



**DESIGNED BY JOHN CASERTA
WITH MAX ACKERMAN**

Cover: Jenny Agota. Innovator, with her moringa tree soap. Nyando, Busia, Kenya 2011. Photo by Jane Martin)

Evaluation Report

Accelerating Innovation for Development

An Initiative funded by the Rockefeller Foundation

FINAL REPORT

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EVALUATION TEAM

Ritu Shroff
Team Leader

Jane Martin
Media and Development Specialist

Amy Jersild
Senior Qualitative Evaluator

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Ritu Shroff, Team Leader

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Abbreviations

AIGA:	American Institute of Graphic Arts
ARD:	Agricultural Research for Development
BPL:	Below the Poverty Line
CBO:	Community Based Organization
CFI:	Center for Innovation (Mayo Clinic)
CIRAD:	Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement
COO:	Chief Operating Officer, Rockefeller Foundation
DQ:	Design Quotient
FAIR:	Farmer Access to Innovation Resources
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
KARI:	Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
KES:	Kenyan Shillings
LISF:	Local Innovation Support Funds
LSC:	Local Steering Committee
M&E:	Monitoring and Evaluation
NARO:	National Agricultural Research Organization (Uganda)
NGO:	Non-governmental Organization
NRM:	Natural Resource Management
NSC:	National Steering Committee
OECD/DAG:	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Group
PID:	Participatory Innovation Development
Prolinnova:	Promoting Local Innovation
R&D:	Research and Development
RIN:	Rural Innovations Network (now Villgro)
RISD:	Rhode Island School of Design
SMEs:	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
UGX:	Ugandan Shillings
VLE:	Village Level Entrepreneurs
VPFI:	Vice President Foundation Initiatives, Rockefeller Foundation
VPSE:	Vice President Strategy and Evaluation, Rockefeller Foundation
WSUP:	Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor
Yale SOM:	Yale School of Management

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
Executive Summary

I. Initiative Overview

The Accelerating Innovation for Development Initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation was a US\$16.5 million effort approved in 2007 aimed at:

1. Identifying and demonstrating that open and user-driven innovation models are effective and efficient innovation processes for the needs of the poor; and
2. Significantly increasing the application of these models to meet the needs of the poor.

Three major models of innovation were selected for support under the Initiative: open, user centered, and user led. Since they were understood to have worked well for the private sector in the industrialized world, and the rationale for the Initiative was based on the belief that they may also be applied successfully to the social development sector in meeting the needs of the poor.



Open: Organization solicits solutions from the crowd through an open call, often offering rewards for the best solution;



User centered: Organization works closely with users to elicit ideas, inputs and refinements on the design and implementation of a solution;



User led: Organization elicits and nurtures the user's innovation, and supports the user to expand it.

At the time of approval of the Initiative, the use of the models was not mainstream practice in the social sector, and thus Initiative funding targeted practical application and use of the underlying concepts of these models. The intervention strategies were four-fold: experiment with the innovation models and infuse new ways of thinking in the social sector; increase capacity and interest in

applying the models in the social sector; generate practical experience in the application of the models; and build awareness of the potential added value among social sector organizations. Through these strategies, the Initiative aimed to achieve three outcomes: a) increase application of innovative tools, techniques and practices; b) increase capacity to innovate among organizations addressing social issues; and c) create networks and promote scaling up of these models.

These outcomes, if achieved, would ultimately contribute to the overall Foundation objective, which is to help poor and vulnerable people benefit from more equitable economic growth, and increased resilience whereby individuals, communities and systems survive, adapt and grow in the face of changes, even catastrophic incidents. The contribution of these outcomes to this Foundation objective was contingent on the assumption that innovation could have successful application in social development.

II. Review In The Field Of Innovation

A literature review on the field of innovation for development reveals that social innovation is an emerging field and that definitions are still evolving. Frameworks on how social innovation occurs are under development, yet are beginning to be instrumental in understanding how social innovation can contribute to social impact. An analysis of the stages of social innovation, defined from the point where the need for an innovation is identified to its contribution to systemic social change, reveals that there is a missing middle that links the stages where innovations are prototyped to where they are sustained and scaled up. This missing middle contains the elements for the enabling environment to systematically support and nurture more widespread use and application of innovation.

Indeed, a review of the growth and shifts in thinking about the three models used in the Initiative toward building the field of innovation for development reveals that the bulk of the overall support (from a range of funders) for application and research has focused on the front-end of innovation. Until this missing middle is better developed, the final stages of systemic social change will remain elusive, and the social sector may not be convinced to create the necessary conditions to innovate more systematically.

III. Purpose Of The Evaluation

The evaluation covers the grantmaking and non-grant work of the Initiative from 2007-2009 on open, user centered, and user led innovation. The evaluation was conducted from July 2011 to February 2012 by an independent evaluation team. The purposes of the evaluation of the Innovation Initiative relate to informing other Rockefeller Foundation initiatives and the work of Foundation grantees and partners; demonstrating accountability for funds spent under the Initiative; and contributing knowledge to the field as a public good

IV. Methodology

The evaluation questions focused on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the Initiative, and sought to describe the knowledge contributions of the work in the field of innovation for development. The methods for data collection included a detailed case study analysis of six grants, with supplementary information gathered through document review and stakeholder interviews. The six grants were selected based on representation of each of the three models, size of grant, and geographic diversity. They include: Ashoka Changemakers, ETC Prolinnova, Global Giving, Ideo, Villgro Innovations Network, and Winterhouse Institute.

Site visits were conducted in four countries spanning three continents in order to obtain a full picture of the end-to-end process of innovation as funded through the Initiative. The six cases were supplemented with additional interviews with funders and other individuals working in the field, as well as a literature and document review. In total, 259 individuals were interviewed in 20 different locations in the United States, India, Kenya, and Uganda.

The data gathered were then analyzed and used to prepare case studies that show what had worked well and what had not, whether outcomes had been achieved, and the contextual realities in which they operated. They were then examined for trends and patterns to determine what the overall findings and learnings might be, and this analysis was supported by a literature review and interviews with stakeholders.

V. Findings

[1] Overall Findings

1.1. The evaluation finds that the Initiative has made a modest positive contribution to innovation practices for social impact. This contribution is demonstrated through initial stages of uptake among some social sector organizations, a greater proliferation of efforts based on the three models of innovation, and deeper understanding and engagement around the systematic use of innovation among some of the partner agencies.

1.2. However, the overall anticipated outcomes of the Initiative appear overly ambitious for the three-year timeframe, and, thus far there is only anecdotal evidence of achievement found within each of the Initiative's expected outcomes.

- » **Outcome 1:** Application of innovative tools, techniques and practices: The evaluation finds evidence of limited use of open-source and user-centered/led innovation models to address social development needs, particularly among organizations that work closely with poor and vulnerable people in developing countries.
- » **Outcome 2:** Increased capacity: The evaluation finds evidence of a handful of organizations (social enterprises and non-profit organizations) that demonstrate enhanced and new skills and abilities in using open-source and user-centered/led models. However, this use is not institutionalized and practices are still far from being embedded. Capacities to ensure systematic and regular use of models of innovation in even a handful of organizations are still being built, and the process is gradual.
- » **Outcome 3:** Networks and scaling up: The evaluation finds that the Initiative has contributed to networking among design agencies to further user-centered design thinking for social impact. There is no evidence that such networks have led to a sustained scaling up of design thinking thus far. There was no evidence of contribution to networks for the other models, or for the use of innovation in social impact work more broadly, nor of scaling up.

1.3. In sum, the positive contributions of the Initiative, while apparent, are fragmented and unaligned, thus reducing overall impact. It is therefore challenging to clearly articulate and offer strong evidence to show how the Initiative has moved the field of innovation for social change as a whole, or show that it has contributed to systematic and significantly greater application of innovation in the social sector. The rest of the findings provide additional insights on factors that affected the achievement of outcomes, what worked well, and what worked less well.

[2] Initiative Design and Relevance

2.1. The Initiative was relevant and timely to the field of innovation for social development. There was small-scale demand and interest in innovative approaches for development at the time of design, and there was limited support from foundations more generally, and for these three models specifically.

2.2. Stakeholders saw the choice of the three models to fund as appropriate, and the intent to generate practical experience around their implementation as helpful.

2.3. The four intervention strategies were effectively focused on both application of the models and on their scaling and uptake, achieving both Initiative objectives.

2.4. However, the need and opportunity for innovation to contribute to social development should have been more sharply defined. A deeper analysis of existing approaches to innovation within the social sector as well as specific opportunities for and barriers to successful uptake of innovation practices would have been useful at the outset in better informing the Initiative design.

2.5. The Initiative's three-year timeframe was insufficient to achieve the outcomes.

2.6. The Initiative could have been designed more purposefully to include grants that built more widely on current and ongoing innovation efforts among non-profit and social sector agencies.

[3] Initiative effectiveness, impact and sustainability

3.1. Contribution to product and process innovations in the social sector

1. The evaluation team was able to identify specific small-scale innovations generated as a result of the grants, focused primarily on process and product innovations. These small-scale innovations are localized and limited in scope, and are highly unlikely to be diffused broadly.
2. The Initiative was more effective in supporting innovative ways of connecting individuals and organizations together in addressing social development issues that would otherwise not have thought of working with each other or known of each other's work. The Initiative has contributed toward the diffusion of this innovation. Yet overall, the evaluation team asserts that the social impact potential from any of these innovations is limited.

3.2. Contribution to acceleration in innovation for development as a concept

1. There has been an acceleration of innovation for development as a concept, illustrated by what appears to be greater levels of understanding and interest among social development organizations, and an increased amount of literature on the topic written in the past three years. There is acknowledgement that the Initiative has played a positive role in this acceleration, particularly in generating knowledge on the practical application of concepts.
2. The Initiative contributed toward a certain amount of diffusion of two of the three models. Open innovation is more popular, and user-centered has gained more momentum among designers in the USA. User-led, which was funded to a lesser degree by the Initiative, experienced little acceleration.

3.3 Contribution to social impact

1. Many of the grants did not lead to the development and implementation of projects intended to promote social impact,

and there are few outcomes to examine related to any effects on the social fabric of the communities in which they worked and the wellbeing of individuals and families within those communities.

2. The evaluation team notes that social impact, especially at scale, was not an intended outcome of this Initiative. However, it was intended that the Initiative would clearly indicate how the systematic use of approaches to spur innovation in addressing social problems led to greater social impact. Based on the evaluation, the team is not able to conclude whether systematic greater use of the three innovation models can lead to greater social impact, although initial results do indicate promise.

3.4 Contribution to sustainability and scaling up beyond the Initiative:

1. The evaluation team identified partnerships and projects that will likely be sustained across all six grants.
2. The team noted in particular the visible contribution made by the Initiative to the design industry in the U.S., as demonstrated by the high level of interest, enthusiasm and new commitments formed during the Initiative among the design sector. Greater growth in the number of organizations engaging the public on social issues through online crowd sourcing and collaborative competition platforms is also apparent. These efforts are nascent, and hence actual social impact is hard to assess at this time.

[4] Management of the Initiative

4.1. Resource allocations and expenditure:

1. The Initiative did not invest equally in the three models; the number of grants provided to user-centered model outnumbered those to the open innovation model, and the smallest number of grants and resources were devoted to the user-led model. A more even distribution of funds among the models would have generated greater learning about the models.

2. Further, resource allocation decisions should have better informed by a greater understanding about the need for innovation in the social development sector. Analysis on the need for innovation with what types of innovation approaches seen as most viable to succeed could have better informed resource allocation, as well as decisions on the overall Initiative design.
3. The Initiative sourced the majority of innovative approaches from the private sector and provided the greatest number of grants to the non-profit sector for application. This allocation was in line with the hypothesis that the private sector approaches had worked well in the for-profit sector, and would therefore be of value to the social sector. Interestingly, the allocation of resources to different types of organizations (private, public, non-profit and social enterprise) was more balanced, indicating the intent of the Initiative to accelerate the use of the models in the social sector.

4.2. Strategic oversight and management of the overall initiative:

1. The Initiative was characterized by unusually high staff turnover, and as a result, its strategic oversight suffered. Although there was well-articulated analysis of what was working well and less well, course correction was less evident toward achieving outcomes and reshaping the overall grant portfolio.
2. Grantee selection appeared opportunistic. It was not based on a strategic rationale for resource allocation nor on needs in the social development field, nor on complementarity of grantees to achieve common objectives.
3. Grantees were not provided enough opportunities to share lessons learned and exchange their practices, with the exception of the efforts for the design industry.
4. Although Foundation staff effectively maintained a sound conceptual overview of the social innovation field and maintained networks within the field, frequent staff turnover resulted in less effective day-to-day management of the grants and monitoring of the Initiative's progress.

VI. Lessons Learned From The Case Studies About The Field Of Innovation For Development

The Initiative has contributed to learning around the application of open, user-centered and user-led innovation models to social development problems. These lessons are summarized below.

1. **Open innovation model:** The case studies reveal that the usefulness of the open innovation model in addressing social development problems lies primarily in generating ideas that are at the early stages of proof of concept. Its limitation is that it does not necessarily produce sustained or scalable innovative approaches to addressing the needs of poor and vulnerable people. The model largely focuses on the front-end of implementation, with little focus on sustaining and scaling a proposal or prototype. Furthermore, the resources required to undertake the front-end work are significant, raising questions on efficiencies and returns for investment. The open innovation model does, however, promote new ways of networking and connecting among donors and organizations, providing an added value through an innovative means.
2. **User-centered model:** The case studies reveal that the user-centered model to the social development sector, as applied through the design thinking approach, resonates with non-profits since it draws on similar approaches to problem analysis and project design. Further, those approaches are combined with practices such as product design and rapid prototyping, which are valuable processes in the social sector. The evaluation team identified several barriers that currently exist to greater levels of acceptance of design thinking among the social development sector: organizations accustomed to delivery targets and efficiency measures may struggle to adopt design thinking as it favors trial and error; and the lack of a viable business plan for designers to engage with the social sector currently impedes its adoption. Nonprofit design groups, especially those operating in the developing world,

may currently be better positioned to reach out to social development organizations to offer more immediate added value in applying this approach.

3. **User-led model:** The case studies revealed that the user-led model also resonates with agencies working in the social sector. Its practices and principles are in sync with participatory development strategies, and it supports and nurtures thinking and capacities to innovate. The case studies find that this approach is successful at empowering individuals, and promotes their rights to contribute to and shape their own development. However, its limitation lies in its lack of a developed methodology to translate from individual benefits to market-based gains which may be attractive to investors (such as financial viability, sustainability, efficiency and scale). Furthermore, while enabling users to innovate proved to be empowering, addressing the societal barriers to real change for poor and vulnerable people – such as accessing the legal system in acquiring patents for innovations or involving farmers in setting country agendas for agricultural research – was beyond the scope of user-led model.

VII. Implications

The evaluation team identifies several areas for reflection as they may pertain to the Foundation in its strategy and thinking about innovation in development in the coming years. These include how the Foundation approaches the field of innovation for development, and strategies and interventions that may be employed, as well as reflection on social impact and on risk and evaluation.

- » **Targeting support where there is a well-defined need for innovation in development:** Instead of starting from the idea of supporting innovation, a different approach might be to start from understanding where innovation is needed, what types of innovation are needed, and what potential value an innovation might add in a specific problem area/sector or geography. Increased learning may be achieved as a result with more visible proof of the added value of innovation.

- » **Defining capacity development and building in innovation:** The capacity development strategy in the future could focus on building capacity more purposefully by identifying whose capacity would be built and how, instead of providing support to a given model that involves capacity building.
- » **Thinking about innovation, diffusion, integration and scale:** The literature reviewed for this evaluation indicates that there is now greater awareness on the need to understand how to integrate and scale an innovation, and that it is in fact much more complex to take a generated idea and then scale it up. Future Foundation support to innovation should aim to provide greater insights and learning on how innovations are integrated into organizations and societies and how they are scaled up in the social sector.
- » **Thinking about knowledge contribution in a rapidly evolving, sophisticated field:** The discourse on innovation and its intersection with social change is more sophisticated now than it was some years ago. As the field has grown, so have the players and stakeholders. Different types of organizations are now entering this space, and the Foundation needs to play a more strategic role and identify its niche.

Recommendations for alternative strategies the Foundation may consider include:

1. **The opportunities for Rockefeller Foundation support to add value in the field of innovation for development is in the area of application:** Whether it is in the area of capacity building, or in generating, diffusing, integrating or scaling up innovations, or in applying new approaches or models to innovation, the Foundation should focus on application and garnering practical experience. There is a lot of this that is still very conceptual and much that is evolving, and practical experience is needed to understand the concepts in action.
2. **Increased attention to knowledge contribution and learning would be beneficial:** Given that the models themselves are evolving, this is all the more relevant, and the Foundation is uniquely placed to provide leadership in this area moving

forward. Strategies such as grantee sharing and learning or cross-exchanges, and curating experience and lessons learned from actual experience can support such knowledge contribution.

3. **Nurturing relationships with other funding organizations working in social innovation:** The potential of the Foundation support in contributing to the ongoing discourse on innovation for development continues in practical application and use, as mentioned above. Other funders are well placed and well positioned to nurture the ecosystem for innovation for development, and the Foundation’s relationships with such funders are critical to ensure that the lessons learned from practical application are integrated into the theoretical development of the field.
4. **Increased focus on the needs and interests of the poor over reference to ‘end-users’:** It may be useful to distinguish “consumers”, whereby a desired consumer behavior is the desired outcome, from “end-users” or “poor and vulnerable people” in the social development field, who are agents of their own development. The evaluation team notes that specific objectives and desired outcomes as they relate to advancing a social development agenda would be helpful in then determining how an innovative process may be applied.
5. **Acknowledging the differences and similarities between the forces that drive innovation in the private and non-profit sectors and areas for mutual exchange and learning:** Given the learning discussed above, particularly in the area of user-led innovation, the evaluation team offers that drivers of innovation in the social sector are contextually different than the marketplace. Whereas in the social development sector issues of want and scarcity interplay with structural forces that are often hostile to change, in the marketplace, competition is the driving force for survival and innovation. Social, political and economic forces within society will have a defining role as to whether and how certain innovations may be realized, and promoting dialogue across players within a given society to better understand various realities, concerns, and possibilities

for supporting and realizing innovations to address the large and complex problem of poverty may offer greater impact.

6. **Acknowledging the reality of uptake and diffusion among social development organizations:** In supporting the social development sector, the evaluation team suggests that greater understanding of their needs and interests as they identify them, the affirmation of innovation approaches already undertaken within the sector, as well as sufficient demonstration of success of any proposed alternative approaches are prerequisites to uptake and diffusion within the sector. Dialogue on how innovation approaches can be applied, particularly through a focus on specific issues could yield more favorable responses from the non-profit community.
7. **Acknowledging the added value as well as limitations of application of private sector approaches through private sector and non-profit partnerships:** The positives of bringing private sector approaches to the non-profit sector include the infusion of new ideas and new ways of working. The evaluation reveals significant challenges with the application of private sector approaches and private-NGO partnerships that warrant consideration for future programming.
8. **A focus on garnering experience in innovation merged with existing work instead of stand-alone work on innovation for development:** Where the Foundation is already contributing to a field, it is better positioned to identify partners with leveraging power and to encourage risk taking, innovation, and then diffusion, influencing, integrating and even scaling up. It is more in touch with the context and already better informed about what types of innovations are needed and what will work and what will not. Innovation would not be loosely undertaken; instead it would be strategically applied and explored. The enabling environment (the missing middle) would be better addressed.
9. **Innovations that fit more easily into a context are more likely to be diffused.** Fit can include factors such as availability and ease of access to raw materials for manufacture, capacity and ability to scale up, but also, an innovation that is

less likely to require significant behavior change is more likely to be adopted. Such factors raise the question—what innovations can truly be used in a range of settings? What contextual realities might drive and inhibit greater social impact of an innovation? Foundation support to innovation could provide insights to these questions, and as stated above, merging with existing initiatives would increase the social impact of a given innovation.

As this evaluation finds, risk taking in innovation must be defined differently than in other aspects of social development. The evaluation team offers thoughts on requirements for building a practice of innovation:

10. **Different thinking about capacity development:** Organizations that are experienced at service delivery, program oversight, and project management might not have a culture of trial and error. They are incentivized to achieve efficiency and outputs, and the practice of innovation requires different incentives. Foundation support for building capacity thus needs to take such organizational cultural realities and ways of working into account.
11. **Differences in accountability:** Both the Foundation and organizations desiring to build a practice of innovation have to weigh accountability needs in a different way when considering innovation. Process metrics that indicate thoughtful trial and error, integrating and diffusion activities, and engagement with the poor and vulnerable might be more appropriate to indicate to stakeholders that innovation is being practiced with care and rigor, and with social impact in mind.
12. **Different evaluation approaches:** Evaluating a product, process, or service for social impact and innovation (or both) is possible using conventional measures and approaches. However, evaluating innovation practices, or the ability to innovate and to sustain innovation, or the ability to diffuse and scale innovations requires different metrics and approaches. Evaluations should look at the process of innovation to ensure that it was thoughtful and appropriate as well as the actual innovations.

