Looked at in this context, it is entirely understandable that RF has not been able to efficiently or effectively administer, monitor progress, engage and give feedback to the individual grantees within AAR and CPR. Again, a relatively modest increase in management resources would likely considerably improve AAR/CPR efficiency relative to the results delivered.

### 7.4 Sustainability

#### Sustainability

To assess the potential for sustainability of AAR and CPR work, in particular the extent to which the design of the two components and their implementation approaches and strategies have increased the chances that positive change and benefits will be sustained.

The potential for sustainability of AAR and CPR work relates to whether the ideas and practices are sticky. At present the level of sustainability is unclear and dependent on a number of factors. Collaborative initiatives, especially those engaging in complex environments require flexible time-frames to enable multiple actors to engage and interact and for their trust-based approaches to flourish. RF’s current policy is seen by many informants as being too short-term for what needs to be

done. The process and trust-based nature of these collaborative initiatives requires patience with more flexible time-frames.

Whilst African Agriculture Resilience has gained wide prominence amongst donor, government, NGO and civil society actors as a concept that requires further investment, support and funding, Carbon-Markets for Poverty Reduction have not yet reached critical mass in terms of sustainability, especially as faith in the UNFCCC-mandated system has waned. Niche aspects of carbon markets outside mainstream climate finance may offer Rockefeller the best opportunity to take the higher-risk investments the foundation is known for whilst at the same time ensuring the best chance of sustainability.

Future sustainability is also dependent on two key factors:

- The ability to engage and work collaboratively with strategic partners at an institutional rather than individual level. These include emerging 'key' grantees such the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs – COMESA and NEPAD) but also collations/network of grantees.
- The provision and dissemination of accessible public domain knowledge on AAR and CPR. This depends on the production and dissemination of practical and conceptual materials, active knowledge networks, and involvement at knowledge sharing events. These will be central to the future success of the CSRD initiatives, but at present only a limited amount of the new knowledge and learning to have emerged from the AAR and CPR initiatives is available in the public domain and collations of actors (others donors, RECs, key grantees) are yet to be formed, energized and coordinated. In a donor crowded environment there is significant value in investing in donor coordination and leveraging of combined and coordinated resources in pursuit of common objectives.

## 7.5 Impact / Influence

### Impact / influence

To assess the influence of AAR and CPR, in particular the extent to which critical stakeholders have been motivated and stimulated to change attitudes, behavior, practices and systems in support of the objectives of this work

As previously mentioned, it is generally assumed that it is too early to claim meaningful impact within the two to three year life-cycle of the AAR/ CPR grants. Further complicating the issue, neither Rockefeller nor the grantees presently have the systems or procedures in place to be able to collect data to inform impact or influence so assessing this in the future is likely to be problematic. Although a number of scoping studies were undertaken for AAR, they have not been used as baselines. The evaluation has identified a number of examples where Rockefeller can claim to have had influence over policy or an impact in terms of enhanced capacity. However, it is not possible to equate these individual examples with systematic and credible impact or influence.

## 8. Lessons

This chapter summarises lessons emerging from findings in previous chapters.

The climate change and agriculture nexus in Africa is recognised by African governments and key multi-lateral organisations as being of paramount importance to a future development trajectory within and beyond Africa. There is continent-wide commitment towards realising the levels of cross-sectoral collaboration that will be necessary in successfully addressing these challenges. Informed by AU-wide policy initiatives, Regional Economic Communities are key platforms from which member states will develop confidence and direction in their future actions.

The scope of a Climate-Smart Rural Development concept in Africa is wide, with multiple legitimate points of entry and engagement. There is significant multi-lateral and bilateral donor engagement traversing this complex multi-layered and multi-sectoral terrain.

The RF-commissioned scoping studies were relevant and produced information that directly influenced the RF approach and AGRA's own strategy and should have been used by the Foundation to develop dialogue and inform other grantees or development partners. In particular, the decision to invest so heavily in both the national agricultural research institutes and universities is supported by these studies. The content of the studies has value as a public good for practitioners dealing with climate change and agriculture. But neither the studies themselves, nor a summary of their findings were used by the Foundation to inform other grantees or development partners. This was a missed opportunity.