VIII. Conclusions

The Accelerating Innovation for Development Initiative was modestly successful at contributing to a positive trend toward greater use of systematic approaches to spur innovation in addressing large-scale social development problems. It has shown examples where innovation, and building capacity to innovate, can make a difference at the small scale. It has, as yet, not shown how innovative thinking and practice can be embedded and institutionalized, nor demonstrated at significant enough scale, why and how innovation can add value to the social sector. Both are needed to truly spur greater innovation in addressing social needs for the poor and vulnerable and offer an opportunity for the Rockefeller Foundation to consider in its future work on innovation.

I: Initiative Overview

The Accelerating Innovation for Development Initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation was a US\$16.5 million effort approved in 2007 aimed at:

1. Identifying and demonstrating that open and user-driven innovation models are effective and efficient innovation processes for the needs of the poor; and
2. Significantly increasing the application of these models to meet the needs of the poor.

In laying the groundwork for the Initiative, the Foundation found that while innovation has long been viewed as an effective strategy relied upon by the private sector to generate value and growth, the concepts and practices around innovation had yet to take hold in the social development sector. It was hypothesized that applying these concepts to the social development sector, if done effectively, would result in significant advances in the lives of poor and vulnerable people. ***The Foundation’s Accelerating Innovation for Development Initiative was based on the premise that greater and more effective use of innovation concepts would result in products, processes and services that addressed social development challenges, even those that appeared intractable.***

I:A Initiative Development and Rationale

Based on interviews with former RF staff who were deeply involved in the development of the Initiative, it is our understanding that the initial thinking about the Initiative emerged out of the Foundation’s examination of 15 trends around globalization and its effects on the lives of poor and vulnerable populations. One of these trends focused on developments in innovation, product development and technology. A working group within the Foundation produced a paper that highlighted two points—first that technology was increasingly being used to catalyze and generate innovation in the private sector through approaches such as outsourcing and crowdsourcing; and second, that linked to this technology, innovation had been moving away from a “closed”, inward looking and “supply-driven” process to a much more open and networked process, where new ideas, knowledge or resources were being brought from outside.

These approaches were focused primarily on meeting the needs and aspirations of middle- and upper-income populations, particularly in the West, and the discourse within the Foundation focused on finding ways to leverage innovation to meet the needs of the poor and vulnerable. This thinking was further developed into an initiative that focused on the application and uptake of **three open and user-driven innovation models** (described in detail in section I:D.) to address development problems. A 2008 W.K. Kellogg Foundation report summed up the opportunity for philanthropy to support innovation in the social sector as follows:

“We can make innovation happen and can make it more useful by being deliberate and dedicated over time.”¹

The rationale behind the thinking of this Initiative is summed up in the Initiative Approval Document, dated November 1, 2007:

“If these models of innovation work well for the private sector in the industrialized world, will they work well when applied to a wider range of problems in development? Can they be scaled up and diffused for greater adoption?”

At the time of the approval of the Initiative, the use of models such as the ones that the Foundation funded was not mainstream practice in the social sector and there was little foundation or donor support for them. Social innovation, innovation for development and innovation for social change were terms that were discussed, but there was little experience with their practical application in the social change space.

It should be noted that the models (see section I:D Innovation Models and Approaches) were conceptual, and Initiative support was targeted toward **practical application and use of the underlying concepts of these models** in the social sector. In the framework on opportunity spaces for innovation in philanthropy outlined in the W.K. Kellogg Foundation report² there are several areas of focus essential to building an overall culture of innovation in the social sector. These include wielding influence and strategic grantmaking, collaboration and brokering, learning and evaluation, leveraging resources, and research and knowledge sharing. The two areas on which the Initiative’s design focused most strongly are wielding influence and strategic grant-making, with less defined support for collaboration and brokering, learning and evaluation, leveraging resources, and research and knowledge sharing.

I:B Intended Outcomes of the Initiative

The Initiative supported the testing, application, or scaling up of three kinds of innovation models that resulted in new or modified processes, products or services that were potentially valuable for poor and vulnerable people around the world. The Initiative's main contributions, particularly in terms of its impact and influence, were aimed at field building and uptake and acceptance on concepts, ways of thinking and practices that underpin these models.

The design of the Initiative intended to both demonstrate the value of innovation (through practical application) in the pro-poor sector, and, simultaneously, promote its uptake, adoption and diffusion. It was not intended to source, support and diffuse individual innovations that addressed a particular social issue (although it was assumed that such innovations would surface through the support to innovating agencies), but focused instead on building the capacities and enabling environment for innovation to take place in the social sector. The design of the Initiative also envisioned partnering with three types of agencies—those that provide innovation support (innovation providers) by working with social sector agencies to develop innovations targeting specific issues or building innovation capacity more broadly; those that worked in the social sector arena and were interested in more systematic innovation; and those that had a stake in the application of innovation in the social sector more broadly (such as funders, private sector groups and other agencies).

The intended outcomes of the Initiative are thus indicative of greater use of innovation for social development, particularly of these models, and the acceleration of their application in the social sector.

1. **Innovative tools, techniques and practices:** For-profit and not-for-profit organizations increase the use of open and user-driven innovation models as a tool to address the challenges faced by the poor.
2. **Increased capacity:** Not-for-profit organizations have new skills and abilities in utilizing open and user-driven innovation models to address challenges faced by the poor.
3. **Networks and scaling up:** Not-for-profit and for-profit organizations recognize the need for and have created a network of

interested parties focused on furthering open and user-generated driven innovation tools.

These outcomes, if achieved, would ultimately contribute to the overall Foundation objective, which is to help poor and vulnerable people benefit from more equitable economic growth, and increased resilience whereby individuals, communities and systems survive, adapt and grow in the face of changes, even catastrophic incidents. The contribution of these outcomes to this Foundation objective was contingent on the assumption that **more innovation would result in greater achievement of social development objectives.**

I:C Assumptions

Our understanding of the assumptions that underpin this Initiative relate to the application and demand for the innovation models within the social development sector is as follows:

- » Open and user-driven innovation models are effective and efficient in addressing the needs of poor and vulnerable people. Under this assumption are two related sub-assumptions:
 - » Commercial, for-profit innovation models are likely to be effective and efficient to address needs of poor and vulnerable people; and
 - » Socially focused and non-profit innovation models are worth expanding and scaling up.
- » Foundation strategies and the three models are tested, proven and appropriate for scale, and have the potential for increased learning and social impact for poor and vulnerable people;
- » There was an initial demand for these models among organizations working on development issues;
- » Promoting the value and track record of these innovation models will greatly increase their use, exploration and adaptation in the development sector;
- » The resources allocated and support provided (grants, duration, technical support) are necessary and sufficient to generate momentum and increase capacity;

- » The timing of the Initiative was appropriate to generate momentum for scale-up and acceleration;
- » Being an innovative foundation (internally) and ‘commissioning’ or catalyzing innovation to address social problems (externally) are mutually reinforcing; and
- » Working in an innovative way is applicable to all within an organization, not only a subset of people by virtue of characteristics or role, and can be systematically enhanced.

In the Initiative Approval Document, there is acknowledgment of some inherent risks that the Foundation was willing to take. These include:

- » Models might not be effective or efficient in meeting the needs of the poor and vulnerable;
- » There might be little demand for them in the development community;
- » A particular model might not be appropriate for pro-poor work in a particular context, or the grantees might not have the necessary capacity to apply a particular model in a pro-poor context;
- » Promoting models of innovation without promoting access and distribution of innovations would be insufficient;
- » Innovation models may not be sustainable in the long-term without outside funding or subsidy; and
- » Innovation is a complex activity requiring multiple partners in a networked system. There might not be measurable impact within a few years of the Initiative either on catalyzing/generating innovation processes or on the lives of poor people.

Note that some of these risks mentioned were reverse assumptions.

I:D Innovation Models and Approaches Funded Under the Initiative

Three major types of innovation were selected for support under the Initiative. These are:

- » Open Innovation: Organization solicits solutions from the crowd through an open call, often offering rewards for the best solution;
- » User-centered Innovation: Organization works closely with users to elicit ideas, inputs and refinements on the design and implementation of a solution; and
- » User-led Innovation: Organization elicits and nurtures the user's innovation, and supports the user to expand it.

Under the open model, the Initiative funded two approaches, crowdsourcing and collaborative competitions. The approaches are similar in that a challenge or problem is posed for a crowd of people, each submitting their proposed solutions, of which one or a select few are rewarded. The art of crowdsourcing lies in defining the crowd, and reaching out to it using a range of tactics. Under crowdsourcing, the crowd acts autonomously in submitting their solutions. Collaborative competitions offer an additional element, whereby participants in the crowd are encouraged to comment, further develop and enrich solutions, and even collaborate during the course of implementation.

Under user-driven models, the Initiative funded user-centered (primarily design thinking for social impact) and user-led approaches, both of which value the role of the user within the process of creation. A key distinction between the two approaches lies in the role of the user—in user-led innovation, the user leads the creation process, while in user-centered innovation, the user provides input to the creation process (see box in section II summarizing the debate in the literature on the merits of each).

There is some debate as to whether these can be considered models or approaches, and further, there is some overlap between each of them. For example, users are often part of the crowd that participates in a crowdsourcing attempt. Innovative ideas generated through open-source innovation may be further refined, developed and prototypes using user-centered approaches. The models/approaches themselves are relevant for this evaluation in terms of understanding

the underlying concepts, and how they were interpreted and applied through the various grants. Therefore, for the purpose of the evaluation, the three main innovation models discussed below are categorized as open, user-centered and user-led.

I:E Intervention Strategies Deployed to Achieve Outcomes

The Rockefeller Foundation found that while some agencies focused on improving the lives of poor and vulnerable people were experimenting with the use of these models, they lacked practical evidence and resources to scale them up. Tactically, Rockefeller Foundation support would therefore be most useful in larger scale testing and refining of models and in gathering practical, on-the-ground experience of application of such models by the social development sector. The specific strategies devised to achieve the outcomes described above were to:

- » Experiment with models of innovation, to infuse new ways of thinking and working and open-up problem-solving in the social sector;
- » Increase capacity and momentum among organizations and companies to apply models of innovation;
- » Generate practical experience in applying these types of models in the context of pro-poor work, or applying them at scale; and
- » Build awareness of the potential added value from open and user-driven models of innovation among those institutions, both public and private, that are working on the needs of poor or vulnerable people.

The applications of these models selected for experimentation, capacity building and on-the-ground use were primarily from the private sector.

Figure 1: Theory Of Change Diagram

**Desired Impact:
Poor and vulnerable
people benefit from
innovations**

Assumptions

The timing of the Initiative was appropriate to generate momentum for scale-up and acceleration

The resources allocated and support provided (grants, duration, technical support) are necessary and sufficient to generate momentum and increase capacity


Being an innovative foundation (internally) and ‘commissioning’ or catalyzing innovation to address social problems (externally) are mutually reinforcing

Step 1: Adapt innovation models


Open Innovation



User Centered



User Led



Foundation strategies and the three models are tested, proven and appropriate for scale, and have the potential for increased learning and social impact for poor and vulnerable people


There was an initial demand for these models among organizations working on development issues

Promoting the value and track record of these innovation models will greatly increase their use, exploration and adaptation in the development sector;

Working in an innovative way is applicable to all within an organization, not only a subset of people by virtue of characteristics or role, and can be systematically enhanced.

→ Step 2: Apply the models in the field

Grantees experiment with the models



Step 3: Reach, influence, persuade and encourage a larger audience to also use the models

For-profit innovators
More like IDEO

Funders

More like the Rockefeller Foundation

Social sector:
Non-profit and public institutions

More like Global Giving



Leads to: Greater use of models which creates change in social sector

Open and user-driven innovation models are effective and efficient in addressing the needs of poor and vulnerable people.

Commercial, for-profit innovation models are likely to be effective and efficient to address needs of poor and vulnerable people; and

Socially focused and non-profit innovation models are worth expanding and scaling up.

II: Overview Of The Field Of Innovation For Development

The Rockefeller Foundation definition of innovation for development is as follows, as described in internal memos, “Innovation in an organizational context is a new product, process or service that is discontinuous from previous practice and yields new avenues for solving acute problems or fulfilling an organization’s mission.” Placing the Initiative for Accelerating Innovation for Development alongside this definition, we can state that the Initiative aimed to support and grow three models/approaches that could spur innovative products, processes and services in service of social change. It also aimed to encourage more systematic and widespread use of these three models toward a systemic change in the social sector—that of how innovation was undertaken and supported in the social sector. This literature review summarizes some current thinking on:

1. The value and role of innovation for social impact, and issues faced in the field with growing the use of innovation in the social sector; and
2. The growth and shifts in thinking about the three models/ approaches used in the Initiative toward building the field of innovation for development.

II:A The Case for and Issues Faced When Using Innovation in the Social Sector

Social innovation is defined as “the development and implementation of new ideas (products, services and models) to meet social needs.”³ Stanford Social Innovation Review defines it as “a novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than existing solutions, and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private individuals.”⁴

In recent years, several foundations and donors (including the Skoll Foundation, the Lemelsen Foundation, and the W.K. Kellogg Foundation) have developed a strong interest in how greater and more systemic use of innovation can be achieved to better support social needs. Rodrigo Canales of the Yale School of

Management (SOM) described to the evaluation team the role that innovation can play in social change:

“If we, as in the developmental organizations, all of a sudden found a way to do what we are doing today, ten times better, ten times quicker, ten times more efficiently, do you think we’d be solving the world problems?” And the answer is no. Even if we were ten times more efficient today, we wouldn’t even make a dent in the problems. So the question for NGOs is not to become more efficient, the question is to come up with new ways to do things, the question is to keep on experimenting until we find really innovative solutions.”

However, as a literature review conducted for the Rockefeller Foundation by The Young Foundation points out, “few social entrepreneurs have an explicit framework for explaining how social innovation occurs. Meanwhile, social change funders...trying lots of things and seeing how they turn out, rather than using a rigorously analytical, step-by-step investment process.”⁵ Without such a framework, it is difficult to fully test and refine the hypotheses underpinning the role, added value, and potential for deeper social impact through the systemic use of innovation.

The Young Foundation offers a framework depicting the key stages to design, develop and grow social innovation, which is helpful in thinking about where investments to grow social innovation have focused to date, and where additional support may be needed to reap the value and potential benefit of the systemic use of innovation.⁶ These stages can also be used to analyze and assess the hypothesis that greater and more systemic use of social innovation can have greater social impact. These six stages are described below:

- » Prompts: A stage which includes all the factors which highlight the need for or possibility of a social innovation;
- » Proposals: The stage of idea generation;
- » Prototyping: The stage where ideas get tested in practice;
- » Sustaining: The stage where the idea becomes everyday practice;
- » Scaling: The stage where a range of strategies for growing and spreading an innovation are implemented; and

- » Systemic Change: The ultimate goal of changing whole systems, including cultures as well as practices.

Mulgan et al. address the gap between sustaining and scaling that they have often observed. Calling it the “missing middle” they refer to intermediary bodies that would link the stages of proposals and prototyping to sustaining and scaling. The authors note the following specific challenges within the social sector that affect uptake of social innovation⁷:

- » Fragile markets for the results of social innovation;
- » Underdeveloped capital markets to provide financing for social entrepreneurs;
- » Few and weak institutions and networks for spreading innovation around communities of practice;
- » Few established methods and strategies for nurturing and growing social innovations; and
- » Underdeveloped labor pools from which to draw managers and others to help with growth.

Mulgan et al. go on to state that the process of scaling-up and spreading social innovations is often characterized by difficulty and underperformance before they can yield benefits.⁸ This idea is reinforced in the Young Foundation framework above, where the authors state “the process of social innovation is not linear, often involving feedback loops and jumps between stages.”⁹ The report by Mulgan et al. recommends several strategies for building up the “missing middle” to better realize actual social impact from social innovation efforts. This missing middle refers to the environment in which innovation can take place more regularly, more naturally, and be nurtured toward social impact.¹⁰

As the literature review on the spread and acceleration of the three models reveals, support for social innovation has been “front-loaded” on the prompts and proposals stages, and to a lesser extent on prototyping—in that it has focused on specific idea generation to solve social problems, on researching the models to show how ideas are generated and prototyped by using them, and on funding deeper use of these models to develop proposals and prototypes. It has focused less on the enabling environment to sustain and scale actual innovations, or to sustain and scale the use of these models in the social sector (see next section).

Until the missing middle is better developed in detailing the enabling factors that promote, sustain or inhibit innovation within an overall societal context, the stages of systemic social change will remain elusive, and the social sector may not be convinced to create the necessary conditions to innovate more systematically. Related to this, the actual case for innovation in the social sector may continue to be based on hypotheses of what it can potentially offer, rather than on strong evidence of social impact, which can further diminish the demand for more systematic innovation.

II:B Open Innovation

“... the world is becoming too fast, too complex and too networked for any company to have all the answers inside.”¹¹

“No matter who you are, most of the smartest people work for someone else.”¹²

The term open innovation was first promoted in the 1960s by Henry Chesbrough, a professor and executive director at the Center for Open Innovation at the University of California, Berkeley, in reference to a number of different techniques for gaining ideas from business partners and customers. In his book *Open Innovation* (2003) he identifies open innovation as:

“[A] paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology.”¹³

The central idea behind open innovation is that in a world of widely distributed knowledge, companies cannot afford to rely entirely on their own research, but should instead buy or license processes or inventions (e.g. patents) from other companies, or engage its customer or user base. In addition, internal inventions not being used in a firm’s business should be taken outside the company (e.g. through licensing, joint ventures or spin-offs). In other words, open innovation is based on the premise that boundaries between a firm and its environment have become more permeable and that innovations can easily transfer inward and outward.

Open innovation in its simplest form as it relates to engaging users consists of a suggestion box for a company’s customers to submit ideas. More sophisticated versions rely on vetted partners, and other open innovation approaches use

contests to incentivize the crowd in solving problems. There are variations in approach in terms of level of instruction provided and the make-up of the crowd addressed. While becoming increasingly popular in the past decade, the practice of tapping a crowd has long been used by businesses. In 1916, for example, Planters Peanuts held an open contest to develop its logo. The difference in today's world is the use of the web 2.0 technology to quickly and more affordably reach a global crowd, engage their interest, manage and filter their ideas and feedback, and help choose optimal scenarios to act upon.

There has been extensive research on open innovation and crowd sourcing in recent years, which includes a substantial discussion on its cost benefits.

In the private sector, analyses reveal substantial cost benefits to crowdsourcing. The success of the InnoCentive platform with private sector firms, particularly pharmaceutical companies undertaking research and development, was based on costs. Beyond cost, benefits for the company can include externalizing the risk of failure, as companies only pay for products or services that meet its expectations.¹⁴ Other benefits include quality of solutions and ideas, and networking.¹⁵

“NASA...has been implementing the Open Innovation approach to achieve NASA’s goals of going back to the moon, to Mars, and beyond. Forming partnerships in which both NASA and its collaborator have something valuable to contribute to address the other’s technology “need” allows both parties to use fewer resources to solve their respective problems. For NASA, this approach not only accelerates space mission research and development (R&D), but it also makes the R&D more cost-efficient, which is a benefit for taxpayers.”¹⁶

At the same time, challenges to effective crowdsourcing, and open innovation more broadly, include significant time and resource investments, as well as transaction costs. Open innovation often generates large quantities of inputs, which then need to be sorted to select appropriate ideas. Further, research points to several examples where framing a challenge or defining a request was difficult, and if not done correctly, led to decreased effectiveness of ideas generated. The research also points to a critical mass that is needed in order to ensure that the crowd is engaging. This requires marketing and connecting with users and contributors, encouraging their participation (by making it simple), and developing a question around an issue that they can connect with, especially in crowdsourcing for

social impact initiatives. Finally, the research points to the need for enforcement of appropriate structures, rules and formats in open innovation, and notes that this has sometimes been a challenge.¹⁷

Another area of discussion in the literature relates to transferability of knowledge. Schenk and Guittard have coined the term “knowledge appropriability,”¹⁸ which refers to how knowledge may be transferred in the form of ideas, solutions or recommendations. They further propose that for knowledge to be appropriate, the context and situations where the idea is being implemented need to be simple, rather than complex. In his working paper, *Crowdsourcing critical success factor model*, Ankit Sharma of the London School of Economics argues that crowd participation, which is crucial to the success of the crowdsourcing approach, requires that the motives of the crowd be in alignment with the overall crowdsourcing objective. He poses five factors involved in aligning objectives with crowd motives and expectations, including clear vision and strategy, human capital, infrastructure, linkages and trust, and external environment.¹⁹

While there is more movement in the literature toward the application of crowdsourcing in a social development context and envisioning its adoption by the non-profit sector,²⁰ there is not a consensus on whether the open innovation models necessarily demonstrate what could be characterized as an innovative process or one that leads to innovative ideas. West and Bogers (2011) argue that the process of innovation is generally not linear and unidirectional, as most open innovation models like crowdsourcing assume, but that in practice, it is bi-directional and characterized by reverse flows and reciprocity. Their review of the current research on open innovation points to some significant gaps, identifying the focus to be heavily front-loaded in the innovation process, e.g. more focused on searching for and acquiring ideas than on their application or commercialization.²¹

II:C User-Centered Innovation

User-centered innovation is a model that identifies user needs and aspirations, and incorporates these, with user input, into the full process of designing, prototyping, marketing, and distributing an innovation. The Initiative funded design thinking as a form of user-centered innovation.

“Design thinking is a human-centered approach to innovation that draws from the designer’s toolkit to integrate the needs of

Box 1: Human-centered design thinking: Examples of social impact

HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN THINKING INNOVATION THAT HAS HAD SOCIAL IMPACT

A treadle pump is a human-powered pump designed to lift water from a depth of seven meters or less. The treadle pump can do most of the work of a motorized pump, but costs considerably less (75%). Standard treadle pumps are suction pumps, and were first developed in the early 1980s in Bangladesh and made popular by IDE. Since then pressure pumps, a modification to the original design that means water is forced out of the pump under pressure, have also been

developed and are widely in use in East Africa through KickStart and in Myanmar through Proximity Designs. Pressure treadle pumps allow farmers to spray water and run sprinklers – saving the need for an elevated water storage tank and suction pump system. Many NGOs (IDE, KickStart, Proximity Designs, Practical Action (formally ITDG)) have been active in developing treadle pumps, as have student and researcher teams at universities.

“So really this kind of working directly with listening to the people that were using the products, to understand what they needed. Paul (Polak) talks about sitting for a thousand hours listening to these small acre farmers to understand exactly what they needed. And she (Amy Smith, MIT) talks about working in co-creation. That, in fact, it’s not a designer kind of parachuting into a new location and kind of thinking that they have all the ideas. But, in fact, they have to work very closely, as you would any good designer listens and talks to his or her client. So, it’s really working directly with people to better understand what they need. From listening to designers who have been working in this field and who have been successful in this field where, I think of an example like Martin Fisher from KickStart International where he describes where he’d been working in international development for years, and once they finally engaged people in the conversation of actually creating whatever it was that they were working on, people began to

use them (products) in a way that they hadn't before. You could, people could make them themselves, the treadle pumps, the money maker, the super money maker, the treadle pumps that he distributes there, (so) people understand them much better, and, understand their end use because they've been part of the development."

*Cynthia Smith,
Cooper-Hewitt Institute of National Design*

The Jaipur Leg also known as the Jaipur Foot is a rubber-based prosthetic leg for people with below-knee amputations, produced under the guidance of Dr. P. K. Sethi by Masterji Ram Chander in 1969 for victims of landmine explosions. It costs \$45, is designed to be inexpensive, quick to fit and manufacture, and to be water-resistant. Today, nearly 400,000 people have such limbs fitted. In addition, there are mobile clinics setup in 26 countries around the world, including the war torn regions of Iraq,

Afghanistan and Sudan. A Forbes article summarizes the innovation of the product, the business model and the delivery of the Jaipur Foot, as well as the social impact, stating, "The beauty of the Jaipur Foot is its lightness and mobility, as those who wear it can run, climb trees and pedal bicycles."

people, the possibilities of technology, and the requirements for business success.” Tim Brown, President and CEO, IDEO²²

There are many articles in the literature about products and projects that use design thinking for social impact. They include products and processes such as KickStart’s treadle pumps, the Project H’s hippo roller, and Catapult Design’s stoves.²³ These articles summarize the challenges and benefits of design thinking applied to social impact projects, and note where it has made a difference. These projects are undertaken by non-profit design firms and they highlight the importance of contextual understanding and user input as a critical success factor (see Box on previous page).²⁴

Bruce Nussbaum’s article design thinking for social impact offers a perspective shared by some of the designers with whom the evaluation team spoke. The article critiques recent trends in the design industry, especially among those firms and designers based in the West, to apply their practices of design thinking to address social, economic and environmental issues in the developing world. He cautions against designers parachuting in to solve problems faced by communities with little understanding of the context, and urges greater engagement and regard for local designers.²⁵

Several respondents that the evaluation team spoke with mentioned their consciousness about the risks of designers parachuting into situations that were not known to them. Robert Fabricant, of Frog Design, countered the Nussbaum article with:

“But back to the larger question: Is the local model the only way to meaningfully engage in social-impact initiatives? Are American designers who want to have an impact on global issues in emerging markets kidding themselves? /.../ This is a question that I have wrestled with personally and professionally in helping shape frog’s investments in social impact.”²⁶

He lists five factors that can help avoid such pitfalls, and that guide frog’s work on design for social impact: being a global firm with local designers, using global technologies, finding local partners, understanding that there are no silver bullets, and sustained commitment.²⁷

II:D User-Led Innovation

User-led innovation is a model that identifies innovations and innovators among users, and then provides support to manufacture, market and scale up those innovations. In the user innovation approach described by Eric von Hippel in 2005, users are active contributors to the innovation process. User-led innovation is driven by lead users who face specific needs (and possibly anticipate market needs) and who are ready to bear some of the costs and risks associated with innovation. User innovation depicts the non-linear dimension of the innovation process: user and market feedback are a source of novelty for the innovating firm.²⁸

Commentators describe a growing consciousness among consumers to participate in and demand customized services and products. Von Hippel notes that businesses are keen to tap into the insights of creative users into their products, and that the proliferation of user-generated designs signals the democratizing of innovation.²⁹ Wikipedia, YouTube and open-source software are all well-known examples of user-generated content. Von Hippel speaks of the consumer as innovator, and notes many innovations the public believes are the creations of companies themselves are by individuals who innovated out of need and interest. He cites examples of innovations ranging from skateboards developed by children to Facebook and the creation of the World Wide Web itself. Von Hippel discusses the innovation of mobile banking:

“People assume mobile banking is an innovation of mobile phone companies. How mobile banking began was with airtime cards. What users did initially to transfer money was to send their airtime card code to their village and have the local phone owner use that code. The airtime card code became a currency. You bought your airtime. You rang up the person in the village who had a phone. You gave her the code for a \$10 card. She passed on, say, \$9.00 to your family, and used the code for cheap calling. This was the basis of mobile banking. It also meant mobile agents were already in place when mobile phone companies took the innovation on. M-Pesa says it came up with mobile banking but it is not the case.”³⁰

Von Hippel's description of innovation is not fully accepted by skeptics who note another significant trend driving the market, that of corporate-driven innovation in pursuit of a one size that fits many. They argue that the underlying complexity of such innovations demands a higher level of technological capacity than present in the public at large.³¹ As the late Steve Jobs once said, "For something this complicated, it's really hard to design products by focus groups. A lot of times, people don't know what they want until you show it to them."³² Skibsted and Hansen argue that it is actually harmful to listen to users and that innovative brands don't care about what their users want. They make four key points: **1)** Users' insights can't predict future demand; **2)** User-centered processes stifle creativity; **3)** User focus makes companies miss out on disruptive innovations; and **4)** User-led design leads to sameness. Skibsted and Hansen conclude by saying it is time for brands to step up and trust themselves again.³³

Chris Grams writes in favor of user-centered innovation, arguing that **a)** there are plenty of successful examples of user-centered innovation, **b)** obtaining user-feedback does not imply that there is no space for creative design and "disruptive innovations," but that these can be integrated with processes that ensure user feedback, and **c)** even innovative companies like Apple and IKEA, which are used as examples of successful companies eschewing user-centered design, are focused on user aspirations and desires in a very powerful way. He concludes with thoughts on Apple and Google and their different approaches. One eschews open innovation and the other embraces it, noting that both produce fantastic results, and there may not be only one path to innovative breakthroughs.³⁴

While the literature on user-led innovation focuses primarily on consumer products and services, there is some dialogue on application of user-led processes to the social sector. Skeptics use von Hippel's term 'democratizing' innovation, questioning whether the prevalence of its application to consumer products and services rather than innovations that benefit society more broadly is merely a kind of "democracy lite". They further question whether consumer products can be compared to social problems, as the latter has far more complexity than the former.³⁵

Peter Svensson and Lars Bengtsson propose an alternate view in their 2010 article in *Journal of Social Entrepreneurship*. They examined the commercial success of a babysitting service, created by a group of disadvantaged mothers after coming together and discussing their needs. Identified as an example of user-led innovation, Svensson and Bengtsson argue the innovation generated

by the users, or disadvantaged mothers, was successful as they have first-hand knowledge of their problems, making them suited to generate new ideas about solutions. The authors argue that users can be catalysts in the innovation process, and they can play an important role in diffusing innovations as they have legitimacy among their peers.³⁶

Boger (2011) reflects on the literature overall, claiming that greater emphasis is placed on creating, finding and enabling user innovations, rather than integrating them or scaling them for greater use. The evaluation team proposes that this emphasis may be reflective of current practice, and notes that the grants funded under user-led innovations focused on users innovating, and less on scaling them up.³⁷

III: Purpose And Objectives Of The Evaluation

The evaluation covers the grantmaking and non-grant work of the Initiative from 2007-2009 on open, user-centered design and user-led innovation (see Annex 1 for the Terms of Reference for the Evaluation). The evaluation was conducted from July 2011 to February 2012 by an independent evaluation team. The purposes of the evaluation of the Innovation Initiative are:

1. To learn from the Innovation Initiative work to inform other Rockefeller Foundation Initiatives, the Foundation enabling environment work and the work of Foundation grantees and partners;
2. To demonstrate accountability to the Rockefeller Foundation President and Board of Trustees for the funds spent under the Initiative;
3. As a public good, to contribute knowledge on approaches, methods and tools for innovation for development to the fields of philanthropy, development evaluation, and social innovation; and
4. For use in the Foundation's Centennial events focused on "Innovation for the Next 100 Years."

IV: Methodology

IV:A Evaluation Questions

Evaluation questions were developed by the evaluation department of the Foundation together with the evaluation team based on the Initiative Approval documents and the specific current learning needs of the Foundation. These questions are summarized below:

1. What was the relevance and rationale of the Initiative to the field of innovation for development, to the needs of key stakeholders, and to the Strategy and Mission of the Foundation?
2. What was the effectiveness of the Initiative in delivering its outputs and achieving its outcomes? This includes an assessment of:
 - » The quality and quantity of the outputs of the Initiative in relation to the desired outcomes of the Initiative;
 - » Its achievements, challenges and lessons learned; and
 - » What worked, what did not and why?
3. What was the cost effectiveness and efficiency of the Initiative in using its resources (human and financial) wisely in achieving its outputs and outcomes?
4. What was the contribution of the Initiative in providing thought leadership in the Foundation and with its technical and donor partners, and grantees, in the field of innovation for development.
5. To what extent will the work of the Initiative be sustainable and scaled up beyond the support of the Foundation?
6. What recommendations can be made to the Foundation on the implications of the Innovation Initiative's achievements, challenges and lessons learned for the strategy and work of the Foundation in the area of innovation for development? This could include lessons for specific fields of work (urban, health,

climate, etc.) as well as lessons for Initiatives and grantees that aspire to use innovation to achieve development outcomes.

7. What have been the knowledge contributions and value added of the Initiative as a public good to the field of innovation for development, philanthropy and development evaluation. This includes highlighting conceptual advancements, frameworks, approaches, methods and tools for innovation and evaluation.

IV:B Approach to Data Collection and Analysis

The Initiative's main impact and influence was intended to be field building and uptake and acceptance on concepts, models, ways of thinking and practices. Given the nature of this contribution, the approach to the evaluation focused on a case study analysis of selected grants in each category of innovation: open, user-centered and user-led. These cases provide the evidence to examine how Foundation investments contributed to greater uptake and use of the concepts and the models in the organizations under the grant, their partners, and the communities. They also provide evidence on how well the models worked when applied to social issues, their strengths and their limitations. Finally, they help identify gaps in Foundation investment areas. The case studies were supplemented by additional data, as described below.

Case Study Analysis

Six of a total of 25 grants were selected for in-depth analysis, with each grant forming the basis for the development of a case study. The six grants are to the Rural Innovations Network (now called Villgro Networks Foundation), GlobalGiving, ETC Foundation, IDEO, Ashoka Changemakers, and Winterhouse Institute. Selection criteria for these six grants were:

- » Adequate representation of the three innovation models, while taking into consideration the amount of investment;
- » Scope of work and related scale, reach and contribution;
- » Number of years of collaboration with Rockefeller; and
- » A balance between activities carried out in the United States and globally.

The purpose of each case study was to examine the work under the grant from activity to output to contribution to larger outcomes and impact. Data was collected from a sample of the full range of stakeholders engaged with the grant, including grant managers and implementers, sub grantees, target groups and ultimate beneficiaries. Additional sources of data included a comprehensive document review, as well as internet research.

Assessment of Contextual Factors and Realities

Contextual information was gathered on the field of innovation, the field of social innovation and social development, and on Foundation-specific priorities, strategies, and objectives in order to examine the assumptions, the hypothesis and the niche, role and fit of the Initiative. Data was gathered through a literature review and by interviewing innovation leaders, social development practitioners, Foundation staff, and others.

Assessment of Conceptual Analyses and Frameworks

Information to assess the Foundation's conceptual analysis of the field of innovation and the use of frameworks was gathered to further understand and describe the conceptual basis for the Initiative. It was also tested against the information gathered through the case studies to reinforce or challenge the concepts based on actual experience. Data was collected from the same sources as the contextual information and the case studies, and supplemented by document review.

Assessment of Initiative-wide Performance

Information on the grants that do not form the case studies as well as the non-grant work was incorporated into the evaluation. A survey with all remaining grantees under the Initiative, interviews with Foundation staff and a comprehensive document review of Initiative project proposals, grant memos and internal memos were all used to collect this information.

IV:C Process of Data Collection and Analysis

The evaluation team collected data as described above over a four-month period, from August to November 2011, through both desk review of available documentation and interviews with grant managers and implementers, sub-grantees, target groups and ultimate beneficiaries. Interviews were also conducted with

Rockefeller Foundation staff and with others knowledgeable about the social innovation field. A total of 259 respondents were interviewed for the evaluation.

The collection of data was global, spanning across three continents (see map for locations). The evaluation team visited project sites in southern India, Kenya, Uganda and Alabama, USA, where the team observed ongoing activities and viewed innovations resulting from application of the three models. The evaluation team employed mixed methods, collecting both quantitative and qualitative data through interviews and using secondary data available through grantees. Interviews were primarily semi-structured in nature. The evaluation team also conducted focus group discussions with groups of five to fifteen beneficiaries at a time, as well as individual interviews with selected beneficiaries. Video was used to capture interviews, and both video and still images were taken of project sites. An online survey was conducted with all the grantees of the Initiative, with a response rate of 30%. The low response rate is likely due to the turnover of staff among the grantees since the time of the grant, as in many cases, the principal investigator was no longer with the organization.

Data analysis was done using qualitative analysis techniques, mostly by looking for patterns, trends and themes in the transcripts. The nature of the data was such that quantifying the qualitative information was not possible.

Annex 2 includes the full list of 259 respondents interviewed by the evaluation team. A reference list of documents consulted is provided at the end of the document; however it does not include the list of internal Rockefeller Foundation documents that were consulted.

Figure 2: Map of locations where the evaluation team collected data



V: Findings

The evaluation finds that the Initiative has made a modest positive contribution to innovation practices for social impact. This contribution is demonstrated through initial stages of uptake among some social sector organizations, a greater proliferation of efforts based on the three models of innovation, and deeper understanding and engagement around the systematic use of innovation among some of the partner agencies.

However, the overall anticipated outcomes of the Initiative appear overly ambitious for the three-year timeframe, and, thus far there is only anecdotal evidence of achievement found within each of the Initiative's expected outcomes.

- » **Outcome 1: Application of innovative tools, techniques and practices:** The evaluation finds evidence of limited use of open-source and user-centered/led innovation models to address social development needs, particularly among organizations that work closely with poor and vulnerable people in developing countries.
- » **Outcome 2: Increased capacity:** The evaluation finds evidence of a handful of organizations (social enterprises and non-profit organizations) that demonstrate enhanced and new skills and abilities in using open-source and user-centered/led models. However, this use is not institutionalized and practices are still far from being embedded. Capacities to ensure systematic and regular use of models of innovation in even a handful of organizations are still being built, and the process is gradual.
- » **Outcome 3: Networks and scaling up:** The evaluation finds that the Initiative has contributed to networking among design agencies to further user-centered design thinking for social impact. There is no evidence that such networks have led to a sustained scaling up of design thinking thus far. There was no evidence of contribution to networks for the other models, or for the use of innovation in social impact work more broadly, nor of scaling up.

In sum, the positive contributions of the Initiative, while apparent, are fragmented and unaligned, thus reducing overall impact. It is therefore challenging to clearly articulate and offer strong evidence to show how the Initiative has moved the field of innovation for social change as a whole, or show that it has contributed to systematic and significantly greater application of innovation in the social sector. The rest of the findings provide additional insights on factors that affected the achievement of outcomes, what worked well, and what worked less well.


Detailed findings are organized in the main body of the report as follows:

- » Section V.A. and V.B. cover the evaluation findings as they pertain to the relevance conceptualization, and design of the overall Initiative;
- » Sections V.C., V.D., and V.E. cover the detailed findings on the effectiveness, effects and impact of the Initiative;
- » Section V.F. covers sustainability;
- » Section V.G. offers an analysis of the resource allocations and expenditure under the Initiative; and
- » Sections V.H. and V.I. cover the strategic oversight and management of the overall initiative.

(See Annex 3 for responses to detailed questions according to DAG Criteria).

On the next two pages, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the timeline of the Initiative and the main events in the course of the six grants that were used for the six case studies. These two figures provide an overview look at the course of Initiative during the three years.

Figure 3: Initiative Timeline







Figure 4: Main events during the timeframe of the six case study grants



V:A Relevance of the Initiative at Conception to the Field of Innovation for Social Development

Main Findings:

- » *The Initiative was relevant and timely to the field of innovation for development. There was limited support from foundations for innovation for development more generally, and for these three models specifically. There was a demand and momentum that was smaller scale prior to Rockefeller Foundation support.*
- » *The need and opportunity for innovation to contribute to social development should have been more sharply defined.*
- » *A deeper analysis of the social sector’s innovation approaches, examples of success and barriers to innovation uptake would have been useful at the outset.*

Several respondents commented on the relevance of the Initiative to the field of innovation for development when it was first initiated.

“The Rockefeller Foundation work on innovation was truly groundbreaking. In 2006/2007, the concepts of social innovation were not really well known. The three approaches [models] were not well known. All three are now mainstream. [The Foundation] really demonstrated leadership in this sector, and the Initiative was a bold and brave effort. I had no idea that their investment was as modest as US \$16.5 million. I thought it was five times that given the influence.”
Simon Tucker, CEO, Young Foundation.

Respondents stated that the fields of open innovation and user-driven innovation for social impact were at the early stages of implementation in 2006/2007, and Rockefeller Foundation support was an investment in the early stages of an emerging field. The Rockefeller Foundation’s approach was described as follows:

“It’s [the Foundation support] based on the investing in the infrastructure of a field before the field is there. And essentially saying - in order for this approach to have a possibility of taking hold, it needs these various elements, and if nobody else is going to do those elements, we’re going to make sure that they are done and

they are done well and they are done thoroughly, so that then it will be able to attract on both the supply side of funding and the demand side...a nexus where they have a common language.”
 Tony Sheldon, Yale SOM

“One, there seems to be an attitude [at the Foundation] that we should give triumph a chance rather than avoid risk at all cost, which is really a critical attribute for any funder. Secondly, when they decide they’re going to fund it, they fund it adequately to allow people to try different things and to find the right solutions. So that combination of being willing to take risk and then funding it adequately, it’s absolutely critical for innovation.” Ric Grefe, American Institute of Graphic Arts (AIGA)

There was an expressed agreement by many respondents, particularly by those working in the area of design thinking and crowd sourcing, that an overall need to accelerate innovation for development, and opportunities to provide support were all present in 2006-2007. Respondents also noted that Foundation support to field building generates interest and attracts support from other grantmakers because it is seen as a serious foundation, with expertise and insight on funding new areas that can make a powerful difference.