1. The complexity and vast scope of the African agricultural terrain that RF has chosen to engage with suggests that greater added value can be achieved through engaging "deeper" with "fewer" groupings of mutually reinforcing interventions. The AAR/CSRD intervention is, in development terms, still a nascent collection of widely distributed and mostly unconnected projects that have been retrospectively clustered into component areas. There appears, in a number of cases, to be untapped potential value in RF providing additional management and technical support "glue" to cross-pollinate and facilitate the development of additional collaboration and development in a CSRD programme.
2. The work of the Foundation in AAR and CPR is highly relevant in helping develop results from adaptation experiments and has the potential to link with work on mitigation. Adaptation is a new area of research and development. But already, governments, municipalities, the private sector, NGOs and individuals are going ahead and are taking leadership in adaptation to climate change. Continued and expanded capacity development for adaptation requires increased and sustained resources. One of the best ways to access resources is to show, with as rigorous data as possible, that the adaptation efforts being made have produced positive results, and that these results are showing impact, or at least progress towards impact. The sort of innovative work promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation, supported by monitoring and evaluation of adaptation initiatives, has potential to help build that evidence.

Given the growth in available donor resources and interests in this African arena, the potential added-value of the Rockefeller Foundation in African Agriculture and Climate Change will arise from *how* the Foundation goes about enabling a collection of grants to contribute to a focussed niche of targeted outcome areas.

### Results orientation

The shift in defining grant-making success as "grantee successfully identified and grant disbursed", towards a results-based focus: "the grant is contributing to the outcomes being targeted" has far-reaching operational and resource implications for RF as an organisation.

3. Grantee reporting is weak and is not used as a management and learning tool by either the grantee or RF. Grantee reporting is highly uneven in quality, and in some cases found to be absent or not as frequently submitted as stipulated in the letter of grant. A number of grantees did express doubts that anyone read the reports submitted. A number of the grantees did comment strongly that the level of detail that could be provided in the time allowed for grantee report-backs in the February 2011 convening meeting was unsatisfactory, and felt there should be higher expectations of accountability and presentation of evidence in support of claims of impact.

A desk-top review of AAR/CPR grants found forty two per cent of the grants give very limited or no attention to distinguishing between activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts. Forty nine per cent of the grants had limited presentation of performance indicators and targets (See Annex 8). The challenge is retrospectively how to shape and adjust grantee and grant-maker practices towards the discipline of planning and managing for results. It is unlikely that existing grantees can be incentivized to change grant implementation, as these grants require only focus on deliverables and not outcomes. The ACCCRN mid-term evaluation also found challenges in getting existing grantees to own and engage with a results-based system introduced outside of already concluded contractual processes.

4. Additional grant management resources are necessary if an effective results-based management approach is to be implemented. It can reasonably be argued that if a results-based management approach is to be undertaken in what is already an institutionally challenging and diverse African context, the CSRD programme should be allocated additional grant management resources, especially to enable capacity building and monitoring support to some potentially important grantees whose experience of results-based planning, implementation and reporting is limited. Lessons can be drawn from the experience with ACCCRN.
5. Strategic soaks are an effective innovation to help construct, mediate and guide initiative direction. The progression of organisation development within RF has resulted in the recent emergence of “strategic soaks” as a key platform in constructing, mediating and guiding initiative direction. These “soaks” are the recognised platforms from which internal strategic discussions and monitoring are beginning to be carried out. The “soak” enables engagement of grant staff with senior management in determining the evolution of strategy. They are the site from which memos and Board updates are constructed, and also the site at which grant managers account for the alignment of their proposed grants with the overall portfolio strategy.
6. RF grants need to be managed as a coherent portfolio if the benefits from each individual intervention are to contribute towards outcomes. Analysis of the theories of change for both the AAR and CPR grants identifies two key issues about the strategy that has been followed:
  - Firstly, progress towards outcomes involves interaction between the outputs of the different types of grants: support to ARIs, experiments, and supporting institutions. A large part of that interaction is treated as assumptions in the grant plans, and grants are not planned or managed to enable the interaction to take place.
  - Secondly, the gap between the outcomes and impact is too great to be spanned without further actions, which under present arrangements are also all assumptions. Two missing but necessary outcomes, termed by the evaluation team as ‘secondary outcomes’, concern the roles of extension and dissemination, and the enabling environment.

They bring clear implications: i) that the grants need to be managed as a coherent portfolio if the benefits from each individual intervention are to contribute towards outcomes; and ii) that much of the current portfolio is work that is well ‘upstream’ from benefits to farmers. This is not a criticism, as the grant programme has only been active for a few years, but the Foundation needs to have a clear strategy about how the grants do enable progress towards impact.