The evaluation team’s review of documents and interviews with former Foundation staff indicate that the Initiative was based on a general assumption that innovation is limited within the non-profit social development sector as a whole, and more intentional uptake on models that have worked in the for-profit sector would be useful. This general assumption did not appear to be grounded in deep evidence of social sector practices or the specific issues that innovation uptake could address.

Therefore, the evaluation team notes that the need and/or demand for innovation from the side of the social development sector could have been better defined. Respondents stated that the Initiative, at conception, did not define why innovation was needed and what it could contribute to current development practice, and did not clarify adequately why the three models offered value to the social sector.

A deeper analysis of the social sector and the experience of the organizations working in the sector would have better informed the actual problem and the

development of models and approaches that could be funded. Such an analysis would have also led to richer insights and learning on how to innovate, when to innovate, what types of innovation may be useful and in what context.

V:B Design and Conceptualization of the Initiative

Main findings:

- » *The Initiative itself was viewed as needed and timely by grantees and players within the social innovation sector. The choice of the three models to fund was seen as appropriate, and the intent to generate practical experience around their implementation was seen as helpful.*
- » *The four strategies were effectively focused on both application of the models and on their scaling and uptake, achieving both Initiative objectives.*
- » *However, a more even distribution of funds among the models may have generated greater learning, and a greater understanding of the types of innovations already used in the social development sector, as well as the need for innovation. The funding for specific innovations seen most viable by social development organizations would have been beneficial.*

Several aspects of the design and conceptualization of the Initiative were appropriate. The evaluation team notes the following:

Decision to contribute to the field of innovation for development was timely and needed: Evaluation respondents confirmed that there was a clear niche for Foundation support in the application of innovation concepts, models and approaches for development. This niche was based on the gaps in the social development field at that time, Foundation capacities and expertise, and the potential of the Foundation's investment to contribute to learning and uptake. There was also an indication in the documentation prepared for the Foundation that there was potential for social impact from increased application of innovation.

Grant support to generate practical experience around the use of innovation approaches in the social development sector was useful: The decision to fund and demonstrate what worked well and what worked less well through

application of each of the models in the development sector was useful and achieved by the Initiative. It has answered several questions around grantee capacity and resources needed to apply a model, the appropriateness of such application to social change efforts, and the value added and limitations of such application to social change. It has not answered fully whether the models themselves are effective and efficient in addressing needs of poor and vulnerable people—in part because it may be too early to assess impact, and in part because the Initiative funded select applications of each model, not a full range of possible applications.

The choice to fund the three models—open innovation, user-led and user-centered—was timely: The three models chosen for support captured the thinking at the time on what would be effective in achieving impact within the social development sector. Initial activities in this arena had already started. Foundation investments came at the right time to provide additional boost and support to the three models in increasing their application, and generating learning from such application.

The four strategies devised were well-formulated in achieving desired outcomes: The strategies effectively focused on both application of the models, and on their scaling and uptake. Implementation of the strategies, including funding, resourcing and support to grantees, as well as grantee selection is discussed in the next section on shaping the Initiative during implementation.

However, certain things could have been done differently at the design stage:

Risks were identified but poorly managed: The Initiative Approval Document has a thoughtful summary on risks to achieving outcomes. Some of these risks are “reverse assumptions”. For example, “models will not be effective or efficient in meeting the needs of poor and vulnerable people” is also, in reverse, a hypothesis underpinning the Initiative. The risks identified indicate to the team that the Foundation was aware that the application of these models to the social sector was not a given, and that there was a chance that the models might not work to meet needs of the poor and vulnerable. Conversations with former Foundation staff reveal that this was not considered a significant risk at the time, as it was felt that the models were proven to be effective, and therefore would translate well to the social sector.

More exploration on what already is innovative within the social development sector and where innovation is needed would have led to more targeted funding and generated greater learning, as well as possibly greater impact: The evaluation finds that the Initiative’s investments were relatively scattered and opportunistic, rather than strategic and hypothesis-driven. The Initiative was not designed to purposefully align investments with models, and grants were neither designed to complement one another to achieve common outcomes, nor set up as comparative examples of application with clear learning questions. Rather, the approach appears to have been to provide grants where there was potential for unspecified field building in social innovation. This may have seemed appropriate in the early years of the Initiative due to the nascent nature of the field itself; however, the scattered nature of investments has resulted in highly dispersed and small-scale outcomes and effects, both on the field of social innovation as well on poor people themselves.

Better communication about Initiative objectives and outcomes was needed: More than half of the respondents, including grantees and other stakeholders, stated that there was little understanding of the Initiative as a whole. Five out of six grantees were unaware that there was a larger initiative on innovation for development, and some stakeholders understood the Initiative to focus entirely on promoting private sector approaches to innovation, particularly on crowdsourcing.

More even distribution of funds and focus within the Initiative would have generated more effective learning: The models selected and the grants funded were skewed toward a for-profit set of approaches to generating and catalyzing innovation, as seen in section V:A. on the summary of activities, grants and duration. The private sector approaches led to challenges with uptake and diffusion, as described in more detail under section V:G on contribution to acceleration of the models.

A clearer strategy that laid out an initial phase for testing and refinement of the approaches, followed by a phase of reflection and learning, followed by a scaling-up phase: The Initiative consists of a diverse array of approaches in different stages of development and application. Some grants were given to organizations thought already to be successful and thus the intention was to scale their work, while other grants were focused on further demonstration and application to social development problems. Still others were meant to further the discourse and dialogue on innovation for development. The fit of each grant

with a larger set of outcomes and linkages between different grants and their approaches is not evident. Further, the evaluation finds that the Initiative has resulted in innovations that have demonstrated impact at a very small scale or have yet to demonstrate impact. This implies the need for greater demonstration, trialing and testing of these models in the social sector, as well as learning and refinement on their application, and further dialogue and discussion on what works well and what does not. Phases of implementation prior to outcomes that focused on scale up would have been more appropriate.

The non-profit and social sector world has examples of applying some of the models and many of the concepts to generate innovation for development: Some of the concepts behind the for-profit models applied in the Initiative are similar to approaches that have been tested over time and have generated significant learning within the social development sector. If they had been considered, they would have contributed to learning on innovation and may have better informed the design of the Initiative. It is also possible that such acknowledgement would have supported greater uptake in the non-profit world, and would have resulted in more mutual learning and lessons learned for the for-profit institutions as well.

More dialogue and partnering with non-profits and social sector organizations to explore challenges and opportunities for application, accompanied with greater investment for those innovations seen viable: Even when an approach is proven successful, given the nature of organizations, change and the adoption of new approaches do not happen quickly or easily. For those approaches that may be successful in a for-profit arena, other factors come into play in a non-profit arena, namely availability of funds and the interest of donors in funding such approaches. Greater understanding of the social development sector and their needs and interests as they identify them, as well as a more targeted approach to certain NGOs/development agencies with capacity and expressed interest in such approaches may be prerequisites to meaningful uptake. The health care industry in the U.S. was an example provided by respondents where innovative ideas abound. Rather the implementation of ideas is the challenge.

“In health care, in particular, what you desperately need is a catalyst for connection, collaboration, and implementation or execution on some level...Ideation you know, it’s not our problem.”

Maggie Breslan, Center for Innovation, Mayo Clinic

With limited support for implementation, learning on what works well and what needs improvement on the ground is reduced.

V:C Innovations generated through the Initiative

Main findings:

- » *The evaluation team was able to identify specific innovations generated as a result of the grants, focusing primarily on process and product innovations, and also on innovative ways of connecting individuals and organizations to address social development issues.*
- » *However, these innovations are, for the most part, limited in scope and less likely to be diffused broadly. The one exception may lie in how one of the grants led to an innovative way of connecting different types of organizations. This innovation has been diffused, and the Initiative contributed to it. Yet overall, the evaluation team asserts that the social impact potential for the innovations is limited.*

The Initiative was designed to support the application of the three innovation models that, in turn, would catalyze or generate innovations that could have social benefit. The evaluation team posed the question, “Did these processes and approaches yield innovations (process, product or service) that in turn either led or have the potential to lead to social impact?” (In answer to this question, the team notes that it is not possible to obtain a comprehensive list of every process, product or service generated for social impact through the evaluation, and instead the six case studies were used to draw out examples for analysis. Please refer to the case studies for further detail.) The evaluation team notes the examples of innovations catalyzed or generated through the efforts funded under the Initiative for the following reasons:

- » They illustrate the range and type of innovation generated under each application of the three different models;
- » They tell us about the degree of diffusion and the potential of diffusion of these innovations; and
- » They are helpful in generating learning about the models themselves as well as the design and implementation of grants.

Table 1: Examples of innovation from six Case Studies

Type	Example	Model	Grantee	Degree of innovation	Degree of Diffusion
Technical solutions to small-scale technical problems	Rainwater harvesting system for a unique ecosystem in a part of Kerala State India	Open Innovation/ Crowd-sourcing	GlobalGiving	Varied, but can be high in theory	Limited to communities where organizations working
Small-scale innovative processes to reach poor people	VisionSpring distribution model for children's eyeglasses in part of Andhra State, India	User-centered design thinking	IDEO	High in the specific context	Within the actual partner organizations
Small-scale innovative products to reach poor people	Farming/agricultural products such as cattle feed in small communities in Tamil Nadu, India, Western Kenya and Uganda	User-led Innovation or user-centered innovation	ETC Prolinnova/ Villgro	Varied, but can be high in the geographical context	Limited to communities where organizations working
Medium-scale innovative ways of connecting organizations	Grassroots organizations/social enterprises connected with larger foundations	Open innovation	Ashoka Change-makers/Global-Giving	High	Greater level of awareness and participation among partners and entrants; greater number of sites devoted to collaborative competitions

V:D Contribution to Acceleration of Innovation for Social Development

Main findings:

- » *There has been an acceleration of innovation for development as a concept, illustrated by what appears to be greater levels of understanding and interest among social development organizations, and an increased amount of literature on the topic written in the past three years.*
- » *The Initiative contributed toward a certain amount of diffusion of two of the three models. Open innovation is more popular, and user-centered has gained more momentum among designers in the U.S. User-led, funded to a lesser degree by the Initiative, experienced little acceleration.*

V:D:1 Diffusion/Acceleration of innovation for development as a concept

The past three years have seen, according to respondents, greater understanding about social innovation among non-profit organizations and other organizations working on programs to address the needs of poor and vulnerable people. Most of the articles used as references for this evaluation were published between 2008 and 2010, indicating that there has been research and analysis conducted in this arena in the last three years. Respondents also stated that organizations are increasingly using models such as user-centered innovation and crowdsourcing. While it is difficult to gauge the exact contribution of the Foundation's efforts to this shift, comments from respondents indicate that the Foundation is seen as a thought leader, a significant contributor, and a funder to the field of social innovation, and has helped shape the discourse on methods, approaches and practices.

At the same time, the communication plan to further promote and encourage uptake of innovation for development among the social sector that was included in the Initiative Approval Document was never executed. Reviews of internal memos reveal that Foundation staff recommended holding off on executing this plan, as impact data and results from the models were not strong enough to favor dissemination at that time.

V:D:2 Diffusion of the innovation models themselves

The Initiative contributed to a certain amount of acceleration of two of the three models.

There is enthusiasm and interest among designers about design for social impact: There are several indications that the design industry in the USA is increasing its attention on the role of design in the social sector. The creation of IDEO.org and Winterhouse Institute demonstrates an institutional commitment to further their work in the social development sector, and other design firms are carefully watching to see if, how and when they should enter the space. There is movement within academia with the development of new programs addressing design for social innovation, yet there is currently a need for greater discussion and thinking on career paths for graduating designers. There are emerging partnerships between non-profit institutions and design groups, for example the Alabama Innovation Engine, that are gaining traction and yielding results. Finally, there are forums for reflection, learning and exchange on the role of design for social impact.

Crowdsourcing is more mainstream: The success of the Ashoka Changemaker platform is testimony to its own effectiveness at meeting clients' needs for field mapping, grantee identification, networking and public relations, and meeting projects' needs for profiling, networking and fundraising. It is also indicative of a broader shift where challenges and online competitions, as well as collaborative online platforms have become more common. Having wide appeal, the InnoCentive platform is interested to continue challenges within the social development sector. There are now several other platforms that encourage a crowd to participate in addressing social development issues, and increased use among non-profit agencies such as Oxfam, Care International, and UN agencies, as well as other donors, of this model.

User-led innovation experienced less acceleration as an approach: The Initiative has yielded useful learning about the application of user-led innovation for farmers/agricultural research and development. In one example, the focus was very much on incremental, locally appropriate innovation for the purpose of innovation capacity building and the right of users to innovate. In the other example, the focus was on scale and marketability of the innovation. The evaluation team offers that the trade-offs between scale and marketability and user-led innovation are higher than other models, and may provide some

explanation as to why this model has witnessed less acceleration. The team also finds that the social value of investing in local innovation capacity has been positive. If this outcome is linked with greater advocacy around poor farmer's access to trademarks/patenting processes and farmer participation in agricultural research, there may be significant gains in sustainable natural resource management and agriculture, as well as anti-poverty efforts. Finally, as a model, user-led innovation received less support and less investment than the other two, and a fuller investment and promotion may have led to greater diffusion.

V:E Contribution to Social Impact

Main findings:

- » *Many of the grants did not lead to the development and implementation of projects intended to promote social impact, and there are few outcomes to examine related to any effects on the social fabric of the communities in which they worked and the well-being of individuals and families within those communities.*
- » *The evaluation team notes that the potential for the three innovation models to achieve social impact varies. The open innovation approach is primarily a tool for facilitating networks and field mapping, and it may or may not result in projects that lead to social impact among poor and vulnerable communities. The activities of both user-centered grants indicate that design thinking has the potential to make a positive contribution to the field of design for social impact. Yet greater dialogue with designers and inclusion of those who practice design thinking but do not call themselves designers and who live and work in the developing world is needed. With regard to the user-led innovation model, the social development sector may offer similar and more developed and effective approaches in meeting the needs of poor and vulnerable people. Acknowledgement of the different driving forces for innovation in the private sector market economy versus the social development sector is needed.*

The Initiative was not designed to, through its investments, contribute to or result in significant social impact. Social impact, in this context, is examined to better understand whether the models themselves, and the applications, have demonstrated any impact on the ground. The evaluation team notes that the

three- to four-year time period of the Initiative was not a long enough investment to achieve social impact, defined as the effect of an activity on the social fabric of a community and wellbeing of the individuals and families.³⁸ However, as discussed above, many of the grants did not lead to the development and implementation of projects intended to promote social impact, and there are few outcomes to examine related to any effects on the social fabric of the communities in which they worked and the well-being of individuals and families within those communities. Therefore, the evaluation team reflects on how the models may or may not lead to social impact.

Open: The collaborative competition approach used by Ashoka Changemakers provided real value and benefit to those changemakers and clients participating in the competitions. Primarily a tool for facilitating networks and field mapping, it may or may not result in projects that lead to social impact among poor and vulnerable communities. With regard to the GlobalGiving grant, it is unknown whether the projects can have social impact, as the proposals that came forth on the InnoCentive platform have not been implemented. As these constitute learnings at an early stage, there is a need to **a)** understand the effectiveness of the projects themselves in having social impact, **b)** develop measures to better capture contributions of innovations emerging from applying them, and **c)** understand what works well and less well in terms of the actual application on the ground.

User-centered innovation: The evaluation team notes that there are parallels between established participatory development approaches used by the social development sector, and the principles of design thinking. There is a natural affinity for these principles in the social sector and the Initiative has demonstrated a certain level of interest by those social development agencies participating as stakeholders to the grants. The activities of both IDEO and Winterhouse Institute indicate that user-centered design thinking has the potential to make a positive contribution to the field of design for social impact. However, as mentioned in the case studies, greater dialogue and inclusion with designers and even those who practice design thinking but do not call themselves designers and who live and work in the developing world is needed.

User-led innovation: This model also includes some approaches that have parallels with participatory development approaches used by the social development sector. Engaging users or beneficiaries and creating space and opportunity for them to take charge of their own development agenda have long been

advocated in the social sector. Yet, as discussed above, acknowledgement of the different driving forces for innovation in the private sector market economy versus the social development sector is needed. The user-led model employed by ETC Foundation demonstrates changes in farmers' capacities and confidence to innovate, yet the sharing and sale of product innovations by the farmers, while having social benefit, is limited in scope due to various structural, manufacturing, marketing and financial capital barriers. In addition, ETC Foundation's ultimate objective of achieving social impact at the institutional level through the farmer-led innovations represents a more complex advocacy agenda that requires a long-term perspective with various social and political factors at play. The other example of user-led innovation, Villgro, also illustrates some of the same challenges. However, in that case, the grantee chose to scale up and aim for financial sustainability, and moved to a user-centered approach where SMEs designed and distributed products for the poor and vulnerable with substantial input from them.

V:F Sustainability Beyond Initiative

Main findings:

- » *The evaluation team identified partnerships and projects that will likely be sustained across all six grants.*
- » *The team noted in particular the visible contribution made by the Initiative to the design industry in the U.S., as demonstrated by the high level of interest, enthusiasm and new commitments formed during the Initiative. Greater growth in the number of organizations engaging the public on social issues through online crowd sourcing and collaborative competition platforms is also apparent.*

The Initiative has contributed to partnerships, projects and efforts that will be likely be sustained, and will further diffuse and scale up the concepts and models applied under the Initiative. The most visible contribution is to the design industry, where new partnerships, institutions, and synergies have already emerged and have expressed a commitment to deepen the role of design for social impact. Examples of such efforts include the establishment of the Winterhouse Institute committed to learning and understanding how design can have social impact, the formation of IDEO.org, and the Alabama Innovation Engine.

There is also evidence of sustainability in some of the organizations undertaking open innovation—either the platforms themselves will be sustained (e.g. Ashoka Changemakers) or the organizations will continue to experiment with forms of open innovation (e.g. GlobalGiving). The concepts have also diffused beyond these partners, and application is being nurtured and supported by other agencies. The user-led model of innovation appears to have achieved less traction, but also received less funding. However, the operational local innovation support funds coordinated by ETC Prolinnova in the eight countries will continue, as will the partnerships undertaken by Villgro and their talent development program. Grantees who applied that model are still experimenting with ways to reduce grant reliance, and scaling is one of the challenges of this model.

V:G Analysis of the Activities, Grants and Duration

Main findings:

- » *The Initiative did not invest equally in the three models; the number of grants provided to user-centered model initiatives outnumbered open innovation initiatives, with the smallest number of grants devoted to the user-led model.*
- » *The Initiative sourced the majority of innovative approaches from the private sector and provided the greatest number of grants to the non-profit sector for application. This allocation was in line with the hypothesis that the private sector approaches had worked well in the for-profit sector, and would therefore have value for the social sector. Interestingly, the allocation of resources to different types of organizations (private, public, non-profit and social enterprise) was more balanced, indicating the intent of the Initiative to accelerate the use of the models in the social sector.*
- » *These allocations have had significant consequences on effects of the Initiative and have shown that some of the assumptions might need further testing, as is discussed in later findings.*

Figures 5–7 (pages 48 and 49) represent the distribution of funds disbursed through grants under the Initiative. These figures indicate how funds ended up being allocated to different models and approaches.

V:H Shaping and Crafting During Initiative Period

Main finding:

- » *The Initiative was characterized by unusually high turnover, and as a result, its strategic oversight suffered. Although there was well-articulated analysis of what was working well, and what was working less well, course correction was less evident toward achieving outcomes and reshaping the overall grant portfolio.*

The Innovation Initiative was affected by unusually high staff turnover, which undoubtedly had an effect on the overall shaping of the Initiative, as well as on the rethinking and reallocation of resources to strategies, and on grantee management. It is impossible to state what the Initiative’s strategy would have been with consistent management. However, interviews with staff and grantees indicated that there was little management support for several months, and this would likely have been different with low staff turnover.

In spite of turnover, the evaluation team has found careful analysis in internal memos about the results of the Initiative, challenges with some of the initial design concepts, and implementation issues. The acknowledgment that there was relatively little evidence on the effectiveness of the models, (as stated in an internal memo, 2009), and therefore a recommendation to slow down their promotion, is an example of such reflection. There also appears to have been reflection and learning within the Foundation on Initiative management as well as on supporting Innovation based on the experiences of the Initiative. Whereas the Initiative was approved for the “execution” stage, with a focus on impact, there is now a sense among Foundation staff that this Initiative is better characterized as an Initiative at the “development” stage, where the focus is on field building and understanding the field.