7. A two-year project cycle period is a challenging and limited amount of time in which to set up new pathways and interventions to develop new institutional arrangements between climate information providers and African agricultural research organisations. A two-year approach is more suited to ‘commissioning’ organisationally sophisticated and mature institutions to test something that they are already equipped and set up to undertake. Many of the solutions to the strategic objectives chosen by RF in the AAR arena demand the pioneering and development of new cross-sectoral collaborative partnerships in institutionally weak and fractured contexts.
8. Gap filling to identify new grants across the outcome areas has been a mixed success and needs to be based on a sound investigation of contextual and institutional positioning of the individual grantee. Key to grant-making strategy for 2010 was to “*identify gaps in grant-making across the Outcome areas*”, and “*to identify and engage new grantees to fill gaps*”. Examples are shown that illustrate both the positive benefits from how this was approached and the consequences of RF seeking to award a grant without sufficiently confirming or validating the assumed contextual and institutional positioning of the individual grantee that was referred to them.
9. It is possible that relatively small individual short-term grants introduce an unintended bias towards activities already within the sphere of the grantee’s control, and discourage the development of new collaborative investments whose time demands and outcomes are uncertain. In some cases the short-term nature of the granting does not give confidence to the stakeholders to invest their own time and resources as deeply, and could lead to an under-investment in activities with potential, but that require time and effort in facilitating process and collaboration with other institutions?
10. In a donor crowded environment there is significant value in investing in donor coordination and leveraging of combined and coordinated resources in pursuit of common objectives. Very often, where intervention outcomes are dependent upon cooperation and cross-sectoral collaboration donors have the opportunity to add value and align with a demand-driven agenda in a facilitatory and convening way. There is a qualitative difference between, for example, granting jointly with other donors in a pilot to test approaches to index-based insurance systems – as compared to establishing from scratch a collaborative research platform across diverse institutions in five different countries. The added-value of convening and facilitating extends beyond target participant organisations.

### **Agricultural Research Institutions**

11. Collaborative initiatives require patience with more flexible time-frames to enable locally owned trust-based approaches to flourish. RF’s current two-year granting strategy within a five-year focus is seen by many informants as being too short-term for what needs to be done. Multiple informants interviewed were highly appreciative of RF being among the first, for example, to champion and finance explorations of micro-insurance in Ethiopia. The visibility and confidence of a donor like RF can serve to play an important trigger role in giving other donors and stakeholder actors confidence to engage more deeply. Concerns were however voiced by these same informants at the short-term nature of RF funding adding uncertainty and higher opportunity costs in sustaining interventions in complex areas that take longer. Compared to other donors in the field, RF is seen as contributing small grants for periods of time that are too short for what needs to be done.

The initiative to support the development of climate units in ARIs is ambitious, and will require more resources and time for the development of a clear focus and achievable common purpose. More especially, a successful ARI collaborative initiative will require dedicated RF support in engaging and cohering with the increasing number of donor organisations engaging all of these same institutions from different organisational entry points, and with competing visions. Support is also needed in the



planning, implementing and monitoring of the ARI interventions with a view to results-based management and demonstrating impact.

### **Carbon Markets for Poverty Reduction**

12. It is evident that CPR lacks the exploration and testing of ideas, identification of risks, and the development of innovative solutions that would have been undertaken if the initiative had progressed through the standard RF programming process including a Search phase rather than being approved directly as an Initiative in Development. There is evidence of a number of impressive outputs and some evidence of higher level outcomes across CPR grantees. For example,

- At the policy level: CCI can demonstrate it has made a major contribution to developing a viable MRV system in Guyana and has set up a National Carbon Accounting Centre in Tanzania and assisted Kenya with REDD Readiness proposal.
- At the project level: the neat, well-planned alternative approach to carbon finance tested by the Rainforest Alliance through their low carbon farming module which could be integrated in their sustainable agriculture standard.
- At the capacity level: mobilising support for African institutions as philanthropists, donors and African governments themselves increasingly recognise the emerging maturity and potential of NEPAD and RECs such as COMESA.

13. Whereas RF has been able to demonstrate success with new financing and implementation models it is less clear that RF can really make a difference at the level of international policy, especially within the three to five year initiative life-cycle currently favoured by RF.

## 9. Recommendations

These formative recommendations emerge in a dynamic context, both within RF as a transforming organisation, and within the context of African agriculture and climate change. From an RF perspective the scope and focus of future work in CSRD is in process of strategic formulation. From a grant management perspective RF is transforming its own operations to enable an approach to initiative planning and monitoring which enables learning and demonstration of grantee contributions to agreed outcomes.

These recommendations are offered in support of the vision of a future CSRD initiative which can achieve and demonstrate results and impact from an array of strategically selected and managed grants.