At the same time, the evaluation team notes that greater thinking on grantee selection, on cohesion of the initiative as a whole, on funding allocations to the models and to the strategies devised, and on learning and reflection shared outside of the Foundation would have benefited the Initiative in achieving its outcomes on understanding and contributing to the field. An enabling environment is essential in such field building activities. The evaluation team notes that a deeper analysis on factors that drive uptake of innovation, and actions that

Figure 5
Resources allocated by innovation model

Note that funds for user-centered application are separated into those that were provided for design thinking and those that were provided to other organizations practicing user-centered innovation. The numbers in parentheses represent the number of grantees. The open source innovation grantees are almost all related to the InnoCentive effort, with the notable exception of the Ashoka ChangeMakers grant.




Figure 6
Resources allocated by type of organization

The educational institutions listed here are all universities. With few exceptions, all grantees were US-based. Implications of these funding allocations are discussed in greater detail in the findings and implications sections.





Figure 7
Resources allocated by origin of innovation approach

This graph presents allocations that show whether the grant was given to apply an approach that had originated in the private sector (e.g. InnoCentive), whether the grant was given to apply an approach that had originated in the social sector and Foundation funds were being provided for scale up (e.g. Positive Deviance Institute), or whether the application was a mix of private and social sector approaches (e.g. Villgro). A significant proportion of the support for social sector approaches was made up by the grants given to Tufts University for scaling up its Positive Deviance approach.



Percent of resources allocated by origin of innovation approach

could foster a more enabling environment to this end would have been valuable, and was missing from the overall design.

Overall, while the analysis on the progress undertaken through the Initiative was strong, the follow-up corrective actions taken to review and revise overall strategy in order to achieve outcomes were less evident. It also appears that the Foundation has continued to support innovation work using different strategies and approaches outside of the Initiative.

V:I Management of the Initiative

Main findings:

- » *Grantee selection appeared opportunistic and not based on a rationale for resource allocation or needs in the social development field.*
- » *Although Foundation staff effectively maintained a sound conceptual overview of the social innovation field and maintained networks within the field, frequent staff turnover resulted in less effective day-to-day management of the grants and monitoring of the Initiative's progress.*

The Rockefeller Foundation acknowledges that frequent turnover among staff involved with this Initiative affected its management and oversight. Such a lack on continuity in Initiative management is, as we understand it, unusual, hence some of the findings in this section may not apply to other Initiatives.

Grantee selection appears to have been opportunistic rather than strategic:

Grant amounts awarded to grantees also seem to have been based on what the grantee proposed as a budget for tasks/activities, rather than a rationalized allocation of funding based on changes needed in the field. For example, the disproportionate funding allocation to the design thinking for social impact grantees is not explained. Conversations with grantees indicated that they were not clear on why they were selected in terms of fit with an Initiative or a model. They understood the rationale for selection to be based on interesting work that they were doing, not in order to achieve a set of objectives in the field of social innovation. Grantee selection could have been modified to explore different applications of the models—applications that built on existing practices and players in the development arena.

In general, grantees interviewed indicated that Foundation communication and oversight was uneven: In the initial stages, there was a very high level of engagement, and grantees thought of the Rockefeller Foundation as a thought partner in their work. They stated that they were pushed and encouraged to achieve outcomes, and appreciated the sense of shared collaborative work with their funder. However, they were unaware of the broader Initiative, and were not informed about how their work contributed to other Foundation investments related to social innovation or innovation for development. Some grantees stated during the evaluation that they were surprised that the InnoCentive work (that they had heard about) was funded under the same Initiative as their work. The grantees commented that support and thought partnership was non-existent in subsequent years, and contact for grant management and administration was also weak. They stated that they felt abandoned and initially missed the thought partnership, and then realized that it was not going to be reinstated for the Initiative.

Uneven support and oversight of the Initiative: As mentioned above in Section V:H, Shaping and Crafting during the Initiative, the Foundation took stock of the progress and results of the Initiative, and was conscious about some of the challenges and difficulties emerging during implementation. The team notes that the actions taken in response to this analysis could have been strengthened. The user-centered model, particularly design thinking for social impact approach was where the Foundation facilitated analysis about what worked well and what did not, promoted learning and exchange, and encouraged uptake the most. However, for the other two models, the Foundation did less to push the thinking and learning on what works and what does not, as well as on increasing uptake among funders and social sector organizations. In general, the Initiative could also have, through stronger documentation and sharing, contributed a more nuanced set of insights and more analysis to the discourse on innovation in the social development arena.

Sound contextual understanding demonstrated by the Foundation: The Foundation managed to maintain an overview of the field and continued to maintain and develop relationships with other agencies working in this sector. Some of these relationships, as well as contextual understanding, has emerged out of ongoing work on social innovation and innovation for development outside of the Initiative.

VI: Lessons Learned From The Case Studies About The Field Of Innovation For Development

This section presents some overall lessons learned from the case studies and evidence about the field of innovation. The case studies demonstrate how the concepts of open innovation and user-driven innovation were applied in various social impact projects and therefore provide experiential evidence that illustrates the following:

1. Usefulness and limitations of each innovation model in addressing the needs of poor and vulnerable people;
2. Learning on designing suitable and appropriate interventions to apply these innovation models for social impact; and
3. Learning on the quality of implementation to bring about success or failure of that application.

VI:A Table 2: Summary of Lessons Learned from six Case Studies

	Open Innovation	User-Centered	User-Led
Usefulness and limitations of each innovation model	<p>The usefulness of the open innovation model in addressing social development problems lies primarily in generating ideas that are at the early stages of proof of concept. Its limitation is that it does not necessarily produce sustained or scalable innovative approaches to addressing the needs of poor and vulnerable people. In some cases, the open innovation model also promotes new ways of networking among donors and organizations.</p>	<p>The usefulness of the user-centered model, as applied through the design thinking approach, to addressing social development problems lies in its similarities in principle to approaches already applied by non-profits in problem analysis and project design. Design thinking may have greater levels of acceptance and broader impact in the future as an effective and viable approach to poverty alleviation among social development organizations.</p>	<p>The usefulness of the user-led model in addressing social development problems also lies in its similarities in principle to approaches applied by social development organizations in problem analysis and project design. While the benefits of the user-led approach in supporting and nurturing innovative thinking and capacities to innovate among poor farmers are highly relevant in a social development context, its limitation lies in its lack of a developed methodology to translate from individual benefits to market-based gains attractive to investors such as financial viability, sustainability, efficiency and scale.</p>
Intervention designs to apply the three models	<p>The design of the two open innovation interventions examined revealed the value of open innovation models in generating ideas, but the challenges of implementing even prototypes of such ideas. In one case, the selection of a large for-profit innovation provider to partner with small community organizations, even with an intermediary organization, was largely ineffective in generating solutions that were easy to prototype and manufacture at scale. In the other case, the design of the intervention favors generating information and solutions that are of value to funders in mapping and understanding a field, and of less value in connecting individuals to co-create and collaborate on solutions or to attract funding for projects that would generate social impact.</p>	<p>Analysis of the design of the user-centered innovation interventions revealed that the Initiative favored for-profit U.S.-based design firms to undertake the work, and may have, as a result, overlooked important work being undertaken by non-profit agencies.</p>	<p>The design of the user-led innovation interventions revealed two pathways for implementation, leading to different types of social impact. One intervention prioritized business viability, best achieved by scale and moved to a user-centered model. The other has continued to build the enabling environment for the user to innovate, stating that the right of the user to play an active role in innovation is the key driver. Through giving value to the user's participation in the innovation process, an advocacy agenda was pursued to affect societal change at both behavioral and institutional levels.</p>

	Open Innovation	User-Centered	User-Led
Implementation of the projects to apply the three models	<p>The implementation of open innovation efforts squarely raises the question around how innovations that are generated can be nurtured and supported. Most of the implementation focused on the front-end of innovation, with little focus on sustaining and scaling a proposal or a prototype. The resources used to undertake the front-end parts are significant, raising additional questions on efficiencies and returns for investment.</p>	<p>The implementation of the interventions using design thinking for social impact innovation revealed that the principles of risk taking, prototyping, learning from failure, and deep consultation with users are closely aligned with participatory development approaches, and should find resonance with development organizations. However, organizations accustomed to delivery targets and efficiency measures may struggle to adopt some of these practices. Non-profit design groups, or those with deep experience with the social sector may be better positioned to reach out to and influence the social sector, and offer them immediate added value in applying design thinking.</p>	<p>Analysis of the design of the two user-led interventions revealed that, while successful in their support to farmer-led (and farmer-centered) innovations, they faced challenges in sustaining and scaling their program objectives/innovations. And, in the case of ETC ProInnova in particular, with its ambitious advocacy agenda, challenges of achieving systemic change were apparent. Analysis also revealed that achieving financial viability and profitability from the user-led model was extremely challenging in the southern India context.</p>

Further analysis in response to these three types of learning is provided below and substantiated in greater detail in the section under Case Studies.

VI:B Open Innovation

The two open innovation grants examined to develop case studies include the GlobalGiving grant in 2009 to wholesale five challenges, and the grant to Ashoka Changemakers to scale up its platform.

VI:B:1 Usefulness and limitations of open innovation as a model for innovation for development

The case studies developed for the evaluation are largely consistent with the literature. The evaluation team finds that open innovation, both through crowdsourcing and collaborative competitions is useful in generating solutions or eliciting ideas. Both case studies illustrated this, and noted that even larger crowds formed with more individuals putting forward their ideas to the kinds of social development challenges posed on the platform. The higher level of interest on the InnoCentive platform and in the GlobalGiving challenges was significant, as was the increasing numbers of individuals participating in the Ashoka Changemaker social development challenges. And, as noted in the literature, the evaluation team also noted that the ideas that came forth may or may not be innovative, and they may or may not be appropriate for implementation.

Operational challenges around transaction costs, framing challenges effectively, and transferability/applicability of ideas generated feature in both case studies. The case studies demonstrate low implementation of crowdsourced ideas into actual projects that benefit poor and vulnerable people. Issues such as limitations in human capital and infrastructure, the lack of a clear vision and strategy, and consideration of the external environment or context in which the challenge lies were not adequately taken into account to ensure success and follow-through.

The two case studies also demonstrate high costs for the results generated. Issues such as intellectual property rights and patenting limited the participation of some individuals, and in other cases, the ownership of the idea generated through the crowdsourcing was a contentious one. Non-profit institutions, unlike companies, are largely interested in funding solutions that can eventually be in the public domain so that other non-profits and funders can expand, replicate and scale them up. Limiting the use of ideas generated to one or two

non-profits is in fact counterproductive and counter-intuitive to the way the social sector operates.

Finally, the evaluation team notes that, in both case studies, the choice of the crowd forced certain types of responses. In the case of InnoCentive, the crowd was composed of scientists and researchers and thus limited the types of questions that could be asked. In the case of Ashoka Changemakers, the crowd was contacted through existing networks, and incentivized to offer ideas for awards, rather than to co-create, refine or collaborate over ideas.

A positive outcome illustrated by both examples of open innovation, particularly in the Ashoka Changemakers case, is the value placed by participants in forming connections and expanding their networks. The evaluation team identified numerous cases where changemakers were able to leverage the competition and connect with other donors offline. Related to this is heightened awareness among donors and social sector organizations about public opinion thinking on various issues, new organizations working on these issues, and the potential solutions they put forward. The crowdsourcing approach provides valuable mapping of the field in a very transparent manner.

VI:B:2 Lessons about the design of open innovation efforts aimed at social change

The evaluation team finds that the InnoCentive platform was a less effective design to test and scale up the use of crowdsourcing. The many challenges with communications, finding and framing challenges, and time investments led us to question whether InnoCentive was an appropriate choice for crowdsourcing. Overall, there appeared to be a cultural and operational disconnect between all stakeholders, and the process was fraught with complications.

Furthermore, selecting GlobalGiving as the seeker resulted in small-scale organizations with limited human capital and infrastructure participating as the ‘sub-seekers’ in the process. This too resulted in weak capacity to sift through the many proposals to determine which was most viable, and then to implement those ideas. The efforts to crowdfund on the GlobalGiving platform resulted in insufficient funds to move ahead with implementation.

Ashoka Changemakers was effective in building awareness among funders and other stakeholders about solutions, projects, players and issues, and generated

efficiencies for funders. They did not effectively achieve their own objective in fostering genuine collaboration and co-creation of ideas/solutions; participants did not provide inputs to effectively enrich and refine other competitors' ideas. The evaluation team noted that whether an innovative idea was put forward in response to a challenge largely depended on the quality of that individual's idea prior to submission. Thus in the case of Ashoka Changemakers, the premise of the collaborative competition model, whereby ideas generated by a large number of people, the crowd, are refined and enriched, leading to more innovative solutions, did not play out as intended. For those challenges examined by the evaluation team, the crowd was made up of individuals, most representing organizations already implementing their ideas before submission to the competition.

Whereas the evaluation team found the design of both grants to be sound, based on the rationale of open innovation and its approach, the design, as applied to social development problems and application of innovative solutions arising from the crowd, raised questions.

VI:B:3 Lessons about implementation of open innovation efforts

The quality of implementation for both grants was high, particularly in the case of Ashoka Changemakers. Ashoka Changemakers scaled its operations sufficiently, attracted more clients interested in running social development challenges, and attracted greater interest among the crowd. They are now a major player in the crowdsourcing sector, with many other competitors having entered the field. The successful implementation of the grant enabled further scaling of the approach among the public and among clients, and of Ashoka Changemakers' capacity to be self-sustaining as an organization.

The GlobalGiving grant had more challenges in its operation, illustrating problems in developing and framing challenges, the time-consuming process for participating non-profit organizations to review proposals, and the challenges in raising funds for project implementation. As discussed in the section immediately above, another choice of partners may have resulted in better application of the approach.

VI:C User-Centered Innovation

The two grants funded under user-centered innovation that were developed into case studies were IDEO and the Winterhouse Institute. Both grants used the approach of design thinking for social impact.

VI:C:1 Usefulness and limitations of design thinking as a model for innovation for development

The potential of design thinking to address social development issues can be described (as stated by four respondents during the evaluation as well as in the literature) as follows:

“The first is more inclusive activities and processes/.../our ability to build trust with communities and through that engage them in a process where they are really shaping a solution that is an extension of their own situation and context. I think that design has a lot to teach there. The second is that a lot of the projects/.../ have strong/.../behavioral components, like how you reach people and influence them. And what you try and measure in terms of change is very much driven by the decisions and actions of behavior that people make. I feel like it’s another place where design is really good at prototyping or testing solutions that have a more soft behavioral component. [Third] Designers have a very entrepreneurial mindset and like to take ideas and systems and products and services and can accelerate the degree to which they’re turned into tangible prototypes and tangible artifacts and services and examples for people to react to.” Designer

The two case studies that were funded by the Foundation under this Initiative offered interesting learning on design for social impact. The evaluation found sufficient evidence that the application of design thinking (for example in the cases of VisionSpring and the Alabama Innovation Engine) had demonstrated new ways of thinking and working. This thinking had helped, perhaps more importantly, define the problem differently, as in the case of Alabama, where the problem was defined as promoting rural economic empowerment in a state rich with natural resources, instead of a problem defined as tackling rural poverty. It had also generated solutions that may be innovative products, processes, or

services. The team was unable to find any evidence that these two innovations have as of now, yielded any social impact.

Academic leaders, designers and other stakeholders that the evaluation team met with concurred that there was little systematic evidence of social impact, or even effectiveness. Some respondents stated that this lack of evidence was partly due to the newness of the field in the social sector, and some stated that it was partly due to designers being unaccustomed to measurement of impact, and not being clear what metrics were most appropriate. Impact measurement and impact thinking are part of the ongoing conversations among the individuals in the design industry that the team met with, and high on the list of considerations among the social sector organizations.

Related to the question of impact is the question of the role of the designer. Some individuals are engaged in thinking about career trajectories and professional paths for designers in the social sector, and others are developing a portfolio of projects/clients focused on social issues. Many respondents in this evaluation therefore stated the need to obtain a more evidenced-based perspective on how, for what, where and when design thinking can add value to social sector programming. As mentioned already, anecdotal and qualitative evidence from the developing world points to examples where design thinking has made a positive difference. It is interesting to note that such examples were seldom raised by the individuals that the team met with during the evaluation.

Meanwhile, the supply side in the West has grown exponentially, with young designers expressing an interest in incorporating design work with greater social awareness and impact into their work, and design firms both recognizing that this is a potential market, as well as the need to offer such projects in order to attract the best talent.³⁹ The largest U.S. professional association of designers, AIGA, has launched an initiative called “Design for Good,” and design schools are incorporating social sector projects into their curricula. At the same time, design firms (especially the large ones) are experimenting with models to decrease reliance on grant funding, and providing affordable, non-subsidized design services to the non-profit/social sector organizations.

In sum, the evaluation finds that there is considerable energy and momentum among the design industry to support work in the social sector. There is a high level of dialogue, reflection and learning among the industry, and high levels of commitment. If more programs using design thinking are implemented in

the social sector in the coming years, there should be more evidence on the actual effectiveness and impact of this industry, and greater understanding on the approaches and models that work. There should also be a much deeper understanding about the value added of design thinking, and what sorts of programs and issues can best benefit from it.

VI:C:2 Lessons about the intervention design of design thinking efforts aimed at social change

The IDEO grant was designed to demonstrate the application of design thinking to projects intended to have social impact. The rationale to support demonstration by a private sector firm (rather than an existing non-profit firm with more experience in the social impact space) was two-fold, **a)** it was to serve as a way of persuading other design firms to undertake social impact work, and **b)** it was to help develop a business model for the design industry to contribute to social change. This grant was successful in bringing value, learning and change to the two social enterprises it partnered with, and in producing materials that synthesize the basic approach of applying design thinking for social impact. It was successful, two years after the grant was completed, at developing a potential business model, but this in very early stages of operationalization. It was less successful in building dialogue among design firms about social impact.

The Winterhouse Institute grant was primarily designed to spawn that dialogue among designers and design firms, and to generate more examples of design for social impact projects. It has done so successfully. Some of these projects are a result of innovative ways of connecting organizations—the Aspen Design Summit is an example of a meeting that was designed using new ideas and new approaches, and resulted in some lasting partnerships between organizations.

The two grants examined under this model were both given to U.S.-based private sector design firms, one large and one small. In general, the evaluation team notes that the Foundation support to design thinking for social impact was heavily skewed towards larger, U.S.-based private sector design firms, and did not adequately include or even note the contributions of either U.S./Europe-based design firms (especially non-profit ones) that were already working in the social sector, or those based in the developing world. The selection of such primarily private sector grantees to further work on design thinking for social impact is not fully clear to the evaluation. Was it because the private sector firms were more skilled at practicing design? Or was it because there was a perceived need

for developing business models, which essentially translate to greater corporate subsidization of design thinking, instead of donor subsidization?

The consequence of the focus on the private sector has meant that the Initiative has contributed positively to the momentum and energy in the U.S. among the design industry, but it has not acknowledged and bridged the work of successful social sector design agencies or individuals, especially those from Asia or Africa, into the work in the U.S. In doing so, it may have inadvertently contributed to reduced learning about the added value of design thinking, and also not contributed to increasing exchange and mutual learning, as well as greater cohesion.

VI:C:3 Lessons about implementation of design thinking for social impact projects

Both grants delivered and executed activities well. Both grants demonstrate that design thinking offered value to the social sector organizations in organizational change. However, such changes, particularly those that encourage social sector organizations to experiment with ideas that might fail, and to be comfortable with discussing and acknowledging failure, were difficult and gradual. Social sector organizations accustomed to delivery targets and efficiencies in implementation may struggle with embracing these concepts, and agencies offering innovation capacity building may need to be cognizant of the pace of organizational change in such settings.

VI:D User-Led Innovation

The two grants funded under user-generated innovation developed into case studies include the support to Villgro Network Foundation and ETC Foundation (or ETC Prolinnova).

VI:D:1 Usefulness and limitations of user-led Innovation as a model for innovation

The two case studies funded by the Rockefeller Foundation offer interesting lessons in the application of the user-led model. The ETC Prolinnova and Villgro grants both promote farmer innovations in rural areas and largely identify the user in their programs as the farmer. ETC Prolinnova's description of farmers as innovators draws parallels with von Hippel's description of people's interest and capacity to innovate and experiment more generally.

“From its very nature, farming is a constant process of experimentation, adaptation and innovation to a greater or lesser extent – day by day and year by year. Long before there were formal research and extension services, men and women in rural areas were creating and testing possible ways of improving the way they farm. They have been carrying out their own investigations and experiments in order to accommodate changing situations or adjust to new environments. Worldwide, innovation by farmers has been central to their—and everyone’s—survival.”⁴⁰

The evaluation team notes that like the user-centered design thinking approach, the user-led approach is similar to tested and proven approaches within the social development sector. Engaging stakeholders who experience a problem and facilitating their inputs into problem definition, project design and project implementation are common participatory approaches within the development sector. Thus the user-led model is easily understood by social development actors and offers easier opportunity for application and diffusion.

Yet unlike design thinking, which offers a highly developed approach with a specific methodology, the evaluation team notes that the user-led approach as applied to the social development sector may offer no more than a philosophy or set of values rather than a developed methodology. Indeed, stakeholders to the ETC Prolinnova grant were unaware of the term user-led, and instead used the term Participatory Innovation Development (PID) to describe their innovation approach. While the principals of user-led are relevant and appreciated in the social development sector, the team notes the following challenges the cases illustrated with regard to problem definition and user profile.

Definition of ‘user’ within the context of a social development problem:

While the user of a given product within a marketplace may be easy to ascertain, ascribing the term to a social development problem is not as straightforward. Who is the user in the case of climate change? Or in the case of poverty?

The basis of the question lies in how a problem is analyzed, and how users then may be defined. The ETC Prolinnova case identifies the problem of natural resource depletion as caused by poverty, population pressure, climate change and ineffective interventions. Acknowledging that conventional, top-down approaches to addressing sustainable agriculture and natural resource management (NRM) have not yielded results, ETC Foundation thus promotes the idea

of a more complex and non-linear means of systems change through supporting local innovation and experimentation as a means of identifying locally effective practices. The funding of farmer innovations through the locally-managed funds are a means of affecting change at the local level, and combined with an advocacy approach to gain the attention of researchers and policymakers in identifying viable approaches for experimentation and to highlight farmer capacity for experimentation.

The ‘user’ then, according to ETC ProInnova’s analysis, is not only the poor farmer but includes all stakeholders that are part of the larger problem of natural resource depletion. Whereas user-led within a market context identifies one user, the consumer, problem identification within a social development context is invariably more complex. The user-led approach did not facilitate this wider analysis; indeed, if the analysis concluded that only one user, the farmer, was crucial to the problem, the program would have been designed much differently. The ETC ProInnova case, through its broader advocacy agenda, exemplifies the user-led approach through its support to farmer innovations, yet illustrates the risk of the user-led approach excluding other social actors as stakeholders to a social development problem.

In the Villgro experience, the overriding objective of building a sustainable business model resulted in according lower priority to the ownership and capacity of the farmer as user. Villgro’s approach resulted in a shift from user-led to user-centered, with the farmer’s role significantly changing. The farmer’s role shifted from that of innovator who innovates out of his/her own expressed need or reality, to that of farmer playing the dual role of informant and consumer. The evaluation team notes that where marketing is concerned, the user-led versus user-centered approach represents an interesting shift in the role of farmer from that of innovator to consumer. Furthermore, the evaluation team noted a shift in the profile of the farmer as user. With its focus on a sustainable business model, Villgro finds that its users are not necessarily always poor farmers living in Erode as initially intended, but that due to the relatively high cost of their products, the user is effectively not among the poorest and most vulnerable. The Villgro experience thus illustrates challenges around user definition in the quest for a sustainable business model.

Who gets credit for innovating? The case studies also offer lessons into the nature of innovation and the realities of patents and other legal processes that an owner of a new innovative idea or product faces. Von Hippel refers to the

realities of systems and processes created to support company ownership and production.⁴¹

The ETC Prolinnova case offers clear challenges in this area. Several farmers had developed innovations that had garnered the attention of researchers and policymakers at the national level but were struggling with accessing such legal processes that would enable them to further their innovation in the market. While ETC Prolinnova places more emphasis on the innovating process as a means of bringing researchers and farmers together, there was still the expressed desire among the farmers to own and promote what they believed was theirs as a means of generating income, and a certain amount of trepidation toward sharing and working with others on their idea.

The Villgro case's overriding objective to scale their effort into a viable business model raises the question of where the farmers' benefit lies. Is 'co-creating' a euphemism for the soliciting of inputs in order to better sell their product back to them? There is no commission or privilege extended to the farmers for participating in the process, and farmers receive no credit for the innovation. In a social development context, the market holds certain realities that affect user participation and benefit.

In summary, the two cases, particularly the ETC Prolinnova case, raises the question of whether the user-led model and its theoretical basis are entirely applicable to the social development sector. The cases reveal the contrast between the user/consumer within a market context versus the user/poor person within a context where social, political and economic forces come into play. Where issues of market competition may be the driving forces for survival and innovation in the private sector, issues of scarcity and want and of confronting systems and institutions ignorant of and/or hostile to change are the driving forces within the social development sector.

In addition, the social development sector has accumulated considerable experience in engaging those who experience a problem in defining and articulating solutions. There are well-tested approaches that enable problem definition and stakeholder analysis. The evaluation team observes there may well be even more experience of user engagement in the social sector than the commercial sector, and thus learning from the social sector may be applicable to the commercial sector as well.

VI:D:2 Lessons about the intervention design of user-led innovation efforts aimed at social change

Both grants were designed very well with contrasting approaches in accordance with their objectives. In scaling their business model, Villgro adopted a community development approach, that of creating a network of Village-Level Entrepreneurs (VLEs) to distribute their products to farmers. In addition to scaling of their user-led model, Villgro's grant also included a number of capacity building activities aimed at supporting their effort to scale, and their effort to support other partner SMEs in their development toward becoming viable social enterprises. At the time of the evaluation, Villgro was in need of further funds to broaden their reach in their effort to achieve financial sustainability.

While Villgro's objectives were very well defined and focused, resulting in the change of approach in order to meet their aspiration for sustainability, ETC Prolinnova's project design was based on well thought-out problem analysis with a clear advocacy agenda. The ETC Prolinnova approach used methodologies developed within the social development sector, as discussed above, and not specifically based on a user-led approach adapted from the commercial sector.

VI:D:3 Lessons about implementation of user-led innovation efforts

Villgro successfully established their community network of VLEs to distribute their Villgro products. Their objective was solidly grounded in creating a viable business model capable of generating products that reach farmers. While the impact of their products will not reach the very poor, they are used and appreciated among less poor farmers in the Erode area.

The Villgro experience tells us that scaling of a user-led innovation model as applied to farmers in rural southern India is not viable. The evaluation team also observed various challenges in maintaining the integrity of the farmer's inputs and role in the user-centered process of 'co-creation', as discussed in the Villgro case study.

The ETC Prolinnova grant was implemented as an action research program, with the objective to identify factors for successful implementation. The evaluation team noted the successful implementation of the Local Innovation Support Funds (LISF) managed by farmers themselves at each project site visited in Uganda and Kenya. The evaluation team also observed various challenges in the

Kenya and Uganda programs, including achieving farmer understanding of innovation and LISF requirements; the individual support and participation by members of the National Steering Committees (NSC) without full support from their respective institutions, particularly in the case of Kenya; and weak leadership in implementation of their advocacy agendas, particularly in the case of Uganda.

Implementation across all eight country programs is uneven, with some programs performing better than others. Such variation is to be expected, given their ambitious agenda for social change across very different socio-economic and political environments the eight project sites represent. Both cases, while successful in their support to farmer-led (and farmer-centered) innovations, face challenges in sustaining and scaling their program objectives/innovations. And, in the case of ETC ProInnova in particular, with its ambitious advocacy agenda, challenges of achieving systemic change were apparent.

VII: Implications for Rockefeller Foundation

This section contains some of the evaluation team’s reflections on the Innovation Initiative as they may pertain to the Foundation in its strategy and thinking about innovation in development in the coming years. In sharing these reflections, it is our understanding that the Foundation is not looking only for recommendations on continuing the Initiative, but has a broader set of questions on supporting innovation in practice and theory in its work as a foundation.

VII:A How the Foundation Approaches the Field of Innovation for Development

Targeting support where there is a well-defined need for innovation in development: The evaluation shows that the Foundation’s support reflected a rather broad application of innovation thinking in the social sector. Achieving learning about what works well and why, understanding the contextual, political, organizational, and socio-economic factors that interact with application on innovation, and proving the added value of innovation is much more difficult with such a broad application as the Initiative demonstrates. Achieving impact is also diffused and difficult to track. Instead of starting from the idea of supporting innovation, a different approach might be to start from understanding where innovation is needed, what types of innovation are needed, and what potential value an innovation might add in a specific problem area/sector or geography.

Defining capacity development and building in innovation: What might purposefully building the capacity to innovate for development look like? We have seen capacity building in the form of encouraging social sector organizations to innovate by commissioning a provider of innovation (Villgro), developing systems where users themselves build capacity to innovate (ETC Prolinnova), and identifying organizations that can provide innovations to users with their inputs and feedback (Villgro). The capacity development strategy in the future could focus on building capacity more purposefully by identifying whose capacity would be built and how, instead of providing support to a given model that involves capacity building.

Questions to explore around this might be: would one build the capacity to innovate among those organizations and individuals that specialize in providing innovations (product, process, service or organizational) either in the social sector or outside of it? Or would one build capacity among those users that the innovations are intended for, or in some intermediary that provides services and products to poor and vulnerable populations? More purposeful capacity building may yield more targeted results.

The evaluation team suggests the Foundation consider building capacity among innovating organizations or intermediary institutions that are already working in the social sector. The Foundation should look at current innovating organizations, their culture, structure, systems and incentives that promote regular innovation. In addition, an important aspect of capacity building within a sector would be to increase cross-learning among grants, and identifying best practices to generate learning around innovation.

Thinking about innovation, diffusion, integration and scale: The literature reviewed for this evaluation indicates that there is now greater awareness on the need to understand how to integrate and scale an innovation, and that it is in fact much more complex to take a generated idea and then scale it up. The evaluation findings also point to the limitations of generating innovations that are then not supported in implementation. The team therefore recommends that future Foundation support to innovation aimed to provide greater insights and learning on how innovations are integrated into organizations and societies and how they are scaled up in the social sector.

Thinking about knowledge contribution in a rapidly evolving, sophisticated field: The discourse on innovation and its intersection with social change is more sophisticated now than it was some years ago, and there is a strong growing academic movement researching innovation and social change. The field of innovation for development has advanced very rapidly in the last four years. Terms like social innovation, innovation for social impact, and innovation for development have now been given fuller definitions. Partly through the contributions of the work supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, recent developments in technology, communications, and global exchange are now being harnessed in different ways to contribute to social impact. As the field has grown, so have the players and stakeholders. Different types of organizations are now entering this space, and the Foundation needs to play a more strategic role and identify its niche.

Four years ago there was a general sense within the Foundation that **a)** innovation was good for social development, and **b)** private sector approaches to innovation were lacking in the social sector and could add great value. This evaluation has provided some evidence on what works and what does not, and as a result, the above two assumptions have been challenged. The next section on strategies and approaches offers some alternatives to the strategies that emerged out of the two assumptions above.

VII:B Recommendations on Strategies and Approaches

The value added in the field of innovation for development through Rockefeller Foundation support is in the area of application: Whether it is in the area of capacity building, or in generating, diffusing, integrating or scaling up innovations, or in applying new approaches or models to innovation, the Foundation should focus on application and garnering practical experience. There is a lot of this that is still very conceptual and much that is evolving, and practical experience is needed to understand the concepts in action. Two respondents indicated as much, stating that the discipline of social innovation and common methodologies and models in it were in fact still under development, and further application with real and practical experiences in the field would help to further shape and develop approaches.

Increased attention to knowledge contribution and learning would be beneficial: Several respondents in the evaluation emphasized the need for the Foundation to continue their knowledge contribution. One commented that learning had been weak during the Initiative, and that the Initiative had not focused enough on actual challenges and benefits from the three models and sharing that widely. Given that the models themselves are evolving, this is all the more relevant, and the Foundation is uniquely placed to provide leadership in this area moving forward. Strategies such as grantee sharing and learning or cross-exchanges, and curating experience and lessons learned from actual experience can support such knowledge contribution.

Nurturing relationships with other funding organizations working in social innovation: The potential of the Foundation support in contributing to the ongoing discourse on innovation for development continues in practical application and use, as mentioned above. Other funders are well placed and well positioned to nurture the ecosystem for innovation for development, as well as supporting deeper theoretical and conceptual work in this area. The Foundation's

relationships with such funders are critical to ensure that the lessons learned from practical application are integrated into the theoretical development of the field.

Increased focus on the needs and interests of the poor over reference to ‘end-users’: It may be useful to distinguish “consumers”, whereby a desired consumer behavior is the desired outcome, from “end-users” or “poor and vulnerable people” in the social development field, who are agents of their own development. Therefore innovation in the social development space should not be viewed largely as a process where other agencies are innovating for poor and vulnerable people. While the team acknowledges the role of intermediary organizations and innovation providers in offering services and products to poor and vulnerable people, it cannot be by sacrificing their basic rights to own their own development agenda. The evaluation team notes that specific objectives and desired outcomes as they relate to advancing a social development agenda would be helpful in then determining how an innovative process may be applied. The Foundation’s close linkages with social sector organizations working in developing countries also can support bringing in their voices, their realities, their constraints and their aspirations into the discourse.

Acknowledging the differences and similarities between the forces that drive innovation in the private and non-profit sectors and areas for mutual exchange and learning: Given the learning discussed above, particularly in the area of user-led innovation, the evaluation team offers that drivers of innovation in the social sector are contextually different than the marketplace. Whereas in the social development sector issues of want and scarcity interplay with structural forces that are often hostile to change, in the marketplace, competition is the driving force for survival and innovation. Social, political and economic forces within society will have a defining role as to whether and how certain innovations may be realized, and promoting dialogue across players within a given society to better understand various realities, concerns, and possibilities for supporting and realizing innovations to address the large and complex problem of poverty may offer greater impact.

Acknowledging the reality of uptake and diffusion among social development organizations: In supporting the social development sector, the evaluation team suggests that greater understanding of their needs and interests as they identify them, the affirmation of innovation approaches already undertaken within the sector, as well as sufficient demonstration of success of any proposed

alternative approaches are prerequisites to uptake and diffusion within the sector. Further, some social sector organizations are large, and even when an approach is demonstrated as successful, given the nature of organizations, change and the adoption of new approaches do not happen quickly or easily. More openness and dialogue on how innovation approaches can be applied, particularly through a focus on specific issues could yield more favorable responses from the non-profit community.

Acknowledging the added value as well as limitations of application of private sector approaches through private sector and non-profit partnerships: The positives of bringing private sector approaches to the non-profit sector include the infusion of new ideas and new ways of working. The evaluation reveals significant challenges with the application of private sector approaches and private-NGO partnerships that warrant consideration for future programming. Some of the projects revealed issues of cultural disconnect, language and communication problems between the different organizations. In the development context, issues of pace and duration of activities, absorptive capacity, and contextual limitations are understood by NGOs, but difficult to explain to a private sector organization, and difficult for a private sector organization to understand. Private sector approaches also seem to require significant money outlays, and social sector organizations may not be clear on the value for money of such outlays. Indeed, given contextual challenges to implementing an idea or approach developed by a private sector organization, and given that knowledge may not transfer to these contexts, cost effectiveness becomes an issue.

VII:C Recommendations on Merging With Existing Initiatives

One of the questions that were posed to the evaluation team was on the usefulness of and approaches to merging innovation with existing sectoral programs and initiatives versus continuing to support stand-alone work on innovation. We recommend that the Foundation continue to focus on garnering experience in innovation merged with existing work. This is for several reasons—where the Foundation is already contributing to a field, it is better positioned to identify partners with leveraging power and to encourage risk taking, innovation, and then diffusion, influencing, integrating and even scaling up. It is more in touch with the context and already better informed about what types of innovations are needed and what will work and what will not. Innovation would not be loosely undertaken; instead it would be strategically applied and explored. Capacity building to innovate would be integrated with capacity to undertake effective

social development work, and the role and added value of innovation would be clearer. Such integration would therefore help achieve the goals on promoting innovation as well as the goals of that field. The innovation work would be embedded and part of a larger continuum of efforts of field building and contribute to impact.

The stand-alone work should focus on learning from that practical experience, as mentioned above. The team also recommends that any stand alone work on innovation, which might focus on awareness building and learning should be targeted at both those providers of innovation as well as those who could use innovation in their work, and with a better spread of organizations around the world, not skewed toward the U.S.

VII:D Considerations to Increase Social Impact Potential

The potential of any innovative process, product, or service to have social impact is closely linked to how well it can be applied, integrated, diffused and scaled up. The literature points to the factors that affect diffusion. The evaluation also shows that getting from design or idea to mass implementation is contextual. Innovations that fit more easily into a context are more likely to be diffused. Fit can include factors such as availability and ease of access to raw materials for manufacture, capacity and ability to scale up, but also, an innovation that is less likely to require significant behavior change is more likely to be adopted. Such factors raise the question—what innovations can truly be used in a range of settings? What contextual realities might drive and inhibit greater social impact of an innovation? Foundation support to innovation could provide insights to these questions, and as stated above, merging with existing initiatives would increase the social impact of a given innovation.

VII:E Considerations on Risks and Evaluation

As this evaluation finds, risk taking in innovation must be defined differently than in other aspects of social development. In innovation, risks are different because the value is placed on trying, failing, and trying again. One hundred innovations are likely to give very different results than one hundred projects focused on say, education or agricultural productivity. The Foundation has focused on building a practice of innovation in the social sector, but that requires also promoting and internalizing within the Foundation a different understanding and tolerance for failure. Building a practice of innovation requires:

Different thinking about capacity development: Organizations that are experienced at service delivery, program oversight, and project management might not have a culture of trial and error. They are incentivized to achieve efficiency and outputs, and the practice of innovation requires different incentives. Foundation support for building capacity thus needs to take such organizational cultural realities and ways of working into account.

Differences in accountability: Both the Foundation and organizations desiring to build a practice of innovation have to weigh accountability needs in a different way when considering innovation. Again, if the Foundation support is aimed at building innovation practice internally and with other partners, accountability must be approached using different metrics. Process metrics that indicate thoughtful trial and error, integrating and diffusion activities, and engagement with the poor and vulnerable might be more appropriate to indicate to stakeholders that innovation is being practiced with care and rigor, and with social impact in mind.

Different evaluation approaches: Evaluating a product, process, or service for social impact and innovation (or both) is possible using conventional measures and approaches. However, evaluating innovation practices, or the ability to innovate and to sustain innovation, or the ability to diffuse and scale innovations requires different metrics and approaches. The challenge with using conventional approaches is that it might inadvertently send a message that innovation is not useful or valuable, since the risk levels are so much higher. Therefore, an evaluation of innovation that only focuses on whether an actual innovation had impact or not might have the unintended consequence of stifling innovative practice. Evaluations must therefore look at the process of innovation to ensure that it was thoughtful and appropriate as well as the actual innovations.

VIII: Conclusions

The Accelerating Innovation for Development Initiative was modestly successful at contributing to a positive trend toward greater use of systematic approaches to spur innovation in addressing large-scale social development problems. It has shown examples where innovation, and building capacity to innovate, can make a difference at the small scale. It has, as yet, not shown how innovative thinking and practice can be embedded and institutionalized, nor demonstrated at significant enough scale, why and how innovation can add value to the social sector. Both are needed to truly spur greater innovation in addressing social needs for the poor and vulnerable and offer an opportunity for the Rockefeller Foundation to consider in its future work on innovation.

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Annex 1

Terms of Reference and Scope of Work

The Final Evaluation of the Rockefeller Foundation's Initiative on Accelerating Innovation for Development
July 2011

1 Introduction

This document sets out the Scope of Work and Terms of Reference for the Final Evaluation of the Rockefeller Foundation's Initiative on Accelerating Innovation for Development. The Evaluation covers the grant making and non-grant work of the Initiative from 2007-2009 on open source, user-centered design and user-led innovation. The Evaluation will be conducted during the period July 2011 – February 2012 by an independent Evaluation Team, while the grant will extend through April 30, 2012 to allow additional time for reporting.

2 Background Context for the Evaluation

The Rockefeller Foundation (RF) seeks **to help poor and vulnerable people benefit from more equitable economic growth, and increased resilience whereby individuals, communities and systems to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of changes, even catastrophic incidents.**

Working towards that end through a series of time bound global and regional Initiatives, the Foundation builds capacity, fosters networks and partnerships, influences policies and public discourse, nurtures innovation and promotes excellence, accountability, social responsibility and good governance.

In 2007, the RF Board of Trustees approved the Accelerating Innovation for Development Initiative with a budget of up to \$16.5 Million.

The Aim of the Initiative was to: 1) identify and demonstrate that open and user-driven innovation models are effective and efficient innovation processes for the needs of the poor, and 2) to significantly increase the application of these models to the needs of the poor.

In laying the groundwork for the Initiative, RF found that many of the organizations and institutions that work on the problems of the poor had not yet had the opportunity to explore the use of these models of innovation. They hypothesized that, if successful, this Initiative would transform the process of innovation and unlock innovation for the needs of poor and vulnerable people. The main thesis was that models that privilege the ideas of the “crowd” and the input of users in the innovation process from the very beginning, and extend this input all the way to market, would result in significant advances in the developing world.