### Looking forward to CSRD

The scope of possible change interventions under CSRD is broad. Positive lessons have emerged from the experience with AAR and CPR. With the exception of work in support of international policy under CPR, there is no evidence to support the closure of any strands of work. While no major gaps are evident, it is clear that grants would be more effective if their selection and design was guided by an overall strategy which describes a theory of change and the targeted outcomes necessary to produce it. The designing of grants and contracting of grantees could then enable a process whereby ownership and mutual accountability for the agreed targets produces conditions in which collaborating partners pursue and report upon progress in achieving a shared goal.

R1. Starting with the development of a theory of change for the CSRD, it is recommended senior RF management articulate a grant strategy that brings stronger connections, mutual support and added value to the programme as a whole. To this end, the strategy of continuing support at small scale in each of Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda needs to be reconsidered and justified in terms of contribution to outcomes. More effective progress might be achieved from engaging more deeply with fewer partners. If programmes are continued in a number of countries, consideration should be given to developing separate results frameworks for country programmes.

R2. Where CSRD outcomes are dependent upon cross or inter-sectoral collaboration, RF should ensure the provision of resources – either through its own offices, or through a grantee – to enable the necessary coordination and support.

R3. With a view to improving sustainability, it is recommended RF invest in sufficient human resources capacity to develop a granting relationship with organisations, rather than through selected individuals into organisations.

R4. It is recommended that the Foundation builds on emerging results from work on mitigation by small farmers under CPR and continue to meld that work with comparable work on adaptation under CSRD.

R5. Experience from the AAR suggests that work should continue with innovative experiments and agricultural research institutes, but that grant programmes need clearer objectives and stronger links with other programmes, and especially with national meteorological organizations. RF will need to engage for longer than the current two- to three-year horizon and at sufficient scale to stimulate real change from within and between the grantee organisations.

R6. It is recommended that grants in support of policy influence and networks be required to develop clear results frameworks that articulate how outputs will contribute to outcomes, demonstrate links with other grants and report against those frameworks as part of the grant cycle. These frameworks will be strengthened if they are able to incorporate the role of RECs as important regional platforms for developing key policy building blocks.

## Grant management and learning

The first recommendation repeats a recommendation from the ACCCRN evaluation and concerns improving the quality of objectives and approach to implementation by grantees.

R7. It is recommended that Foundation senior management and the grants office review the content of grant letters to ensure they articulate and develop grantees' ownership of initiative objectives. They also need to ensure grantees are obliged, where appropriate, to collaborate with other initiative grantees in their delivery, paying heed to performance against outputs and outcomes rather than activity-level deliverables. This may include considering how financial resources can be better allocated to results rather than activity deliverables, and payment tranches linked to real performance.

R8. RF should strengthen the provision of in-house or contracted technical expertise based in the region to give support to design and implementation of grants or groups of grants. The availability of content and process expertise is an important measure of added-value in RF's own strategic collaborations with other donors working in the same field. RF requires sufficient in-house and/or formally contracted capacity which enables CSRD to make effective management decisions based upon an on-going exchange with grantees (involving M&E, process facilitation, relationship maintenance, magnifying opportunities, and trouble-shooting). In addition to engaging more in the design and structuring of grant-agreements, an increasing collaborative approach also invites RF to consider the extent of its own development role in steering and facilitating groups of grantees towards coherence and demonstrable impact on mutually agreed outcomes.

R9. RF should consider contracting out or developing in-house CSRD monitoring and evaluation support. Such support could assist in:

- building the capacity of some partners in developing results-based interventions for inclusion in grant-agreements;
- bi-annual monitoring and documentation of project and overall initiative progress;
- contributing to the development of feedback loops, reflection and mutual accountability between RF and its partners.

R10. It is recommended that grantee reporting be strengthened and redesigned to help grantees manage towards outcomes. RF should introduce a simple structured proforma report, that would create little additional administrative burden on grantees but would seek their assessment of progress towards outcomes and work in collaboration with others and would form the basis of a grant performance database.

R11. RF should continue with the strategic SOAK exercise and grant convening meetings and invest in these to develop stronger links between grantees. Consideration should be given to elevating the function of the successful grantee convening meeting to include a structured platform for strategic reflection, feedback and guidance for RF's CSRD initiative.

R12. It is recommended the RF Nairobi office take on a more active networking role in strategically connecting and facilitating synergies amongst existing grantees and partners. Value can be brought to the sector through contributions to managing knowledge, coordinating networks and convening stakeholders to jointly pursue opportunities. Some partners responsible for cross-sectoral collaborative initiatives also indicated their own initiatives could have been further bolstered at strategic moments if the convening power support of RF had been available.

R13. The donor environment for climate change in East Africa is very crowded. For RF to successfully develop its niche and comparative advantage it is recommended that more resources are committed to donor coordination and leveraging of combined resources.