The intended Outcomes of the Initiative are:

1. **Innovative Tools, Techniques and Practices:** For-profit and not-for-profit organizations increase the use of open sourcing innovation models as a tool to address the challenges faced by the poor.
2. **Increased capacity:** Not-for-profit organizations have new skills and abilities in utilizing open and user-driven innovations models to address challenges faced by the poor.
3. **Networks and scaling up:** Not-for-profit and for-profit organizations recognize the need and have created a network of interested parties focused on furthering open and user-generated driven innovation tools.

The Initiative aimed to catalyze greater experimentation and use of open and user-driven innovation models to generate innovations (products, services, behaviors) that are valuable for poor and vulnerable people. The Initiative experimented and tested open and user-driven models of innovation with organizations that work on development problems with the aim of demonstrating the utility of these models for development and identifying the types of problems that may benefit from different models. Innovation models included – Open Innovation (Crowdsourcing), Collaborative Competitions, User/Customer-Centered Innovation, and User-Generated or User-driven Innovation.

It tested models of innovation considered to have the highest potential to lead to valuable impact for users and customers, including crowd-sourcing, user-led innovation and user-centered design thinking.

3 Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The purposes of the Evaluation of the Innovation Initiative are:

1. Learning from the Innovation Initiative work to inform other Foundation Initiatives, the RF enabling environment work and the work of RF grantees, and partners.
2. Accountability to the RF President and Board of Trustees for the funds spent under the Innovation Initiative.
3. As a public good, contributing knowledge on approaches, methods and tools for innovation for development to the fields of philanthropy, development evaluation, and social innovation.
4. For use in the Foundation’s Centennial events focused on “Innovation for the Next 100 Years.”

The Objectives of the Evaluation are:

1. **To assess the relevance and rationale** of the Initiative to the field of innovation for development, to the needs of key stakeholders, and to the Strategy and Mission of the Foundation.
2. **To assess the effectiveness** of the Initiative in delivering its outputs and achieving its outcomes. This includes an assessment of:
 - » The quality and quantity of the outputs of the Initiative in relation to the desired outcomes of the Initiative;
 - » Its achievements, challenges and lessons; and
 - » What worked, what did not and why?
3. **To assess the cost effectiveness and efficiency** of the Initiative in using its resources (human and financial) wisely in achieving its outputs and outcomes.

4. **To assess the leadership of the Initiative** in providing thought leadership in the Foundation and with its technical and donor partners, and grantees, in the field of innovation for development.
5. **To assess the sustainability and scaling up** of the work of the Initiative beyond the support of the Foundation.
6. **To make recommendations to the Foundation** on the implications of the Innovation Initiative’s achievements, challenges and lessons for the strategy and work of the Foundation in the area of innovation for development. This could include lessons for specific fields of work (urban, health, climate, etc.) as well as lessons for Initiatives and grantees that aspire to use innovation to achieve development outcomes.
7. **To highlight the knowledge contributions and value added** of the Initiative as a public good to the field of innovation for development, philanthropy and development evaluation. This includes highlighting conceptual advancements, frameworks, approaches, methods and tools for innovation and evaluation.

4 Audiences for the Evaluation

The primary audiences for the Innovation Initiative Evaluation are the RF Board of Trustees, Executive Team, the Innovation Initiative Team and the Initiative Management Team. Primary audiences are expected to act on the results and recommendations of the Evaluation to make improvements in the implementation of innovation in the Foundation and with its grantees. Secondary audiences are the Innovation grantees, partners and other funders in the field of innovation for development.

5 Scope of the Evaluation

The scope of the Innovation Initiative Evaluation includes all activities that contributed to the Innovation outputs and outcomes, including:

- a. All RF Innovation Initiative grantmaking (Annex 3 lists all Innovation grants included in the scope of the Evaluation).
- b. The non-grant work of the Innovation Initiative in thought leadership, relationship-building in the field of innovation for development, including Bellagio and other events undertaken to advance thinking and influence thinking in innovation. Annex 5 sets out a preliminary list of non-grant activities and events considered to be important for this Evaluation.

6 Key Evaluation Questions – to be further developed with the Evaluation Team

The main evaluation questions to be covered in the Innovation Initiative Evaluation are:

1. Relevance

This includes an assessment of rationale, niche, role, comparative advantage and value added of the Initiative to the work of the Foundation and the field of innovation for development:

- a. The extent to which the Initiative is relevant to the field of innovation for development, the needs of key stakeholders and to the Foundation. This includes relevance to:
 - b. state of the art / leading edge thinking and trends in open source, user-centred design and user-led innovation;
 - c. the Mission of the Foundation, its Strategy and Initiatives;
 - d. the major stakeholders involved in the Initiative – grantees and partners.
- e. The extent to which the Initiative occupies a niche in the field of open source, user-centered design and user-led innovation.

- f. The comparative advantage of the Foundation in the area of innovation for development.
- g. The value added of the Initiative to the work of the Foundation and to the field of innovation for development.

2. Effectiveness

This category of questions includes an assessment of the results of the Initiative, including an analysis of the products and services planned and provided (outputs), what worked, what did not, and why. What supported success and what hindered success.

More specifically, the Evaluation will explore the extent to which:

- a. The Initiative demonstrated that open and user-driven innovation models are effective and efficient innovation processes for the needs of the poor.
- b. Open source, user-centered design and user-led innovation models or approaches have been “more generally utilized” (scaled-up, replicated, etc.) to solve the challenges faced by poor and vulnerable people.
- c. The quality and quantity of planned products and/or outputs associated with the grants awarded by the Foundation.
- d. The extent to which the outputs or products are used by target users.
- e. The achievement of objectives and outcomes specifically as they relate to:
 - i. Increasing numbers of for-profit and not-for-profit organizations using open source, user-centered design and user-led innovation to solve challenges affecting poor and vulnerable people;

- ii. Increasing the frequency of use of open source models in for-profit organizations to solve problems faced by poor and vulnerable people;
 - iii. Influencing funders to support open-source models to solve problems faced by poor and vulnerable people; and
 - iv. Influencing not-for-profit and development organizations to apply open source and user-driven innovation models to enhance their effectiveness and efficiency in their work.
- f. The Initiative provided innovative solutions to the challenges posed for poor and vulnerable people.
 - g. What factors supported success and achievements of the Initiative, and what factors hindered achievements of the Initiative?
 - h. The Initiative was sufficiently clear and appropriately communicated so as to be understood by a wide array of stakeholders in the RF.

3. Efficiency

This includes an assessment of the use of resources to obtain results, including the extent to which the Initiative used best management and governance practices and the extent to which those provided good value for money. The specific issues to be addressed are:

- a. To what extent was the Initiative effectively and efficiently planned strategically and operationally?
- b. Was the strategy of the Initiative properly guided and supported?
- c. To what extent did the Initiative provide effective management and leadership of the grantees and partner organizations (vision, management, leadership, mentoring, etc.)?
- d. To what extent was the grant portfolio efficiently managed in order to deliver the work of the Initiative – picking the

right grantees, assessing capacity, developing and supporting the delivery of results?

- e. To what extent were the resources of the Initiative used in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the intended outcomes?
- f. Has there been adequate oversight and risk management by RF staff?

4. Influence and impact

This refers to the extent to which the Initiative has affected the resilience and lives of poor and vulnerable people. Specifically, the Evaluation will comment on:

- a. What have been the effects of the Initiative on the resilience and lives of poor and vulnerable people?
- b. What have been the effects of the Initiative on the Foundation (overall and on its Initiatives) and its reputation?
- c. What have been the effects of the Initiative on the field of innovation for development?

5. Sustainability

This refers to the extent to which the Initiative developed both financial and/or institutional support to sustain / continue the work started by the Initiative. Specifically:

- a. To what extent did the exit strategy for the Initiative create a high probability of the main outcomes of the Initiative continuing beyond RF funding?
- b. To what extent are the efforts (outputs and outcomes) of the Initiative embedded in ongoing practices of people, institutions and communities?
- c. To what extent do expanded partnerships exist for scaling up the work, and sustaining the Initiative beyond the Foundation’s support?

- d. What have we learned from the projects in terms of design, selection and implementation of these ideas?
 - » What sorts of strategies did they employ to encourage replication and scaling up of innovations?
 - » What worked well and why, and what did not?
 - » What have we learned about identifying and supporting innovations?
 - » What have we learned about replication and scaling up from innovations?

7 Methodology

Mixed methods will be used to conduct the Innovation Initiative Evaluation with an emphasis on the use of case studies for selected grants in each category of innovation - open source, user-centered design and user-led innovation.

Data collection and analysis will use both qualitative and quantitative methods using field visits, interviews, surveys, grant portfolio review, desk studies and focus groups. Documentation will include multi-media where possible. This will be further developed in the work-planning phase of the Evaluation by the evaluators and the Evaluation Office in consultation with the Innovation Team.

Methods include:

1. An analytical review of the grants portfolio funded under the Innovation Initiative.
2. Field visits to selected grantees and partners.
3. Up to seven in-depth case studies of selected grantees including – the Rural Innovations Network (new name – Villgro Innovations Foundation), the GlobalGiving Foundation, ETC Foundation, IDEO, Ashoka, Winterhouse, and Innocentive (phase 2). Annex 4 contains details about the grants to these institutions and the rationale for their selection for the case studies.
4. A survey of all grantees to ensure broad coverage in addition to case studies.

5. Stakeholder interviews with
 - » Innovation leaders, policy makers and practitioners in developing countries and globally.
 - » Partner organizations and innovation funders regionally and globally.
 - » RF staff in Asia, Africa, New York, including the President, VPFI, VPSE, COO, all Innovation Team members (present and past) and other relevant Initiative and Operations staff.
6. Desk Review of documents – including grant documentation, trip reports, workplans, Bellagio reports, conference reports, financial reporting, budgets, monitoring reports, etc.

With respect to the quality of Evaluation work, the Foundation requires the Evaluation Team to adhere to the OECD DAC Evaluation standards.¹

A small Advisory Committee of three experts in innovation, case study methods and evaluation will be used in the Evaluation to provide specialized innovation expertise and to add value to the Foundation’s knowledge of innovation for development.

8 Qualifications and Scope of Work of Lead Evaluator

A Lead Evaluator will be recruited to manage and oversee the implementation of the Evaluation, to hire case study evaluators as team members, and to synthesize and report on the overall Evaluation and case studies. The Lead Evaluator will be a senior evaluator with significant experience in development in Asia and Africa (preferably based in Asia or Africa) and with knowledge of the field of innovation for development.

A team of three consultants will take primary responsibility for the evaluation. The team will include the Lead Evaluator, a development media specialist and a senior qualitative evaluator. They will conduct site visits to projects pertaining to the seven case studies mentioned above, and in addition, will conduct interviews with project staff, grantee staff and RF Foundation staff (current and past) engaged in the Innovation Initiative. The development media specialist will use

1. OECD DAC Quality Evaluation Standards
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/62/36596604.pdf>

visual anthropology approaches with video and photo in order to provide a richer data set. Qualitative methods including in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, as well as ranking approaches will also be used. Annexes 6-9 contain the TORs and specific tasks and responsibilities for the three consultants.

A small Advisory Committee of 2-3 experts (one-two experts in innovation and one expert in case study methods) will be used in the Evaluation to provide specialized innovation expertise and to add value to the Foundation's knowledge of innovation for development. The TORs for the Advisory Committee are also attached (Annex 9).

The Lead Evaluator will report to the Managing Director, RF Evaluation.

9 Outputs of the Evaluation

1. A draft and final Workplan, containing the methodology and evaluation matrix, and a team of evaluators and case studies specialists.
2. A set of up to seven individual Case Studies representing the three categories of open source, user-centered design and user-led innovation.
3. A set of multi-media products illustrating the lessons from the case studies, suitable for use in the RF Centennial events.
4. A synthesis Evaluation Report providing an overview of the Evaluation and Case Studies, and with Annexes containing the Evaluation methods and instruments and any other public good products that would be useful to share with the evaluation and innovation communities.
5. An Executive Summary and set of summary slides suitable for presentation to the RF Executive Team and Board of Trustees.

10 Institutional Arrangements

The Tides Center will receive the grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and be responsible for all administrative and contractual arrangements, as well as have overall responsibility for and ownership of the project. The three consultants

— a Team Leader, a Senior Qualitative Evaluator, and a Development Media Specialist — will all be contracted by the Tides Center directly.

The Team Leader will work closely with the Advisory Committee, the team of consultants and the RF Evaluation and Innovation Teams to coordinate and oversee the design and execution of the evaluation.

11 Roles and Responsibilities in the Evaluation Process

The Evaluation is commissioned by the Executive Team of the Rockefeller Foundation and managed by the Evaluation Office in conjunction with the Lead Evaluator. The roles and responsibilities of the Evaluation Grantee and the Foundation in the Evaluation are as follows:

The Evaluation Grantee will be responsible for:

- » Engaging qualified evaluators to carry out the Evaluation.
- » Developing a detailed work plan and methodology that employs appropriate progressive evaluation methods.
- » Conducting the Evaluation in a way that enables capacity development with key participants in the Evaluation, aimed at facilitating learning about the evaluation of innovation.
- » Delivering the Evaluation products according to the agreed workplan and to a level of quality acceptable to the Rockefeller Foundation.
- » Managing the administrative and logistical requirements of the Evaluation, including travel, field visits and stakeholder interviews. The Foundation will assist with logistics where possible.
- » Providing direction to the Tides Centre for the administration of the grant funds according to the agreed workplan and budget.
- » Presenting and discussing the findings of the Evaluation with the Evaluation Office and the Innovation teams, and if requested, the Executive Team of the Foundation.

The Tides Centre will:

- » Vet and select consultants (may be recommended by the funding partner)
- » Execute Agreement(s) for Services with contractors
- » Manage payments to contractors based on timely submission of deliverables
- » Collect reports from contractors and provide narrative and financial reports to funder.
- » Administer and provide grant oversight and ensure timelines and goals are met
- » Hold responsibility for fulfillment of grant purposes.

The Evaluation Office of the Foundation is responsible for working with M&E grantees to ensure that M&E approaches are appropriate to the work of the Foundation, aligned with best practices in development evaluation, and that M&E products meet accepted evaluation standards, including:

- » Working collaboratively with the Evaluation Grantee in the design of the Evaluation to ensure the input of the Foundation managers in the design, and a methodology appropriate for the Foundation and the specific Evaluation.
- » Ensuring a common electronic repository of relevant information that is accessible by the Evaluation Team, and that responds to the requests of the Evaluation Team for information essential to the Evaluation.
- » Facilitating interviews and other data collection of the Evaluation Team in the Foundation's New York Office.
- » Reviewing draft M&E products provided by the grantee (work-plans, evaluation methods, draft reports, briefings, etc.) and signing off on the quality of these evaluation products.
- » Managing the Advisory Committee for the Evaluation and facilitating a dialogue with the Advisors and RF managers as needed.
- » Reporting the results of the Innovation Initiative Evaluation to the Foundation's Executive Team and to the Board of Trustees. The Grantee may be requested to participate in this reporting.

The RF Innovation manager will be responsible for:

- » Providing ongoing guidance and information to the Evaluation Grantee in relation to the work of the Innovation Initiative.
- » Providing guidance on appropriate scheduling of field visit itineraries, and providing letters of introduction for the Evaluation Team.
- » Responding to the requests of the Evaluation Team for additional information (joint responsibility with the Evaluation Office depending on where the information is retained).
- » Providing feedback on draft evaluation reports and other evaluation products with regard to factual accuracy.
- » Providing feedback to the Managing Director of Evaluation with respect to the quality and usefulness of the Evaluation grantee's work.
- » Receiving and considering the recommendations of the Evaluation, and reporting on the actions proposed to take into account the recommendations of the Evaluation.
- » Communicating and discussing the key findings of the Evaluation with grantees and partners.

12 Reporting

The Evaluation Grantee will report to the Managing Director for Evaluation.

13 Budget

The budget for the Evaluation is US 350,000 including the cost of undertaking and producing individual Case Studies and the overall Evaluation Report.

14 Timeframe

Activity	Month							
	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb
A. Inception								
1. Review documents								
2. Prepare evaluation matrix, case study methodology, story/video/photo documentation briefs								
3. Obtain feedback from Advisory Committee on 2.								
4. Prepare detailed methodology note with data collection instruments and protocols, including survey instruments								
5. Contact grantees to set up site visits and interviews								
B. Field Work								
1. Collect qualitative data in each project site								
2. Collect survey information								
3. Collect story/video/photo-based data								
C. Data Analysis and draft report writing								
1. Collate and analyze all data from the field								
2. Prepare a draft report for Advisory Committee to review								
3. Revise the draft and submit to RF								
4. Carry out all video editing and photo editing								
D. Final report and presentation to RF								
1. Revise the report based on feedback from RF								
2. Prepare a final draft for Advisory Committee to review, particularly case studies								
3. Finalize the video and support production design of report								
4. Submit the final report to RF								
5. Present the report to RF Executive Team, Innovation Team and the Evaluation Office								

Annex 2: List of Respondents

Interviewee	Title	Organization	Location
Grantee: GlobalGiving			
Christina Tang	Project Coordinator, Brown University Team	Rainwater for Humanity	Hong Kong
Eli Crumrine	Project Coordinator, Brown University Team	Rainwater for Humanity	Providence, RI
Dr. Sylas	Project Coordinator, India Team, Rainwater for Humanity; Professor of Environmental Sciences	Mahatma Gandhi University	Achinakom, Kuttanad, India
Dr. A.P. Thomas	Director of Environmental Sciences Department and adviser to projects	Mahatma Gandhi University	Achinakom, Kuttanad, India
Dr. Hari	Consultant to project; Professor of Civil Engineering	Mahatma Gandhi University	Achinakom, Kuttanad, India
Dr. John Mathew	Consultant to project; School of Environmental sciences	Mahatma Gandhi University	Achinakom, Kuttanad, India
Mr. Thangachen	Local Technician		Achinakom, Kuttanad, India
15 Village Committee Members and users of rainwater harvesting tank *		n/a	Achinakom, Kuttanad, India
John Hecklinger	Chief Program Officer	GlobalGiving	Washington, DC
Britt Lake	Director of Programs	GlobalGiving	Washington, DC
Chris Schultz	Senior Vice President	CDM	Denver, CO
Lisa Reinhold	Vice President Client Services	InnoCentive	Waltham, MA
Elly Madrigal	Program Operations Manager	InnoCentive	Waltham, MA
Anna Garwood	Executive Director	Green Empowerment	Portland, OR
Charlie Matlack	CEO & Co-Founder	PotaVida	Seattle, WA

Grantee: Ashoka Changemakers

Sushmita Ghosh	Founder and President Emeritus	Ashoka Changemakers	Calcutta, India
Joshua Middleman	Director, Opportunities and Partnerships	Ashoka Changemakers	Arlington, VA
Ben Wald	Executive Partner	Ashoka Changemakers	Arlington, VA
Tito Llantada	Managing Partner	Ashoka Changemakers	Arlington, VA
Emily Bosland	Program staff	Ashoka Changemakers	Arlington, VA
Hilmi Quraishi	Co-Founder & Director Social Initiatives	ZMQ Software Systems	Delhi, India
Subhi Quraishi	Co-Founder & CEO	ZMQ Software Systems	Delhi, India
Abhishek Bharadwaj	Founder President	Alternative Realities	Mumbai, India
Ziba Cramner	Vice President	Cone Inc. (formerly Nike)	Boston, MA
Deborah Bae	Program Officer	Robert Wood Johnson Foundation	Princeton, NJ
Nancy Barrant	Senior Adviser for Program Development	Robert Wood Johnson Foundation	Princeton, NJ
Lauren Moore	President	eBay Foundation	San Jose, CA
Kari L. Ruth	Interactive Media Strategist	Minnesota Community Foundation	Minneapolis, MN
Cynthia Coredo	Programs Manager	Boxgirls	Nairobi, Kenya
Alfred Aanjere (Priest)	Founder	Boxgirls	Nairobi, Kenya
Judy Musyoka	M&E Coordinator	Boxgirls	Nairobi, Kenya
Teenage girl (name withheld for child protection purposes)	Participant	Boxgirls	Nairobi, Kenya
Teenage girl (name withheld for child protection purposes)	Participant	Boxgirls	Nairobi, Kenya
Elizabeth Tatembo	Head Coach	Boxgirls	Nairobi, Kenya
4 Coaches *	Coaches	Boxgirls	Nairobi, Kenya
8 girls participating in Box Girls *	Participants	n/a	Nairobi, Kenya

Interviewee	Title	Organization	Location
10 parents *	Parents	n/a	Nairobi, Kenya
Katherine Lucey	Founder and CEO	Solar Sisters	Providence, RI
Evelyn Namara	Program Coordinator	Solar Sisters	Kampala, Uganda
Cissie (Family name TBC w Molly)	Entrepreneur	n/a	Kampala Uganda
Entrepreneur name TBC w Molly	Entrepreneur	n/a	Kampala Uganda
Grantee: IDEO			
Jocelyn Wyatt	Co-Lead and Executive Director	IDEO	Palo Alto, CA
Matt Townsend		IDEO	Palo Alto, CA
Dennis Boyle		IDEO	Palo Alto, CA
David Kaisal	Consultant	Independent	San Francisco, CA
Mariana Amatolu	Director, Designmatters	Art Center College of Design	Los Angeles, CA
Peter Eliassen	Vice President, Sales and Operations	VisionSpring	San Francisco, CA
Grantee: Winterhouse Institute			
Julie Lasky	Editor, Change Observer/Instructor in Design, School of Visual Arts	Winterhouse Institute	New York, NY
Bill Drentell	Founder and Partner	Winterhouse Institute	New Haven, CT
Rodrigo Canales	Assistant Professor	Yale School of Management	New Haven CT
Tony Sheldon	Executive Director, Program in Social Enterprise	Yale School of Management	New Haven, CT
Charlie Cannon	Associate Professor & Co-founder Innovation Studio	Rhode Island School of Design	New York, NY
Ric Grefé	Executive Director	AIGA, the professional association for design	New York, NY
Allan Chochinov	Partner and Editor in Chief, Core77; Chair, MFA Products of Design, School of Visual Arts	School of Visual Arts	New York, NY
Christopher Fabian	Innovation Specialist	UNICEF	New York, NY

EVALUATION REPORT: ACCELERATING INNOVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

Interviewee	Title	Organization	Location
Maggie Breslin	Senior Designer/Researcher	Mayo Clinic Center For Innovation (CFI)	Rochester, MN
Nick Larusso	Director	Mayo Clinic Center For Innovation (CFI)	Rochester, MN
Doug Wood	Director for Strategy & Policy	Mayo Clinic Center For Innovation (CFI)	Rochester, MN
Alison Verdoon	Design Researcher	Mayo Clinic Center For Innovation (CFI)	Rochester, MN
Cheryl Morgan	Team Member and Advisor, AL Innovation Engine; Director, Center for Architecture and Urban Studies	Auburn University	Auburn, AL
Matt Leavell	Project Director	Alabama Innovation Engine	Birmingham, AL
Karen Rogers	Local Advisor, AL Innovation Engine; CADC Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and External Affairs	Auburn University	Auburn, AL
Sheri Schumacher	Participant, Alabama Design Summit; Assoc. Professor of Architecture and Interior Architecture, Auburn Univ.	Auburn University	Auburn, AL
Steve Cox	Client, Alabama Design Summit; President,	International Expeditions	Birmingham, AL
Beth Stewart	Client, Alabama Design Summit; Executive Director	Cahaba River Society	Birmingham, AL
Dan Monroe	Participant, Alabama Design Summit; Artistic Director	Cayenne Creative	Birmingham, AL
Chris Oberholster	Executive Director, Alabama Chapter; Grant Application Sponsor	The Nature Conservancy	Birmingham, AL
Cindy Ragland	District Ranger	Oakmulgee District of the Talladega National Forest	Patne Lake, AL
Paul Johnson	Director	Alabama Aquatic Biodiversity Center	Marion, AL
Judy Martin	Director of Development	Judson College	Marion, AL
Community Leaders			Marion, AL
Walter Sansing	County Commissioner	Bibb County	Bibb County, AL
Nisa Miranda	Director, Univ. of Alabama Center for Economic Development; Team Member and Advisor, Ala. Innovation Engine		Tuscaloosa, AL
Andrew Freear	Director, Rural Studio; Professor, Auburn University		Hale County, AL

Grantee: Villgro

Paul Basil	Founder and CEO	Villgro	Chennai, India
4 Fellows incoming September 2011	Participants in Talent Development Program	Villgro	Chennai, India
Sucharita Kamath	Head, Innovation Ecosystem	Villgro	Chennai, India
Dr. S. Ramesh	Manager, Villgro Stores	Villgro	Gobe, Erode, Tamil Nadu, India
Suresh Shanmugam	Head, Innovative Products and Operations	Villgro Stores	Gobe, Erode, Tamil Nadu, India
Ashutosh Sinha	CEO, VIMPL	Villgro	Chennai, India
Mayank Jaiswal	Former Fellow, Villgro Talent Development Program	n/a	Philadelphia, PA
Saloni Malhotra	Founder and CEO	DesiCrew	Chennai, India
Svati Bhogle	Managing Director	Sustaintech India Private Ltd.	Bangalore, India
Dr. Xavier S'Doss	Managing Director	Nutre Plus Animal Feed Private Ltd. (SME)	Chennai, India
Basabjit Deshmukh	Managing Director	Sanjivan Organics Private Ltd. (SME)	Pondicherry, India
5 Village-Level Entrepreneurs *	Farmers	n/a	Gobe, Erode, Tamil Nadu, India
K.R. Sukumaran	Farmer/Village Level Entrepreneur	n/a	Erode, Tamil Nadu, India
Narayama Swamy	Farmer/Village Level Entrepreneur	n/a	Erode, Tamil Nadu, India
Nalamal & Gury Samy	Farmer/Village Level Entrepreneur	n/a	Erode, Tamil Nadu, India
B Anuradhe & B Admanabhan	Farmer/Village Level Entrepreneur	n/a	Erode, Tamil Nadu, India
18 end users/farmers of Villgro product *	Farmers	n/a	Gobe, Erode, Tamil Nadu, India

Grantee: ETC Foundation

Ann Waters-Bayer	Senior Adviser	ETC Foundation	Leusden, The Netherlands
Laurens van Veldhuizen	Project Coordinator	ETC Foundation	Leusden, The Netherlands
Chris Macoloo	Associate Vice President – Africa Region	World Neighbors	Nairobi, Kenya

Interviewee	Title	Organization	Location
Makonge Righa	Programme Officer – Africa Region	World Neighbors	Nairobi, Kenya
Queresh Noordin	Former Programme Officer – Africa Region	fmr. World Neighbors	Nairobi, Kenya
5 Local Steering Committee Members *	LISF Committee Members	n/a	Nyando District, Kisumu, Kenya
8 farmer innovators *	n/a	n/a	Nyando District, Kisumu, Kenya
Joe Ougo	n/a	n/a	Nyando District, Kisumu, Kenya
4 Local Steering Committee Members *	LISF Committee Members	n/a	Busia District, Kisumu, Kenya
Individual interviews with 7 farmer innovators and observation of products	n/a	n/a	Busia District, Kisumu, Kenya
Treazah Nganga	Program Officer and Coordinator for LISF	Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI)	Nairobi, Kenya
Violet Kirigua	Program Officer, Horticulture (Fmr Prolinna Coordinator)	Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI)	Nairobi, Kenya
Chair Dr. Bell D.N. Okello, Violet Kirigua, Treazah Nganga, Makonge Righa *	National Steering Committee	Organizations representing Prolinna: International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), KARI, and World Neighbors.	Nairobi, Kenya
Dr. Charles Walaga	Director	Environmental Alert	Kampala, Uganda
Moses Sekate	Project Coordinator	Environmental Alert	Kampala, Uganda
Chair Moses Sekate, Mwendya Augustine, Stella Grace Lutalo, Hellen Naluyima, John Kaganga, Deborah Kasule *	National Steering Committee	Organizations representing Prolinna: Uganda National Farmers Federation, PELUM Uganda, Environmental Alert, KEA, KULIKA Charitable Trust, Uganda Nat. Council for Science and Technology (UNCST). Kampala, Uganda	
4 CBO Funds Management Committee *	LISF Committee	Kikandwa Environmental Association (KEA)	Kikandwa, Mityana, Uganda
20 farmers *	Member	Kikandwa Environmental Association (KEA)	Kikandwa, Mityana, Uganda
Margaret Nabatanzi	Farmer Innovator/Member KEA	Kikandwa Environmental Association (KEA)	Kikandwa, Mityana, Uganda
Nakilembe Elese	Farmer Innovator/Member KEA	Kikandwa Environmental Association (KEA)	Kikandwa, Mityana, Uganda
John Kaganga	Director and Chair of LISF Committee	Kikandwa Environmental Association (KEA)	Kikandwa, Mityana, Uganda
5 CBO Funds Management Committee Members *	LISF Committee	Farmers Mesambe Environment Protection	Mubende, Uganda
10 farmers *	Member	Farmers Mesambe Environment Protection	Mubende, Uganda
2 interviews with farmer innovators and observation of products with 2 farmers	Member	Farmers Mesambe Environment Protection	Mubende, Uganda

Damalie Magala	Rural Sociologist	National Agriculture Research Organization (NARO) - Mukono	Kampala, Uganda
Winnie Nakyagaba	Research Officer	National Agriculture Research Organization (NARO) - Mukono	Kampala, Uganda
Non-Grantee Respondents			
Kippy Joseph	Associate Director	Rockefeller Foundation	New York, NY
Peter Madonia	Chief Operating Officer	Rockefeller Foundation	New York, NY
Heather Grady	Vice President Foundation Initiatives	Rockefeller Foundation	New York, NY
Zia Chowdhury	Vice President Strategy and Evaluation	Rockefeller Foundation	New York, NY
Maria Blair	Former Managing Director, Innovation Initiative	n/a	New York, NY
Antony Bugg Levine	Former Managing Director, Innovation Initiative	Rockefeller Foundation	New York, NY
Pamela Foster	Managing Director, Grants Management	Rockefeller Foundation	New York, NY
Ellen Taus	Chief Financial Officer	Rockefeller Foundation	New York, NY
Ashvin Dayal	Managing Director Asia	Rockefeller Foundation	Bangkok, Thailand
James Nyoro	Managing Director Africa	Rockefeller Foundation	Nairobi, Kenya
Larry Keeley	President	Doblin Incorporated/Monitor Group	Chicago, IL
Gary Natsume	Director of Design and Research	ECCO	New York, NY
Cynthia Smith	Curator of Socially Responsible Design	Cooper Hewitt Museum	New York, NY
Abby Sarmac	Program Officer	Lemelson Foundation	Portland, OR
Robert Fabricant	Creative Director	Frog Design	New York, NY
Heather Fleming	Chief Executive Officer	Catapult Design	San Francisco, CA
Renna Al-Yassini	Senior Designer	Tomorrow Partners	San Francisco, CA
Simon Tucker	Chief Executive Officer	Young Foundation	London, United Kingdom

Annex 3: Response Matrix

Evaluation Criteria I: *Relevance*

To assess the relevance, rationale, niche, role, comparative advantage and value added of the Initiative to the work of the Foundation and the field of innovation for development.

Key Question	Indicator/ Measure	Response
1. What was RF's analysis of the thinking and trends in innovation and trends in open-source, user-centered, and user-led innovation in 2007?	Quality of contextual analysis	Medium/poor: Evidence that there were gaps in innovation for development, and that these three models gaining interest but needed more support. However, analysis of social sector, how it innovates, how innovation can help, and how innovation is integrated and scaled up was missing. Analysis of challenges to diffusion in varied contextual settings was missing. Outcomes to promote models before knowing if they worked in the social sector and without above analysis was premature.
2. At that time, what was the evidence that such models had the potential to contribute to social development issues?	Quality of conceptual analysis	Medium/Poor: No real concrete evidence in documentation that these models would contribute to social development, however, some hypotheses were formed based on application in other sectors on the potential.
3. What were the gaps in use and application of these models in social development?	Evidence of potential niche	Strong: Clear gaps in use and application of these models in social development. Evidence that there was interest in the three models, and a need for support and resources to understand application and use.
4. How did the Initiative fit in at the time with the mission of the Foundation, its strategy and other Initiatives? How does it continue to fit today?	Evidence of fit of Initiative with RF objectives then and now	Medium: Clear fit with strategy and other Initiatives, and clear potential for RF to contribute to innovation thinking. However, linkages with other initiatives, cross learning, and multiplier effect (innovation in other sectors for greater impact in those sectors) poor.
5. Looking back, were the three models (open source, user-centered and user-led innovations) the models which both had the most potential to address social development issues and also where there were gaps in knowledge at the time? Were there other models that could have been considered and if so, were they rejected for appropriate reasons?	Quality of conceptual analysis	Unclear: Documentation and interviews did not reveal clear criteria for rating these models over others, nor were other models identified. More importantly, the application of these models were limited to certain grantees approaches to these models. The evaluation team notes that there are many different ways of applying each of these models, and different applications would have yielded different learning and results.

Key Question	Indicator/ Measure	Response
<p>6. To what extent has the Initiative occupied a niche in the field of open source, user-centered design and user-led innovation? How did factors such as timing of the Initiative, work undertaken by other players and funders in this field, and evolution in thinking about the field of social change interact with the work under the Initiative? To what extent did this interplay effect positively or negatively the niche and role of the Initiative in this field?</p>	<p>Quality of contribution to the field of social innovation</p>	<p>Medium: Strong niche in user-centered design, less strong in open source and weaker in user-led. Timing of the Initiative appropriate. Coordination to an extent with other players in the field such as Skoll Foundation, Kellogg Foundation, Lemelson Foundation, and others. Evolution in the field tracked to an extent, and used to make decisions.</p>
<p>7. What is perceived and demonstrated as the comparative advantage and value-added of this Initiative to the thinking in the field of social development and in the field of innovation for social development?</p>	<p>Quality of added value and unique contribution through the strategies, results and outcomes of the Initiative</p>	<p>Strong/Medium: Many evaluation respondents spoke positively about RF's contribution. It helped pushed design thinking for social impact as a field. Grantees have contributed their learnings to their own work, and to a lesser extent, to the learning about the model. However, the Initiative as whole did not focus enough on cross learning and sharing of insights on application and use of the three models, and on building capacity and integrating innovation in practice in the social sector.</p>
<p>8. What has it contributed to the Foundation's strategy and impact, as well as overall mission?</p>	<p>Quality of actual contribution to organizational objectives</p>	<p>Unclear: Evidence of social impact is limited partly because projects that have potential for impact are in early stages of development, and others have not worked as well.</p>

Evaluation Criteria II:

To assess the effectiveness of the Initiative in delivering its outputs and achieving its outcomes.

Key Question	Indicator/ Measure	Response
To what extent did the grants awarded by the Foundation successfully achieve their planned outputs and projects?	Quality and quantity of planned products and/or outputs from grants	Strong: Six case studies demonstrate achievement of outputs and projects. There are some delays with deliverables, however, these delays are justifiable due to contextual factors.
To what extent did the non-grant support deliver products, processes or services that were useful, and as per plan?	Quality and quantity of planned products and/or outputs through non-grant support	Medium/poor: Staff turnover resulted in poor thought partnership and weaknesses in shaping and crafting of Initiative. Communications plan not implemented due to poor results, but could have been transformed to a strategy on learning on innovation application.
What factors supported success and achievements of the Initiative, and what factors hindered achievements of the Initiative?	Initiative and non-initiative contributors to success	Factors that supported this contribution include the timeliness of the Initiative in the context of social innovation, and hard work and efforts undertaken by grantees. At the same time, the Foundation's contribution could have been more impactful had the Initiative been based on a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the need for innovation in the social sector, and how the social sector innovates. It could also have been designed more purposefully to include grants that built more widely on ongoing innovations efforts among non-profit and social sector agencies.
To what extent have these models generated more effective (more robust, more powerful, more innovative, more useful, more appropriate to needs) solutions to challenges faced by poor people?	Quantity and Quality of social development solutions	Medium: Some solutions generated have been useful in a small number of communities to poor people. Not all solutions have been implemented. There is limited diffusion, but this may change in coming years.
To what extent have these processes/products/services been "more generally utilized" by a wide range of players to solve the challenges faced by poor and vulnerable people?	Quantity and Quality of uptake in the social development sector	Poor: Diffusion of innovative processes/products/services generated through the Initiative is limited so far.
To what extent have these innovation models been effective for implementing organizations that undertake projects aimed at the needs of vulnerable and poor people?	Usefulness to social development organizations	Unclear: Diffusion through the Initiative has been limited to a few social sector organizations. These organizations are in early stages of using and applying these models.
To what extent have these innovation models and the concepts that drive them been applied or taken up by social development players/innovation agencies/other interested agencies?	Quantity and Quality of uptake in the social innovation arena	Mixed: Grantees and partners have developed relationships and partnerships, many of which will be sustained. However, broader diffusion is still limited.

Evaluation Criteria III:

To assess the cost effectiveness and efficiency of the Initiative in using its resources (human and financial) wisely in achieving its outputs and outcomes.

Key Question	Indicator/ Measure	Response
To what extent was the Initiative effectively and efficiently planned strategically and operationally? Was the strategy of the Initiative properly guided and supported?	Quality of planning and allocation of resources	Poor: Staff turnover was a significant factor that affected planning and operationalization. Grantee selection as well as grantee support was affected. Mid course corrections were taken, however, greater focus and conceptual support would have strengthened the achievement of outcomes and contributed to learning
Was the Initiative clear and appropriately communicated so as to be understood by a wide array of stakeholders in the foundation? Did stakeholders provide the right amount of support and oversight? To what extent did the Initiative provide effective management and leadership of the grantees and partner organizations (vision, management, leadership, mentoring, etc.)? To what extent was the grant portfolio efficiently managed in order to deliver the work of the Initiative – picking the right grantees, assessing capacity, developing and supporting the delivery of results? To what extent were the resources of the Initiative used in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the intended outcomes?	Quality of management and oversight of the Initiative	Poor: Interviews with stakeholders revealed weak understanding and ownership of the Initiative. Grantees did not know about the overall Initiative. See synthesis report for more details.
Has there been adequate oversight and risk management by RF staff?	Quality of management and oversight of the Initiative	Poor/Medium: Risks were identified in the Initiative Approval document, and to a certain extent, some were monitored. Others were not. There was little appreciation for a major risk, which was that the models might not be useful in meeting the needs of poor and vulnerable people.

Evaluation Criteria IV:

To assess the influence of the Initiative, specifically in providing thought leadership in the field of innovation for development.

Key Question	Indicator/ Measure	Response
Are these increasing numbers of for-profit and not-for-profit organizations using open source, user-centered design and user-led innovation to solve challenges affecting poor and vulnerable people?	Quality and quantity of uptake of three innovation models	Yes , but in very limited numbers: Uptake is in very early stages among a small number of social sector organizations.
Is there greater use of open source/ user-driven models in for-profit organizations to solve problems faced by poor and vulnerable people?	Quality and quantity of uptake of innovation models	Yes , but in very limited numbers: Some positive movement among organizations to create business models and services that use these models.
Are funders increasingly supporting open-source/user-driven models to solve problems faced by poor and vulnerable people?	Quality and quantity of uptake of innovation models	Yes , to an extent: Many foundations and donors are using open source and design thinking to generate processes and products.
Is there a positive change among not-for-profit and development organizations in applying open source and user-driven innovation models to enhance their effectiveness and efficiency in their work?	Quality and quantity of uptake of innovation models	Unclear/not enough evidence: Uptake is in very early stages among a small number of social sector organizations.

Evaluation Criteria V:

To assess the sustainability and scaling up of the work of the Initiative beyond the support of the Foundation.

Key Question	Indicator/ Measure	Response
What have been the effects of the Initiative, if any, on the resilience and lives of poor and vulnerable people? To what extent are the outputs or products still used by target users and to what extent have they brought about positive effects on their lives?	Quality and quantity of lasting change in end users/beneficiaries	None: The Initiative was not meant to have social impact per se, but was more focused on field building. Those outputs and products generated through the Initiative are either in early stages of production/distribution/implementation or have been distributed very recently. Thus, positive economic or social impact is limited to a few families and households.
To what extent did the strategy for the Initiative create a high probability of the main outcomes of the Initiative continuing beyond Rockefeller Foundation funding?	Quality of strategy and actions to build sustainability	Medium: Since outcomes have not been achieved, sustainability is likely to be limited. User-centered design thinking will be likely sustained as a movement, and the use of challenges and collaborative competitions will continue. The Initiative has made a modest positive contribution to this trend.
To what extent are the efforts (outputs and outcomes) of the Initiative embedded in ongoing practices of people, institutions and communities?	Quality and quantity of lasting change in targeted institutions	Medium: The Initiative has supported the formation of projects and partnerships that are likely to continue. These partnerships have embedded practices and ways of working that were developed and introduced through the Initiative.
To what extent do expanded partnerships exist for scaling up the work, and sustaining the Initiative beyond the Foundation's support?	Quality and quantity of sustained collaborations/networks	Medium: The Initiative has supported the formation of projects and partnerships that are likely to continue. These partnerships may lead to further diffusion and scaling up, but it is too early to tell if this is likely.

